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China does not have a systematic and holistic framework for evaluating environmental 
policy and programs. The absence of effective evaluations of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Treatment (CET) policy, which focused on comprehensively addressing rural 
waste management and pollution control in rural areas, is an example of the lack of a 
systematic and holistic policy evaluation framework in China. Such a framework is needed 
given the range of problems faced and initiatives undertaken, and this is the gap this study 
aims to address. 
Based on a review of the policy evaluation framework literature, McConnell’s policy 
evaluation framework was identified as a potential framework for application in the 
Chinese context. However, this framework has not been thoroughly tested. An integrated 
approach was taken to explore and test McConnell’s framework in the Chinese context. 
This approach included three main and complementary methodologies: adaptive learning, 
case studies, and triangulation. A variety of qualitative and quantitative methods were used 
to examine  four programs implementing the CET policy in rural China.  
McConnell’s framework was first evaluated from a theoretical point of view to lay the 
foundation for further testing and potential revision. A guideline for measuring degrees of 
success/failure of the criteria across three realms (process, program, and politics) was 
developed. McConnell’s framework was then tested, and improved in light of emergent 
knowledge, against the CET environmental policy programs, in two phases each involving 
two case applications.  
Findings first showed that McConnell’s framework and most of its criteria are applicable in 
the Chinese context, subject to some relatively minor but important modifications. Second, 
there were various levels of policy success and failure between cases and across realms. 
ii 
Third, the evaluation results were compared, showing that delegating particular areas of 
authority to local governments and communities, and delegating relevant decision-making 
power to more actors, could help to improve the effectiveness of a policy. Failures in policy 
shaping do not necessarily result in policy implementation failure, and policy formulation 
and implementation are related to the political impact of a policy. Fourth, there are multiple 
and complex interactions between individual behaviour, institutional design, and prevailing 
societal values which contributed to different degrees of policy failure.  
This research indicates that the amended McConnell framework and the methods developed 
in this research are practical and usable for evaluating environmental policy in the Chinese 
political context. Especially at a higher policy level, use of the amended McConnell 
framework can provide a holistic view of the policy process for the identification of bigger 
picture, more strategic, questions. The amended framework can also provide a meaningful 
complement to the existing CET policy evaluation method. This research further deepens the 
understanding of policy success and failure, thus providing an additional reference point for 
future research. 
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1.1 Rural pollution and rural waste management policy in China 
The environment in rural areas1 of China is generally poorer than that in urban areas in 
terms of public facility provision and environmental quality (The State Council, 2014a). The 
rural environment faces numerous kinds of pollution2, including point source pollution, non-
point source pollution, industrial pollution, and pollution transferring from city to rural areas 
(Li, 2008; Wong, 2014). In the past few years, rural waste3 disposal and its side effects have 
been deemed as one of the major causes of rural environment pollution. The main rural 
waste pollution sources include domestic waste4, domestic wastewater5, animal faeces, 
agricultural film6, agrichemical packages, and straw (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 
2014; Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, 2015).  
In China, the rural population generates a huge amount of domestic waste every year, with 
most of it untreated (N. Wang, 2014). As of 2012, only around one-quarter of the 571 
thousand villages in China had domestic waste collection facilities. Most domestic waste was 
 
1 There is no nationally recognized definition of a ‘rural area’ in China and the term is commonly 
misused (Liu, 2005). The National People's Congress (2014) defines rural areas as residual areas not 
included in the urban definition. The rural area in China accounts for a large proportion of land and 
contains roughly 0.6 billion people (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015c). 
2 Pollution refers to “the presence of substances and heat in environmental media (air, water, land) 
whose nature, location, or quantity produces undesirable environmental effects” (OECD, 2003a).  
3 Waste refers to “materials that are not prime products (that is, products produced for the market) 
for which the generator has no further use in terms of his/her own purposes of production, 
transformation or consumption, and which he/she wants to dispose of” (OECD, 2003b).  
4 Domestic waste in rural China refers to a complex set of solid wastes generated in the residential 
environment and daily life, including: kitchen garbage and other organic waste; recyclable waste such 
as paper, metal, glass, fabric; non-recyclable waste such as masonry, and ash; hazardous waste such 
as pesticide containers, small electronic products, oil paint, modulator tubes, daily chemical products, 
and expired drugs (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012a). 
5 Domestic wastewater in rural China refers to the sewage produced by rural residents, mainly from 
flushing toilets, cooking, laundry, bathing, and cleaning (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012b). 
6 Agricultural film refers to the plastic surface covering film and shed film used in agricultural 
production (Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs, 2019). The main component of agricultural 
plastic film is polyethylene, which “continue to break down over decades or even centuries. Most do 
not fully degrade, but split into tiny fragments” (Royal Society Te Apa¯rangi, 2019). When the film is 
left on farmland, it breaks up into smaller fragments which are blown around by the wind, polluting 





discarded, which caused severe pollution to water, soil, air, and human settlement 
environment (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012e).  
The indiscriminate discharging of untreated sewage in rural areas causes widespread water 
pollution. It was estimated that in 2011 rural areas daily discharged around 23 million tons 
of domestic wastewater, 5.3 million tons of BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand), 8.6 million 
tons of COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand), 960 thousand tons of nitrogen, and 140 thousand 
tons of phosphorus (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012c). Until 2011, more than 90 
percent of the villages had no sewage collection and treatment systems, causing serious 
pollution of surface water and groundwater Ministry of Ecology and Environment (2012c).  
The livestock and poultry industry generated 243 million tons of animal faeces and 163 
million tons of urine in 2007, as stated in the First National Census of Pollution Sources  
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Animal faeces caused severe water pollution and the 
situation was rapidly deteriorating. Around one-tenth of large-scale farms in the eastern 
coastal regions, with high population density and multiple river systems, were less than 50 
meters from a local water source. A Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) 
investigation in 23 provinces across China in 2012 found that 90 percent of large-scale farms 
did not conduct the required Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) and 60 percent lacked 
necessary pollution control measures (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012d).  
Agricultural film usage increased dramatically between 2006 and 2014 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2015b). It is estimated that in 2015, China's total use of agricultural film reached 
more than 2.6 million tons, but the recycling rate was less than 2/3 (Ministry of Agricultural 
and Rural Affairs, 2017). According to Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs data from 210 
national agricultural film monitoring sites, the amount of film residue in northwest China, 
the area with the biggest use of agricultural films, was more than 36 kg/ha, and the 
maximum was 138 kg/ha (Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs, 2019). In order to 
protect and improve the agricultural ecological environment, China urgently needs to 
establish a sound supervision and management system for agricultural film. 
There has been no detailed assessment of agrichemical packaging usage in China, but it can 
be estimated from agricultural pesticide usage. From 2006 to 2014, the usage of agricultural 
pesticides significantly increased, and thus agrichemical packaging (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2015a). It was estimated that 10 billion agrichemical containers were generated 





significant sources of rural water and soil pollution (Xia, 2015). In response to this problem, 
the government proposed the ‘Agrichemical Packages Recycling Regulation (interim)’ 
(Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2015).  
Straw burning is another pollution source - it generates much fine particulate matter into 
the air. In 2015, approximately 900 million tons of straw were produced and 80 million tons 
of straw residuals turned into pollutants (Shang, 2015). Because of the increasingly severe 
smog in most parts of China, since 2013 the MEE has started monthly and daily reporting of 
the straw burning situation by using satellite remote sensing in all 31 Chinese provinces 
(Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2017). Based on the agricultural output statistics in 
the eastern and northern areas in China from 2000-2014, Jin et al. (2017) indicated that 
straw burning was one of the significant influential factors that contributed to the increasing 
levels of PM 2.57 from 2000 to 2014. The MEE monitoring centre stated that straw burning 
contributes to around 14-55 percent of the daily concentration level of PM 2.5 (Liang, 2015).   
The Chinese government recognized the environmental issues caused by these rural 
practices and associated wastes. A series of policies and programs were proposed and 
implemented to control pollution in rural areas. Table 1.1 summarises some representative 
policies and programs that aim to control rural waste pollution and improve the rural living 
environment. Besides these policies and programs, many other guidelines, standards, or 
notifications were introduced and published by different government departments.  
Table 1.1 Example policies and programs for rural waste management in China  
Ministry Policy/Program Year Initiated 
Ministry of Agriculture Rural Cleaning Project 2005 
Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment 
Comprehensive Environmental 
Treatment (CET) Policy 
2008 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development 
Five-year Specific Program on Rural 
Domestic Waste Management 
2014 
The State Council Three-year Action Plan for Improving 
Rural Living Environment 
2018 
 
Among these policies and programs, the ‘Incentive Policy to Control Pollution and Promoting 
Comprehensive Environmental Treatment in Rural Areas’, otherwise known as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Treatment (CET) policy, is one policy that focuses exclusively 
on comprehensively addressing rural waste management and pollution control. This policy 
offers financial rewards and compensation to control rural pollution. ‘Building Ecological 
 





Civilization’ is the core concept of the CET policy. There are two specific policy objectives: (1) 
control the most prominent environmental pollutions in rural areas; (2) educate the target 
groups on environmental protection and help the target groups to participate in rural 
environmental protection (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010a). Specifically, this 
policy encompasses the following five types of pollution management programs: water 
source protection, domestic waste and domestic sewage treatment, livestock and poultry 
pollution control, leftover industry and mining pollution control, and comprehensive 
treatment of the rural environment (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2009). In terms of 
rural domestic waste treatment, this policy supports programs to sort, collect, transfer, 
properly dispose of the rural domestic waste, and increase the environmental awareness of 
villagers (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012a). In terms of rural domestic 
wastewater, this policy supports programs to construct drainage systems, wastewater 
collection systems, and sewage disposal systems (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 
2012b). All CET programs must be evaluated after their implementation (The State Council, 
2009). The next section introduces the CET policy evaluation process. 
1.2 CET policy evaluation 
Policy evaluation leads to policy-learning (Fischer & Miller, 2007). The purpose of the CET 
policy evaluation is to provide suggestions for improvements and use as reference for 
follow-up funding arrangements (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010b). In 2010, the 
MEE sent an important notification, namely, ‘Policy Effect Evaluation Guideline on the CET 
policy’, to all environment protection bureaus (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 
2010b). The notification is an administrative order including guidelines and an index about 
evaluating the effect of the implementation of the policy (MEE [2010] 136 evaluation 
framework, Appendix B). MEE protocols state that this evaluation should be conducted one 
year after the policy program is completed. Provincial and prefectural level environmental 
protection bureaus organize the evaluation and recruit an evaluation panel, which involves 
five or more experts in the field of, e.g., rural environmental protection, natural and 
ecological protection, and environment monitoring. The panel checks the environmental 
monitoring data, which is provided by county-level environmental protection bureaus, 
conducts onsite assessments, scores the evaluation index, and completes a report. Provincial 
and prefectural level environmental protection bureaus collect the evaluation reports. All 
reports should be sent to the MEE before August of the year the evaluation was conducted. 





An internet search for CET evaluation results was performed in 2019. Currently, complete 
official government evaluation reports, based on the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework, 
are not available to the public. The brief reports that were available to the public were 
formatted in a newspaper article style, with a very brief overview summary. Thus, it is hard 
to compare these CET evaluation results in detail. On the other hand, evaluation results from 
independent scholars indicated that all the CET programs were ‘successful’ (see Gu, 2012; 
Lao, 2017; Wei, 2015; Zhou et al., 2019). Such uniformly positive conclusions raise doubt 
about the reliability of the evaluations, considering the policy and programs were 
implemented in rural areas with diverse social, economic, geographical, demographic, and 
political contexts. Furthermore, a number of limitations with the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation 
framework process have been identified, e.g., the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework 
cannot provide comprehensive insights and suggestions about the much broader overall 
policy process.  
Given doubts about the evaluation results and limitations of the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation 
framework, a more scientific policy evaluation framework is required. Notably, this 
framework “should include more specific information on why installed interventions have 
succeeded or failed” (Vedung, 2017, p. 209) in order to facilitate policy-learning. However, 
there is a lack of a systematic and holistic public policy evaluation framework in China and 
such an framework is needed (Li, 2016; The Development Research Center of the State 
Council, 2014). 
1.3 A systematic and holistic evaluation framework 
Policy/program evaluation can be complicated, and the results are rarely black and white. A 
‘good’ result may not equal ‘complete policy success’ and a ‘bad’ result may not equal 
‘absolute policy failure’. There may be different degrees of policy success or policy failure, 
e.g., there is likely to be a ‘grey area’. Meanwhile, a program that is successful in one aspect 
may fail in another. It is common in China for local government to take risks in implementing 
local programs, which might greatly benefit the local economy, but also results in public 
opposition (Bradsher, 2013; Wang, 2012). A P-Xylene8 project in China was such a case. The 
National Development and Reform Commission did not officially approve the para-xylene 
project of Qingdao East Chemical Industry Group Co., Ltd. in Qingdao city until July 2010, but 
the project had been put into production in 2007. Public concerns about the project's 
 
8 P-Xylene is an important chemical feedstock. Overexposure of P-Xylene in humans can cause a series 





environmental and health implications had led to mass protests and the shutdown of the 
project after its approval 2010 (Song & Yan, 2011).  
This research uses the notions of ‘policy success’ and ‘policy failure’ as a starting point. 
These words are often used in the literature and reports, but without clear definitions and a 
conceptual framework that facilitates further investigation (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; 
Zittoun, 2015). To fill this research gap, McConnell (2010a, 2010b) clearly defined policy 
success and policy failure (2010a). McConnell believed that it is rare for absolute policy 
success or policy failure to occur, and more often it is a matter of degree. And policy success 
and failure can be observed from three realms, namely: process, program and, politics. 
Based on these definitions, McConnell (2015, 2016) developed a systematic and holistic 
framework to facilitate public policy/program evaluation. 
McConnell’s framework is adopted as the theoretical basis for this research. But the context 
in which McConnell’s framework was developed is different from the Chinese political 
context. Therefore, his framework needs to be considered and tested in China. The findings 
from this research may allow this framework to be adopted to better fit the Chinese context, 
and thus help address the gap of a systematic and holistic public policy evaluation 
framework in China, and also deepen the understanding on the nature of policy success and 
policy failure.  
1.4 Research objectives and questions 
How environmental policy is designed, implemented and evaluated (including in terms of 
relative success and relative failure) is a question often raised in the Chinese context (see 
Gao, 2008; Luo & Zhang, 2010; Song et al., 2003; The Development Research Center of the 
State Council, 2014) . Indeed, contemporary thinking (see Li, 2016; Wang et al., 2014) would 
suggest there is no such systematic and holistic environmental policy evaluation framework. 
This is significant because without such a framework, it is difficult to assess either the policy 
process or the outcomes achieved. More importantly without an integrated policy 
framework, it is very hard to capture the learning from relative successes and failures is 
captured and incorporated this learning into policy improvements or new policy initiatives. 
This thesis seeks to address this gap, first by identifying a potential framework for 
application in the Chinese context, and then by testing and applying it in such a way that it 
gives insights into specific case examples that potentially can then be applied more broadly 





To explore and assess the process of policy evaluation, this research uses the CET policy, and 
specifically the programs related to domestic waste and domestic wastewater that are 
implemented in study villages in rural China, as case studies. These case studies are used to 
explore the application of McConnell’s framework in the Chinese context and provide 
insights into how the policy might be improved. The study has the following objectives:  
• To explore the application of McConnell’s framework in the Chinese context.  
• To evaluate the relative success or failure of the CET policy. 
• To explore the causes of policy failure. 
The specific research questions that contribute to addressing these objectives are:  
(1) What aspects of McConnell’s framework are missing/not fitting/can be revised in the 
Chinese context?  
(2) What are the relative degrees of policy success/failure in each case study?  
(3) What are the internal relationships between success/failure in the stages of 
policymaking, policy implementation, and its political impact? 
(4) What are the causes of policy failure? 
1.5 Overview of the thesis structure 
The thesis contains nine chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) has presented the introduction to 
the problem, the research gap, the objectives, and research questions. Chapter 2 presents a 
literature review of policy success and policy failure. McConnell’s framework is further 
introduced and discussed. The methodology and methods are then presented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 briefly describes the Chinese policy process for the purpose of further testing 
McConnell’s framework in the Chinese context. Chapters 5-7 cover the application of 
adaptive learning, triangulation, and case study methodology in the Chinese context. 
Specifically, chapter 5 evaluates McConnell’s framework from a theoretical point of view in 
the Chinese context. It lays the theoretical foundation for further testing and potential 
revision of McConnell’s framework. Guidelines for evaluating degrees of success/failure are 
developed for empirical field investigations. Chapter 6 reports on the first phase of the case 
study evaluation of McConnell’s framework, and learnings that can then be further tested. 





McConnell framework. The evaluation results are then compared and discussed in Chapter 8 
which also examines the causes of policy success or policy failure. Finally, Chapter 9 outlines 








Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys the academic research on public policy evaluation. It summarises the 
current knowledge about policy evaluation in China, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Treatment (CET) policy evaluations, and relevant studies on policy success and policy failure. 
It identifies gaps in the existing research and proposes a theoretical framework to evaluate 
the CET policy. 
This chapter begins with a literature review of environmental policy evaluation in China and 
the evaluation of the CET policy. International studies on policy success and policy failure are 
then reviewed. The variable and sometimes conflicting understandings of the concepts of 
policy success and policy failure and the limits of current research are discussed. To fill the 
research gap that is identified, a framework is introduced that is considered systematic and 
holistic and is then used to evaluate and analyse the CET policy, as the basis of developing an 
approach that could fit the context of China.  
2.2 Environmental policy evaluaiton in China and the CET policy 
evaluation 
In China, there is a lack of a systematic and holistic environmental policy evaluation 
framework in China (Li, 2016; The Development Research Center of the State Council, 2014; 
Wang et al., 2014). Environmental policy assessment is mainly conducted internally by 
government departments. It is easier for government staff to obtain information and the 
assessment results can easily to be adopted, but it is difficult to guarantee the authenticity, 
reliability, and comprehensiveness of the assessment. Meanwhile, evaluations conducted by 
research institutions and scholars often lack sufficient information to ensure the assessment 
is reliable and robust (Li, 2016). Therefore, many scholars have called for the establishment 
of a sound environmental policy assessment system (Luo & Zhang, 2010; Song et al., 2003; 
Ye & Tang, 2017).  
The absence of effective and independent evaluations of the CET policy can be taken as a 
symptom of the lack of a systematic and holistic environmental policy evaluation framework 





policy effect evaluation guideline for the CET policy from the Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment, Appendix B). However, the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework has 
limitations. It focuses only on policy implementation and its side effects. But contemporary 
policy analysis goes beyond the policy implementation process (Fischer & Miller, 2007; 
Howlett et al., 2015). Failure to fully examine the broader policy stages limits the ability to 
provide comprehensive insights and suggestions on the CET policy programs. In addition, 
several components necessary for policy evaluation were not included in the index, for 
example, the policy impact on human health and policy outcomes on target group 
behaviour. Also, the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework requires evaluations to calculate 
the ratio between inputs and outputs (see Appendix B, Item 3), but these cannot be 
calculated as they are measured in different units. The input can be the resources dedicated 
to the design and implementation of a measure (European Environment Agency, 2001), e.g., 
financial investment in building a garbage collection point. The output can be the tangible 
results of a measure (European Environment Agency, 2001), e.g., the number of garbage 
collection points. Normally, cost-effectiveness is used to describe whether the objectives 
have been achieved at the lowest cost, but this ratio indicator has limited value when used 
to evaluate a single program – it is most relevant when used to compare similar programs. 
Furthermore, it is hard to establish a causal relationship between a CET program and the 
regional water or air quality (see Appendix B, Item 18 and 19). For example, the causal 
relationship between a village domestic waste management program and an improvement 
in regional water quality, or between a township domestic wastewater management 
program and an improvement in the regional air quality are difficult to determine.  
The CET policy evaluation process is also controversial. Key stakeholders, such as local 
community leaders and third-party organizations, may not be fully involved in this process. 
Local governments are not only the policy program designers and implementers, but also 
the policy evaluators, who recruit evaluation panels, provide environmental data, review the 
evaluations, and submit the evaluation reports. Scholars have noted that in this situation 
local governments could potentially bias the evaluation results, given they have a direct 
interest in the evaluation results, which are referenced for follow-up funding arrangements 
(Gao, 2014; Guo, 2007; Li, 2010; Qin, 2015; Wang, 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Yin, 2012).  
To further understand the CET policy evaluation process, an internet search was used to 
gather information about the CET programs and the results of their evaluations. Currently, 





framework, are not available on the internet, although some evaluation summaries are 
available. For example, Zhe Jiang Province evaluated its CET programs during 2010-2012. In 
2010, all counties scored very well in the evaluation: 61.5% counties were ‘very good’ (above 
90), 38.5% were ‘good’ (below 90, the lowest score is 87). During 2011-2012, again all 
counties passed the evaluation: 90% counties were ‘very good’ (above 90/100), and 10% of 
counties were ‘good’ (below 90/100, the lowest score is 88.5). However, due to the lack of 
data from other provinces, it is hard to compare these scores. Hence, it is possible that the 
reason this province received such high scores was that it had a more developed economy 
and other factors, rather than due to the policy itself.  
To date, most of those currently publicly available on internet have been formatted in a 
newspaper article style and contain only a very brief overview summary of the program 
implementation and outcomes. For example, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment 
(MEE) regular news conference in November 2019, stated that “the living environment in 
villages has been improved, and the sense of gain, security, and happiness of rural residents 
has been significantly enhanced” (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2019). The CET 
policy had also attracted the attention of scholars. However, evaluation results from 
independent scholars were surprisingly similar, that is, the policy and the program have 
been a great success (see Dong & Zhu, 2012; Gu, 2012; Lao, 2017; Wei, 2015; Zhou et al., 
2019) . Such conclusions raise doubt about reliability, considering the policy and programs 
were implemented in areas with diverse social, economic, geographical, demographic, and 
political backgrounds all over China.  
Given the above limitations, the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework cannot provide a 
comprehensive picture of the CET policy programs - not only failing to “describe the 
components of systems”, but also “how these connect and interact to generate change” 
(Lemire et al., 2020, p. 58). Therefore, a systematic and holistic environmental policy 
evaluation framework that can fit the Chinese context is needed. 
2.3 Assessing policy success and failure 
Policy evaluation is complicated and there are multiple ways to evaluate policy. Vedung 
(2017) summarised several evaluation models, including: effectiveness models (e.g., goal-
attainment model, side-effects model, goal-free evaluation model, comprehensive 
evaluation model, client-oriented model, stakeholder model), economic models 





frameworks are used in different countries, in different fields, and for different goals, e.g., 
the DPSIR framework in the European Union for evaluating the environmental policies 
(European Environment Agency, 2001), the six-step CDC Framework for evaluation in public 
health (Milstein & Wetterhall, 1999) and the Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses for 
evaluation of environmental regulations and policies in the United States (National Center 
for Environmental Economics Office of Policy, 2010), and the Policy Quality Framework in 
New Zealand for assessing the quality of policy outputs (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, 2017).  
Vedung (2017, p. 3) defined evaluation as a “careful retrospective assessment of the merit, 
worth and value of administration, output and outcome of government interventions, which 
is intended to play a role in future, practical action situations”. As per Schoenefeld and 
Jordan (2019), in their examination of environmental policy evaluation in the EU, this 
definition is adopted for the purposes of this research. Vedung (2017, p. 209) also 
emphasised that “evaluation should include more specific information on why installed 
interventions have succeeded or failed” – this further requirement is important when 
examining all components of the policy cycle and when considering the detail of particular 
policies, programmes and projects. Clarity of understanding and this definition are necessary 
to help properly examine the claims that a policy is a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ that are 
commonly made in government reports, the media, and academic journals, by politicians, 
journalists and scholars. Thus, the conversation should surround “what exactly constitutes 
policy success and failure” (Howlett, 2012, p. 542). A specific agreed-on meaning and 
approach that involves describing indicators and dimensions of the evaluation method is 
essential to set up a benchmark and avoid misusing the concept in further evaluations 
(Babbie, 2015).  
Building on the above requirements, and in order to identify a policy evaluation framework 
for testing in the Chinese context, it was important to first determine what is meant by 
success (and failure) and what criteria can be used to determine the degree and nature of 
such success or failure? Such a determination requires that evaluation should “establish 
systematic criteria for assessing success or failure” (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 565). 
Simply judging the success or failure of a policy from a single perspective is not sufficient; 
rather, a more holistic view will take into account that policy success or failure does not only 
happen in the policymaking process and policy implementation process, but that there may 





Therefore, the second question was: is there a systematic and holistic framework for 
evaluating policy success or failure, generally and more specifically, which has potential to 
be applied in the Chinese context? This research uses the notions of ‘policy success’ and 
‘policy failure’ as a starting point, with the literature concerning key debates relating to the 
above two questions being reviewed next.  
The literature on defining policy success is limited. Baldwin (2000, p. 167) commented “there 
was not even a common understanding of what is meant by success”. Most literature refers 
to ‘policy success’ in case studies but fails to define it clearly, or fails to provide a systematic 
framework to evaluate policy success (Hall, 1993; Hulme & Moore, 2007; Kane, 2003; King, 
1999).  
Compared to policy success, policy failure attracts more public attention (Birkland, 1997; 
Cairney, 2011). Social media tends to report and spread the news of policy failure, but again 
without a clear definition of what such failure is. There is also a paucity of literature focused 
on the definition of policy failure and remarkably little is known about what actually 
constitutes policy failure. Without a clear definition, it is worth noting that policy failure is 
often described in emotive terms such as ‘policy blunders’, ‘policy disasters’, ‘policy fiasco’, 
and ‘policy omnishambles’ (see Annison, 2019; Boin et al., 2008; Bovens et al., 1996; Butler 
et al., 1994; Massey, 2013; Richardson & Rittberger, 2020) . These words could easily 
confuse the process of determining the degree of failure. On the other hand, policy failure is 
normally described in case studies as “if policy has failed to achieve an objective or perceived 
set of outcomes” (Hall, 2011, p. 653). And the typical focus in the literature is to investigate 
the causes of policy failure rather than the nature of the failure, either without a systematic 
structured assessment or sometimes just making an occasional passing comment (see 
Ascher, 2000; Aspinall, 2006; Bourblanc & Anseeuw, 2019; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Davidson, 
2019; Luk, 2009; Ward, 2003). Meanwhile, scholars often consider policy failure in either the 
policymaking process or the policy implementation process, but lack a holistic perspective 
(see Howes et al., 2017; Howlett, 2012; Khalilian et al., 2010; Mitchell & Massoud, 2009; 
Payne, 2000) . Thus, discussion of the relationship between policy failure, policy learning, 
and policy change may also lack a systemic examination (see Ei-Jardali et al., 2014; May, 
1992; Stronks et al., 2006; Zhong et al., 2017).  
The reason for the lack of proper analysis and discussion of policy success and failure may be 
attributed to methodological difficulties in conceptualizing policy failure, including: “what 





‘success’; [no] universally agreed benchmark; a policy that failed to deliver benefits for one 
group may be successful for another; a policy that failed in the short term may yield 
successes in the long term” (McConnell, 2015, pp. 226-229).  
Despite the difficulties, scholars have sought to illuminate the types of policy failure to 
facilitate policy evaluation. Howlett (2012) presented a two-dimensional typology. One 
dimension is ‘high’ to ‘low’ for salience, meaning the intensity and visibility of policy failure. 
The other dimension is ‘high’ to ‘low’ for magnitude, meaning the extent and duration of 
policy failure. He categorized policy failure, namely: major failure, focused failure, diffuse 
failure, and minor failure. In a six-country and four-sector comparative empirical 
investigation on public administration, Mark and Paul (2016) also developed a two-
dimensional framework and presented a matrix setting out four possible combinations of 
‘++’ and ‘- -‘ for programmatic performance assessment and political reputation assessment, 
namely success, tragedy, farce and fiasco.  
However, each categorization mentioned above has its limitations. Firstly, policy failure was 
only categorized and evaluated in the stages of policy formulation and implementation in 
Howlett’s categorization, or in the stage of policy implementation and with respect to 
political reputation in Mark and Paul’s categorization, rather than taking the entire policy 
cycle into account. Secondly, while there may be a correlation between policy process 
failure, policy implementation failure, and political aspects of policy failure, the studies did 
not provide a tool for further research on the tension between the failures in different 
themes. Thirdly, words such as effectively or ineffectively, high and low, or symbols like ‘++’ 
and ‘- -’ that were used in previous studies proved difficult to define clearly.  
Therefore, a specific agreed-on meaning that involves describing indicators and dimensions 
is essential to set up a benchmark and avoid misusing the concept in further evaluations 
(Babbie, 2015). Meanwhile, simply judging the success or failure of a policy from a single 
perspective is not sufficient. It is critical to have an overall view and notice that policy 
success or failure does not only happen in the policymaking process and policy 
implementation process, but its political repercussion could also be an important aspect in 
judging the policy success or failure.  
In order to fill the above research gaps, Marsh and McConnell (2010) published an article 
entitled ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’, which is based on Boyne’s 





that policy may succeed in the ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘political’ realms. These three 
realms are built on the distinction between policy implementation success and political 
success by Bovens et al. (2001), with a policymaking category added. Therefore, policy 
success is considered “beyond the assumption that success equates with meeting policy 
objectives or producing ‘better’ policy” (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 565). On this basis, 
Marsh and McConnell constructed a framework for judging policy success and identified 
nine indicators from the above three dimensions. However, both Marsh and McConnell 
admitted that this framework “is a heuristic, not a model, let alone a theory” (p. 571), but it 
became the basis of subsequent studies by McConnell on policy success and policy failure.  
McConnell (2010b) published a book titled ‘Understanding Policy Success: Rethinking Public 
Policy’. In this book, he defined policy success from the perspective of “both foundationalist 
(success as fact) and anti-foundationalist (success as interpretation) approaches” (p. 39). 
McConnell argued that policy may succeed in the realm of ‘process’, ‘program’, and 
‘political’, and he identified eleven indicators as criteria for evaluating policy success (pp. 40-
54). Moreover, he held that policy success has five degrees, namely: policy success, durable 
success, conflict success, precarious success, and policy failure (pp. 55-62). If a policy 
succeeded, certain degrees of success in each of the indicators and in three dimensions as 
well, can be observed.  
Based on his book, McConnell (2010a) published a paper titled ‘Policy Success, Policy Failure 
and Grey Areas In-between’. He expanded his focus from policy success to policy failure, and 
explains the gap between policy success and failure, known as the ‘grey area’. Policy failures 
are seen as “a mirror of policy success” (p. 356). In this 2010 paper, McConnell revised the 
definition of policy success and defined policy failure. McConnell argued that policy may 
succeed or fail in the realm of ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’, along a spectrum of 
success, resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success, and failure (pp. 352-356). 
Fourteen indicators were identified as criteria for evaluating policy. Certain degrees of 
success/failure can be observed in each of these indicators and in the realm of ‘process’, 
‘program’, and ‘politics’. He further argued that the success or failure in one realm may 
relate to the success or failure in another realm (pp. 357-359).  
McConnell next turned his focus to studying policy failure. In an article titled ‘What Is Policy 
Failure? A Primer to Help Navigate the Maze’, McConnell (2015, p. 228) argued that “failure 
is rarely all or nothing” and modified his previous definition on policy failure (p. 230). Thus, a 





(Outright) Failure = Marginal Success, Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success, Tolerable 
Failure = Resilient Success (p. 237). Thirteen indicators were identified as criteria for 
evaluating policy failure (pp. 233-235). And he indicated that three patterns may emerge 
between realms, namely: process success vs program/political failure; program success vs 
political failure; political success vs program failure (p. 238).  
In a later article entitled ‘A Public Policy Approach to Understanding the Nature and Causes 
of Foreign Policy Failure’, McConnell (2016) extended his study on policy failure further to 
the study on the causes of policy failure. Based on his previous research, he used examples 
of foreign policy to summarise and categorize the underlying causes of policy failure in a 
heuristic framework. This framework used three frames, namely: individual actor centred 
frame, institution/policy process centred frame, and societal centred frame (p. 678). 
McConnell admitted that these “various categorizations are not mutually exclusive, but the 
framework at least allows us to order a range of elements to help prompt deeper and 
subsequent theorizing and operationalizing” (p. 677). 
McConnell's research has been applied by some scholars, but it has also been criticized. For 
example, based on McConnell’s (2010b) research on policy success, Rutter et al. (2012) 
examined six cases of policy in the last 30 years in the USA and explored seven common 
factors behind policy success. They acknowledge that a successful policy is highly adaptable 
and resilient. But a policy is considered successful only when a controversial issue becomes 
an acceptable norm, which departs from McConnell's view of political success. Gray (2011, 
pp. 48-49) reviewed McConnell’s book (2010b) and argued that the simplistic policy cycle 
approach that applied in McConnell’s framework has gaps, and the rigid stylisation and 
matrix-based frameworks “would [not] be sufficient to ascertain for definite whether or not 
'success' had been achieved, and whether the policy initiative in question could claim 
responsibility”. Despite these doubts, McConnell’s research provided a tool for a detailed 
and in-depth evaluation of a policy. Table 2.1 summarises the key findings of McConnell’s 
major literature on policy success and policy failure in chronological order. The next section 
presents McConnell’s definition of policy failure, the extent of policy failure, a policy 





Table 2.1 Summary of McConnell’s major literature in chronological order 
Title Year  Research Focus Concept Defined Spectrum of policy success or failure 
Towards a Framework for 
Establishing Policy Success 
Marsh and McConnell (2010) Policy success Policy success None 
Understanding Policy Success: 
Rethinking Public Policy 
McConnell (2010b) Policy success Policy success • Process success 
• Durable success 
• Conflict success 
• Precarious Success  
• Process failure 
Policy Success, Policy Failure and 
Grey Areas In-between 
McConnell (2010a) The area between 
policy success and 
failure 
Policy success 
and Policy failure 
• Process Success 
• Resilient success 
• Conflicted success 
• Precarious success 
• Process Failure 
What Is Policy Failure? A Primer 
to Help Navigate the Maze 
McConnell (2015) Policy failure Policy failure • Tolerable = Resilient Success 
• Conflicted failure = Conflicted Success 
• (Outright) failure = Marginal Success 
A Public Policy Approach to 
Understanding the Nature and 
Causes of Foreign Policy Failure 
McConnell (2016) Causes of policy 
failure 
  
Source: Marsh and McConnell (2010); McConnell (2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2016).  
Note. The main theoretical applications are the framework of policy failure proposed by McConnell (2015) and the explanation of the causes of policy 






2.4 McConnell’s framework on policy failure 
This section introduces McConnell’s framework on policy failure. His definition of policy 
failure is presented first, followed next by an introduction of how to consider the extent of 
policy failure. Based on the above concepts, McConnell’s policy evaluation framework and 
his explanation of the causes of policy failure are then considered.   
2.4.1 Defining policy failure  
Some literature has conceived of policy failure as “purely relativistic constructions or 
interpretations” (Howlett, 2012, p. 542). For example, Bovens and Hart (2016, p. 654) stated: 
“Success and failure are not inherent attributes of policy, but rather labels applied by 
stakeholders and observers. They are constructed, declared and argued over. Clearly, these 
labelling processes are not necessarily evidence-based”. However, policy failure is also 
conceived as “rendering judgments about an actually existing state of affairs” (Howlett, 
2012, p. 542). This is the contention in the policy sciences about how to interpret policy 
failure. In other words, what constitutes policy failure (Grant, 2009).  
McConnell (2010a) acknowledged that there was no universal benchmark measure of 
success or failure, and that was always an issue of objective or subjective view. For example, 
opposition politicians almost always want to describe government policies as failures. 
However, his definition of policy failure was balanced between foundationalist (failure as 
fact) and anti-foundationalist (failure as interpretation), and based on two objective 
standards, namely: whether the policy has fundamentally reached the goals that proponents 
set out to achieve; and the existence of opposition or support. As the mirror of policy 
success, policy failure was defined as:  
A policy fails, even if it is successful in some minimal respects, if it 
does not fundamentally achieve the goals that proponents set out 
to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-
existent (McConnell, 2015, p. 230) 
McConnell’s definition of policy failure was based on two objective standards, namely: goal 
attainment and the existence of opposition or support. First, policy failure requires 
measurement of the general characteristics of a policy according to whether the goal has 
been achieved, rather than providing any moral judgment of the policy content. For 
example, when a government achieves its goal, it is considered successful, rather than 
evaluating whether the goal is desirable. Second, the public has different understandings of 





into support or opposition to the policy, which are based on the subjective will of the public 
and can be measured objectively.  
2.4.2 Extent of policy failure 
McConnell (2010a, 2015) believed that there was no absolute policy success and policy 
failure, even a ‘policy fiasco’ can have minimal success and ‘grey areas in between’. The 
policy is not ‘all or nothing’. Policy failure can be “a matter of degree, as well as being 
interspersed with success” (McConnell, 2015, p. 236). Therefore, he rated policy failures as 
existing on the following three scales: Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success; Conflicted Failure 
= Conflicted Success; (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success (2015).  
2.4.3 McConnell’s policy evaluation framework 
McConnell (2015) distinguished between policy failures in different realms, namely: 
‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’. Process refers to the policymaking process, including 
agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption. Program refers to the policy 
implementation process. Politics refers to the political repercussions of a policy. Some 
failures are redeemable and others not, “while failure in some realms may actually be a 
consequence of success in others” (McConnell, 2015, p. 237).  
In McConnell’s policy evaluation framework, 13 criteria, including four criteria across 
‘process’, five criteria across ‘program’, and four criteria across ‘politics’ (Table 2.2), are 
considered as observed variables. All 13 criteria are considered key indicators to judge 
whether a policy has reached the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and the 
existence of opposition or support. If a policy failed, certain degrees of failure (Tolerable 
Failure = Resilient Success; Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success; (Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success) in each of the criteria can be observed.  
McConnell’s policy evaluation framework provided the basis to delve deeper into issues that 
are critically important in public policies, allowing structured comparison over time and 
across sectors. The framework can be used to evaluate the shaping, implementation, and 
political impact of any policy, program, and plan within and across different levels of 
government. The framework also helps identify scales that delineate degrees of failure 
(outright, conflicted, tolerable) to explore the inextricable link between policy shaping, 
implementation, and political impact. Questions such as: ‘did outright process failure lead to 





can then be investigated based on the framework (McConnell, 2015). To sum up, the 
framework helps provide the basis for further examination of the dynamics in/between 
individual cases in the aspects of policy success or failure into meaningful analytical 
categories (the ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ realms) as well as degrees of failure 
(outright, conflicted, and tolerable). 
Table 2.2 McConnell’s policy evaluation framework 
Realm No. Criteria (13) 
Process 1 Preserving goals and policy instruments 
2 Securing legitimacy 
3 Building sustainable coalition  
4 Attracting support for process 
Program 5 Implementation in line with objectives 
6 Achieving desired outcomes 
7 Benefiting target group(s) 
8 Satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain 
9 Attracting support for program 
Politics 10 Enhancing electoral prospects/reputation 
11 Easing the business of governing 
12 Promotion of government’s desired trajectory 
13 Providing political benefits for government 
Source: McConnell (2015, pp. 233-235) 
2.4.4 Causes of policy failure 
Policy failure attracts public attention and facilitates policy learning. McConnell (2016) 
distinguished between what could be observed if a policy failed (via the 13 criteria 
mentioned above) and the cause of the policy failure. The causes of policy failure from the 
perspectives of unsupportive (unsympathetic) and supportive (sympathetic) views were 
categorized in three frames, namely: individual actor centred frame, institution/policy 
process centred frame, and societal centred frame (Table 2.3). While this framework does 















• Reckless self-interest 




• Appalling judgment 
• Lapse in otherwise good 
judgment 
• Genuine mistake 
• Bad luck 
Institution/policy 
process-centred frame 
• Institutional self interest 
• Institutional arrogance 
• Major blind spots 
• Weak capacity for good 
decision making 
• Small weakness in 
otherwise solid 
institutions and process 
Societal-centred 
frame 
• Core value/elite interests 
produced policy-making 
biases and inevitable failures 
• Good society has 
perhaps drifted slightly 
from core values and 
issues 
Source: McConnell (2015, p. 678) 
2.5 McConnell’s framework as theoretical framework 
This thesis is based on McConnell's study of policy failure. The main theoretical applications 
are the framework of policy failure proposed by McConnell (2015) and the explanation of 
the causes of policy failure proposed by McConnell (2016). This section explains why 
McConnell's framework is chosen as the theoretical framework in this research. 
McConnell’s framework has the potential to be applied to examine public policy in the 
Chinese context. First, McConnell clearly defined policy failure and produced the necessary 
criteria and judgments for assessing success and failure in his framework. ‘Criteria’ refers to 
“the yardsticks to be used as the basis of comparison”, and ‘judgments’ refer to “the overall 
process of actually comparing the intents, observations, and criteria of merit” (Vedung, 2017, 
pp. 64-65). Second, McConnell’s framework is a systematic and holistic framework, which 
systematically describes the components that need to be evaluated (the realms of ‘process’, 
‘program’, and ‘politics’) and facilitated in a holistic evaluation of the connection and 
interaction between these realms. No other framework or approach could be found that 
included the full policy cycle and clear criteria for defining success or failure.  
2.6 Testing application of McConnell’s framework in China 
McConnell’s framework is the theoretical basis of this research. However, this framework 





China. The assumptions underpinning McConnell’s framework are based on a political 
system that has a very different background, traditions, and institutions when compared to 
the political system in China. For example, China's policymaking process may not involve as 
much stakeholder involvement as occurs in western countries, nor is the electoral process as 
transparent (Horsley, 2009). Given such complexity, McConnell’s framework needs to be 
tested in the Chinese context. This research uses the CET policy, and specifically the 
programs related to domestic waste and domestic wastewater that are implemented in 
study villages in rural China, as case studies. These case studies are used to explore the 
application of McConnell’s framework in the Chinese context and provide insights into how 
environmental policy might be improved. 
2.7 Summary 
China does not have a systematic and holistic environmental policy evaluation framework, 
and the various limitations of the CET policy evaluation framework can be seen as a 
reflection of this. The search for a framework that might potentially be applicable in the 
Chinese context began by reviewing how policy success and failure are defined in the 
literature, then looking more closely at McConnell’s framework on policy failure. In 
McConnell’s framework, the key nodes in the policy process and the important influential 
factors that may affect policy outcomes are used to evaluate a policy, while the context is 
further extended to the political response to the policy process. McConnell’s framework is a 
relatively systematic and holistic policy evaluation framework, which has the potential to be 
applied to examine environmental policies in the Chinese context but needs to be tested. 
Therefore, suitable research approaches are needed. The next chapter introduces the 






Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on policy success and policy failure. McConnell’s 
framework was introduced as the theoretical basis to evaluate rural waste policy in China, 
and thus against which to test and to modify the framework both for theory and practice 
purposes. This chapter provides an overview of the methodology and methods used. The 
chapter begins with an introduction of the basic methodology applied in this research. Based 
on the methodology, detailed methods, including how the data was collected and analysed, 
are then presented.   
3.2 Methodology 
McConnell (2015) proposed a framework for the evaluation of policy failure. This framework 
provides the basis for the evaluation of the Comprehensive Environmental Treatment (CET) 
policy, but it has not been thoroughly tested internationally, or tested at all in the Chinese 
context. Therefore, the research itself is an exploration of the framework in the Chinese 
context which in turn is hoped to contribute to further development of the framework. An 
integrated approach is taken to explore and test McConnell’s framework in the Chinese 
context. This approach includes three main methodologies: adaptive learning, case studies, 
and triangulation, with each of the methodologies complementary to the others. Within and 
across these methodologies, a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods are used, all 
designed to inform the research objectives of the thesis. 
3.2.1 Adaptive learning 
It is proposed to explore the framework via an adaptive learning approach, namely: 
preliminary understanding; trial and re-inform; retrial and refine. Adaptive learning has been 
widely used to improve learning achievements in the education sector and knowledge 
exchange for better decision making in the public policy sector (Reed et al., 2006; Tseng et 
al., 2008; Tyre & Von Hippel, 1997). Implementation of these steps is intended to lead to an 
improved framework applicable in China. In this research, the preliminary understanding 
step of adaptive learning is to evaluate McConnell’s framework from a theoretical point of 





testing and potential revision of McConnell’s framework to fit the Chinese context. The next 
steps then tested and improved the framework in the light of emergent knowledge, against 
CET policy programs, in two phases each involving two case applications. Phase I is a trial to 
assess the utility of a modified McConnell’s framework and gain preliminary insights into the 
evaluation criteria applied in the Chinese context. Based on the findings from phase I, phase 
II further tests McConnell’s framework and evaluates the CET policy. The aim of phase II is to 
gain deeper insights into McConnell’s criteria. The findings from phase I and phase II should 
provide deep insights into McConnell’s framework and allow for further development in the 
Chinese, and similar, contexts.  
3.2.2 Case studies 
McConnell’s framework is a semi-finished product. He has proposed the base against which 
to explore, explain, and evaluate the success or failure of policy. This research aims to 
evaluate and develop this framework within complex Chinese contexts. Given the context, 
case studies are appropriate for policy evaluation research of this type (Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
“Case studies are a design of inquiry found in many fields, especially evaluation, in which the 
researcher develops an in-depth analysis of a case, often a program, event, activity, process, 
or one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2014, p. 43). Case studies applied in this research can 
provide in-depth insights into how the policy worked in different cases.  
3.2.3 Triangulation 
This research uses an untested framework to evaluate policy in the Chinese context. 
Therefore, the application of triangulation methodology provides an opportunity to improve 
the validity and mitigate the potential biases that may contribute to a poor outcome. 
Triangulation is used as “a strategy for the validation of the procedures and results of 
empirical social research” (Flick, 2004, p. 178). Data triangulation is applied in this research 
(Denzin, 2017) and data is collected “from different sources and at different times, in 
different places or from different people” (Flick, 2004, p. 178).  
It should be noted that evaluation results that are based solely on McConnell’s framework 
may not be valid. Therefore, the case study approach incorporates two complementary 
comparative methods: (1) the evaluation results using McConnell’s framework are compared 
with the results obtained when the CET policy evaluation framework from the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment (MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework, see Chapter section 2.2) 





the above are compared with the CET policy evaluations undertaken by the governmental 
departments. These complementary comparative methods help to inform further 
development of the framework.  
3.2.4 Methodology summary  
Achieving a triangulation based methodology requires the following related components: 
adaptive learning involving theoretical review for further testing and potential revision of 
McConnell’s framework; adaptive learning involving multiple cases to test and improve the 
framework; and data collection from multiple sources and analysis to inform adaptive 
learning. Table 3.1 summarises the sequence of adaptive learning steps and the purpose of 
each step. These approaches are explained in the following sections. Detailed theoretical 
evaluation of McConnell’s evaluation is presented in Chapter 5. The phase I case study is 
presented in Chapter 6 and phase II in Chapter 7.  
Table 3.1 Sequence of research steps 
Adaptive 
learning steps 
Purpose of each step 
Theoretical 
evaluation  
Lay the theoretical foundation for further testing and potential revision 
of McConnell’s framework to fit the Chinese context. 
Phase I  A trial to assess the framework’s utility and gain preliminary insights 
into the policy evaluation criteria; Draw conclusions about policy 
success or policy failure.  
Phase II  Provide deeper insights into the framework; Draw conclusions about 
policy success or policy failure. 
 
3.3 Focus group 
“Focus groups are semi-structured discussions with groups of 4–12 people that aim to 
explore a specific set of issues” (Tong et al., 2007, p. 351). A focus group was used in the 
preliminary step of the adaptive learning approach to complement the literature review 
because McConnell (2010a, 2010b, 2015) did not state clearly what was included in Criterion 
8 (satisfied criteria highly valued in policy domain). Therefore, before any field investigations 
could be conducted, it was necessary to identify what criteria were most valued in public 
sectors in the Chinese context. To do this, five professionals in public policy and public 
administration, including three scholars in public administration and two local-level 
government officials (county and township) were recruited for a focus group discussion. All 
five were recruited when they participated in a Master of Public Administration (MPA) 





China and could provide practical insights. Information, including a range of literature 
discussing criteria for evaluating public policy was given to these professionals before the 
discussion. They were then asked: what criteria do you think are most highly valued in the 
policy domain in the Chinese context, and why? Each of the professionals answered the 
question and a preliminary list of what should be included in the criterion was developed 
based on their answers. Finally, an open discussion on the preliminary list was conducted, 
and the professionals reached a consensus on the five principles they considered most 
important (see section 5.2.8).   
3.4 Case study 
As shown in Table 3.1, case study was used in the next step of adaptive learning to test 
McConnell’s framework and draw conclusions about policy success or policy failure. It was 
conducted in two phases each involving two case applications.  
3.4.1 Case study setting 
Validity is an issue in social science research and variances need to be taken into account to 
help ensure research finding validity. For example, due to the challenging information 
disclosure system in China, this research is best conducted in locations where data collection 
is most likely to be available to the researcher. In addition, the large and diverse geography 
across China poses a significant limitation to the study in regard to labor and financial 
resources required for data collection. Variances between different regions, such as socio-
economic conditions and political background, may also considerably affect the policy 
process and evaluation results (Sabatier, 1991). And the baseline environmental and 
geographic variability, population differences and cultural variances between different 
regions may also influence the policy process and evaluation results. In order to mitigate the 
above limitations, this research selected two Chinese provinces, namely: Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region and Beijing9. They are geographically close to each other and contain 
similar sociocultural and political contexts, but also capture enough of the variation that this 
research needs to consider, e.g., the influence of different economic conditions. Such 
variation allows comparison between different cases.  
 
9 China's administrative divisions can be simply divided from top to bottom into provinces, city, 
county, and township. The administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Beijing 
are equivalent to province (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 





A qualitative sampling process does not need to be random, but can instead be a 
purposefully selected set of participants and sites (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, four case 
study areas were selected purposefully in the two provinces (Case 1 and Case 2 for phase I, 
Case 3 and Case 4 for phase II). In phase I, Case 1 is in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Region, and Case 2 is in Beijing. Both cases have implemented domestic waste management 
programs. In phase II, Case 3 and Case 4 are both in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Region and have implemented domestic wastewater management programs. Choosing 
another program type and different policymaking levels in phase two enriches the research 
and helps to examine the potential application of McConnell's framework to different types 
of programs and administrative tiers. 
3.4.2 Participant Sampling 
Participants were sought from two groups: (1) local officials; and (2) villagers. Local officials 
are the CET policy program architects who are in charge of designing and implementing the 
programs, e.g., deputy head of the township government and village CPP branch committee 
secretary. They have a comprehensive understanding of the policy process and policy 
results, and therefore were selected. Villagers, in this research, refers to those who reside in 
the village but do not hold an office in the local villagers’ committee, e.g., community 
leaders, farmers, and others who may know about the policy. They were selected because 
they are the CET policy target group. Their experience, knowledge, and possible insights 
concerning the policy process could provide rich information for this study.  
The snowball sampling strategy was used to select participants (Flick, 2009; Patton, 2014). 
Local officials were selected first. Information was sought about the key government 
departments that cooperated with them, who implemented the program, who influenced 
the policymaking and implementation process, and who was most affected by the program. 
The snowball sampling method was used to identify and sample other officials. Villagers, 
such as community leaders, were approached next. Information was sought about who were 
the key stakeholders of the programs’ target group, and who influenced the program making 
and implementation process. The snowball sampling method was also used to identify and 
sample other villagers. Participants were approached via the face-to-face method. As a rule 
of thumb, the manageable sample size of a qualitative study is under 50 (Ritchie et al., 





3.4.3 Description of participants 
“Key demographic variables are likely to have an impact on participants’ view of the topic” 
(Bricki & Green, 2007, p. 10). In the four case studies, participants’ demographic variables 
are considered, namely gender, occupation, age, and ethnic group. It should be noted that in 
China, women are underrepresented at local governments compared with men (Wu, 2012), 
and women are sometimes marginalized in a village community (Hu, 2017). Therefore, fewer 
women were identified as participants in this research. But women were still targeted to get 
a balanced view. However, most of the government officials and community leaders that are 
key participants, e.g., village CCP branch secretary and villagers’ representatives, are male. 
And few women farmers would want to talk to someone they are not familiar with.  
Description of participants - Phase I (Case 1 and Case 2) 
In Phase 1, eleven people were selected, five in Case 1 and six in Case 2. Table 3.2 shows the 
demographics of the interviewees. Of the 11 interviewees, two were older than 50, two 
were female, four were Mongolian and seven were Han.  
Table 3.2 Demographics of participants in Cases 1 & 2 
Key. Age: 1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50-59, 5 = 60-69; Gender: M = Male, F = 








1 V1 village Village CCP branch 
committee secretary 
1 4 M M 1VS 
Head of villages’ 
committee 
1 3 M H 1VC 
Farmer 1 4 M M 1FR 
Villagers’ 
Representative 
2 3 M H 1VR 
2 T2 township Deputy head of the 
township 
1 2 M H 2HT 
V2 village Village CCP branch 
committee secretary 
1 4 M H 2VS 
Villagers’ 
Representative 
1 4 M H 2VR 
Local Business 
Representative 
1 2 M H 2BR 






Description of participants - Phase II (Case 3 and Case 4) 
In Phase II, sixteen people were selected, seven in Case 3 and nine in Case 4. Table 3.3 shows 
the demographics of the interviewees. Of the sixteen interviewees, four were older than 50, 
two were female, five were Mongolian and eleven were Han.  
Table 3.3 Demographics of participants in Cases 3 & 4 
Key: Age: 1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50-59, 5 = 60-69; Gender: M = Male, F = 










Director of Agriculture 
and Animal Husbandry 
Bureau in DS3 district 
1 3 M H 3DA 
T3 
township 
Deputy head of T3 
township 
1 3 M H 3HT 
V3 
village 
Village CCP branch 
committee secretary  
1 2 M M 3VS 
Farmers 2 4 F/M M/H 3FR 




Director of Environmental 
Protection Bureau in CT4 
county 
1 4 M H 4DE 
Deputy captain of 
Environmental Inspection 
Team of the 
Environmental Protection 
Bureau in CT4 county 
1 2 M H 4CE 
Director of the Rural and 
Township Department of 
the Bureau of Housing 
and Urban-Rural 
Development in CT4 
county 
1 2 M M 4DR 
T4 
township 
Director of ‘Armed 
Forces’ who was in charge 
of township environment 
issues 
1 2 M H 4DA 
V4 
village 
Village CCP branch 
committee secretary 
1 3 M H 4VS 
Farmers 2 4 M H/M 4FR 





3.4.4 Data collection 
Given the complexity of rural waste policy, comprehensive information is required to answer 
the research questions, and quantitative and qualitative data are both necessary in these 
case studies.  
Quantitative data were collected via public documents from local governments (including 
villagers’ committees). These organisations have data about actual outputs from policy 
implementation, e.g., program funding and the number of garbage collection points.  
Qualitative information was collected via: public documents, such as newspapers, official 
reports, and conference speeches; from observation as an observer using an observational 
protocol (i.e., field notes were made during the observation); and from qualitative audio and 
visual materials, such as photographs. 
Empirical data was also gained from face-to-face in-depth interviews using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. The duration of each interview was between 40-120 minutes. Audio 
recording was used during the interviews. Qualitative data were collected until information 
saturation was reached (Charmaz, 2006). In this research, no more interviews were 
conducted in each case when information saturation was reached. The questionnaire and 
interview questions for testing and application of McConnell’s framework presents in 
Appendix A.  
The MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework (Appendix B) is also applied by this author as a 
complementary comparative method. The MEE [2010]136 evaluation framework provided 
indicators and illustrated relative weighting of each indicator used for evaluating the 
‘objective achievement’ and ‘overall output’, depending on the type of pollution that the 
program targeted. However, the MEE [2010]136 evaluation framework did not provide 
details on how to score each indicator. Therefore, the MEE [2010]136 evaluation framework 
was revised according to program type, with unreasonable items removed to ensure the 
validity (see section 2.2), and a set of methods and rules were developed as the basis to 
judge the indicators.  
Appendix C presents the revised MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework used in Case 1 and 
Case 2 (in Phase I). It includes the indicators from the MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework 
which are relevant for assessing domestic waste management programs and the methods 





Evaluation Framework used in Case 3 and Case 4 (in Phase II). It includes the indicators from 
the MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework which are relevant for assessing domestic 
wastewater management programs and the methods developed for assessing these 
indicators. Data were collected from: public documents, observation, qualitative audio and 
visual materials, and in-depth interviews.  
3.4.5 Data analysis 
The interviews were first transcribed from audio documents to text documents in Chinese. 
The text documents were then translated into English and analysed in English. Thematic 
analysis was applied to analyse qualitative data. To test McConnell’s framework, 
predetermined codes and emerging codes were used (consistent with Creswell 2014, p248), 
based on the information derived from McConnell’s framework, literature review, and case 
studies. Themes, descriptions, and context information were interrelated, and meaning 
determined. Findings from the initial exploratory database were then built into quantitative 
measures to facilitate analysis. Finally, it should be also noted that the currency appearing in 
this study is New Zealand dollar 2019. 
Evaluating McConnell’s framework 
In this research, the theory review ascertained whether the criteria in McConnell’s 
framework can be applied in China and the criteria were grouped into three categories, 
namely: supportive, non-supportive, and unclear. These criteria were further tested in case 
studies. An ‘extent-of-fit’ category was developed to judge the extent to which a criterion 
fits the Chinese context. Table 3.4 shows this categorisation and the standard for evaluation. 
It is important to note that depending on the findings at each stage of the case study, and 











Table 3.4 Extent-of-fit category for each of McConnell’s criteria 
Extent of fit category  Standard for evaluation 
Clearly fit Interviews and literature strongly support the application of the 
criterion in the Chinese context 
Partially fit Part of the criterion applies in the Chinese context or applies in 
some circumstances 
Potentially fit  Interviews provide hints of the potential application of the 
criterion, and literature strongly supports its application in the 
Chinese context 
May fit Interviews tend not to support the criterion but based on theory, 
the criterion may be applicable in the Chinese context 
May not fit Interviews tend not to support the criterion and literature does 
not support/state clearly the application of the criterion in the 
Chinese context 
Does not fit Interviews and literature do not support the application of the 
criterion in the Chinese context 
 
Based on the research findings, changes to the criteria are proposed. The suggested changes 
fall into the following categories: 
• Criteria scope change 
• Split criteria into separate aspects, weighted accordingly 
• Add new criteria 
• Criteria not retained 
Analysis of policy success and failure  
McConnell’s framework was also used to draw conclusions about policy success or failure. 
However, McConnell did not articulate a method to judge the success and failure of each 
individual realm (process, program, and politics) and the overall policy program based on the 
success/failure of each criterion, nor how to weight each criterion and realm.  
To fill this gap, an ordinal five-point scale has been proposed to capture the different levels 
of success/failure, showing how a criterion, a realm, and the overall policy program scores in 
the range from ‘Absolute Failure’ (a score of 1) to ‘Absolute Success’ (a score of 5), namely: 
Absolute Failure = 1; (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success = 2; Conflicted Failure = Conflicted 
Success = 3; Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success = 4; Absolute Success = 5. This method 





• First, based on this scale, the degree of success and failure of each criterion in each case 
study is quantified. If a result for a particular criterion is unclear, it is not included when 
calculating. 
• Second, the scores given to the criteria in one realm are then added up and the mean is 
calculated to indicate the success/failure level for that realm. All criteria, including 
Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C, are each considered in their own right and are given the same 
weight. A mean score is used because the ‘program’ realm comprises more criteria than 
the ‘process’ and ‘politics’ realms, thus the ‘program’ realm would be always score 
higher if simple addition was used. In this research, mean scores between 2 and 4 are 
rounded to the nearest whole number. For example, a realm score of 2.7 will be 
rounded to 3. However, a realm will not be considered as ‘Absolute Failure’ if there are 
minor successes, and a realm will not be considered as ‘Absolute Success’ if there are 
minor failures. Thus, a realm with a mean score between 1 and 2 is rounded up to 2, and 
a realm with a mean score between 4 and 5 is rounded down to 4. 
• Third, similar to how to determine realm performance, the extent of success or failure of 
the overall program can be determined by averaging the mean score of the three 
realms, of which each is given the same weight.   
3.4.6 Human ethics 
Complying with human ethics (HE) is a basic requirement for research involving human 
participants (Lofland & Lofland, 2006). The HE application submitted to the Lincoln 
University Human Ethics Committee included the questionnaire and interview questions 
which had been developed in compliance with relevant policies and procedures. The HE 
application was granted in November 2017 (see Appendix E). 
No data which allows identification of specific individuals is or will be included in any written 
or oral presentation of this research, and geographic and demographic information about 
the specific villages has been generalised to prevent identification. Every participant and 
case study location were assigned a respondent code (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). All 
quotations from individual interviews are obscured with this respondent code. Interviewees 
were contacted in person by the researcher. The researcher first explained clearly the 
purpose and participants’ rights. An information sheet was given to the participants. If they 
intended to participate, a consent form was required to be signed. The signed consent forms 





the data. Face-to-face interviews were then conducted. The audio data was recorded with 
the participant’s permission. At the end of the interview, the participants were given a 
chance to ask questions.  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the methodology and methods used to explore a framework that is 
untested in the Chinese context and to evaluate it within the rural waste policy in China. The 
adaptive learning approach, case study, and triangulation methodologies are applied in this 
research. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analysed using a range of 
standard techniques.  
McConnell’s framework is the basis for this research. In order to test whether McConnell’s 
framework fits the Chinese context, it is a necessity to have an overall view of the Chinese 
political background and policy process in advance. The next chapter introduces the Chinese 






The Chinese Policy Process – A Brief Introduction 
4.1 Introduction 
McConnell’s framework is used as a basis to evaluate the Comprehensive Environmental 
Treatment (CET) policy and provide insights into how the policy might be improved. 
However, the underlying context for the development of McConnell’s framework is 
democratic politics, which is very different from the Chinese political context. In order to 
test the potential application and utility of the framework in the Chinese context, it is 
therefore necessary first to consider how policy is developed and implemented in China. This 
chapter provides an overview of the Chinese policy process, focusing on policymaking and 
the policy implementation process. 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the policymaking process in China, including 
agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption. The policy implementation process 
is then introduced. Finally, the characteristics of China’s policy process are discussed. 
4.2 Policymaking process in China 
The most significant insight of policymaking in China is that formal 
institutional structure shapes policy processes and outcomes even 
in a communist authoritarian system. The structure is bureaucratic; 
authority is fragmented among the various central ministries and 
provinces; fragmentation is overcome by bargaining; decisions are 
made by consensus; and the policy process is protracted and 
incremental (Shirk, 1990, pp. 83-84).  
The policymaking process usually contains a set of sequential and distinct activities that 
facilitate analysis: namely, agenda-setting, proposal formulation, and policy adoption 
(Anderson, 2003). This section introduces the policymaking process in China, from the above 
perspectives. 
4.2.1 Agenda-setting 
Agenda-setting is about “how an issue or a demand becomes or fails to become the focus of 
concern and interest within a polity” (Cobb & Elder, 1971, pp. 903-904). Agenda-setting 





and how a social issue becomes a public agenda issue. The above aspects are introduced in 
this section.  
Participants, namely those “inside of government, including the administration, civil 
servants, and Congress……and outside of government, including the interest groups, 
academics, media, and public opinion”, can be the source of agenda items (Kingdon & 
Thurber, 2011, pp. 15-21). In China, the ‘Interim Regulation on Major Administrative 
Decision-Making Procedures’ specified the agenda initiators, including: the leading members 
of a policy-making organization; subordinate department of a policy-making organization or 
subordinate government; deputies to the People's Congress or members of Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and citizens, legal persons, and other 
organizations (The State Council, 2019). In addition to the above participants, ‘opinion 
leaders’ from social media, such as BBS and Weibo10, can propose a topic for general 
discussion (Deng & Meng, 2016; Liu, 2013; Yin et al., 2012).  
Not all issues proposed by participants get on the policy agenda. Some issues receive more 
attention and become a government agenda priority, but some do not. A triggering 
mechanism is essential in this process (Anderson, 2003; Gerston, 2015). There are a number 
of common triggering mechanisms in China. First, the more extreme, concentrated, intense, 
visible, and broadly scoped a problem, the more likely that it will be included on the policy 
agenda. For example, the frenzy of coverage from reporters and bloggers nationwide drew 
attention to the gravity of PM2.5 pollution, after the USA embassy first started monitoring 
air pollution in Beijing in 2008. Then air pollution control became a government agenda 
item. Prime Minister Li Keqiang pledged to the delegates and Chinese citizens in the National 
People’s Congress in March 2014: “We will resolutely declare war against pollution as we 
declared war against poverty” (The State Council, 2014b). Second, an issue which is similar 
to an existing one has more chances of being included on the policy agenda item. The 
government tries to maintain the policy continuity and inheritance between new and old 
policy, especially for long-term policy (Lu, 2015). Third, a program with positive values or 
one which has the potential to eliminate the adverse effects of existing policies might be 
more likely to be placed on the agenda. Positive symbolism is critically important for 
program establishment in China. For example, the creation of the label ‘environment 
protection’ may help a program move onto the government agenda (Li & Wu, 2017). Fourth, 
governments may actively put forward a solution for market failure. For example, few 
 





companies and farmers have the economic incentive to recycle agriculture film that severely 
pollutes farmland. The public called for the government to intervene (Zhu & Liu, 2015). In 
2017, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs responded to market failure and 
announced the ‘Agri-film Recycling Action Plan’. This plan encouraged local government to 
reduce taxes and provide subsidies to agriculture film recycling companies (Ministry of 
Agricultural and Rural Affairs, 2017). In contrast, a problem without an obvious technical 
solution and beyond the capacity of the government would not be placed on the agenda 
(Anderson, 2003). For example, the use of kitchen waste shredders in cities. There are 
concerns that kitchen waste shredders would increase urban water pollution, energy 
consumption, and the cost of sewage treatment, especially in cities where sewage treatment 
facilities are aging. But there were no technical solutions dealing with the problems caused 
by kitchen waste shredders (Home.163.com, 2018). Therefore, the use of kitchen waste 
shredders was not on the national policy agenda, e.g., ‘Implementation Plan of Household 
Garbage Classification’, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in 2017 (General Office of the State 
Council, 2017). It was also not on the agenda of the provincial plans for domestic waste 
management, e.g., ‘Sichuan Province Municipal Solid Waste Classification System 
Implementation Plan’ (General Office of Sichuan Provincial People's Government, 2018).  
“Problems do not move themselves on and off agendas” (B.G. Peters, 2015, p. 75). A rich 
literature has categorized the process of agenda-setting in China from diverse perspectives. 
S. Wang (2008) focused on the policy initiator and public participation. He proposed six 
agenda-setting patterns (Table 4.1). Liu (2011) emphasized institutional backgrounds and 
proposed four models: Inside Initiative Model, Mobilization Model, Outside Initiative Model, 
and Integrated Model. Zhao and Xue (2017) focused on the effect of the social focal event 
and identified the Response-oriented Agenda-setting Process Model: a government may act 
as a firefighter and put social focal events onto the agenda under the influence of public 
pressure. 
Table 4.1 Six types of agenda-setting patterns in China 
 Policy Initiator 
Policymaker Think Tank Public 
 
Level of Public 
Participation 






High II Mobilization 
Model 
IV Leveraging Model VI External 
Pressure Model 





In the early stage of ‘Reform and Opening-up’ in China since 1978, agenda-setting relied 
more on the judgment of policymakers in terms of policy issues. With the deepening of the 
‘Reform and Opening-up’, policy agenda-setting was open to more participants, and the 
process became more scientific and democratic when experts, media, and the public began 
to influence this process (Qi et al., 2015). However, agenda-setting in China remains goal-
oriented and based on top-down planning, e.g., top-level design (Naughton, 2012). National 
trajectory and prioritized issues proposed by the National Congress, National People's 
Congress, central government, and ministries, such as the ‘Five-year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development’ and ‘Made in China 2025’, are considered cornerstone 
and fundamental guidance of social and economic development. Following the national 
trajectory, local governments are expected to compile their own long-term plan. The chief 
executive of each level of government sets up the policy agenda in the ‘Government Work 
Report’ at the beginning of each year to respond to the national objectives.  
4.2.2 Policy formulation 
When the agenda is being set, the government would formulate practical and applicable 
policy terms. “Policy formulation involves developing pertinent and acceptable proposed 
courses of action (often called alternatives,  proposals, or options)  for dealing with public 
problems” (Anderson, 2003, p. 101). However, policy formulation takes place in a 
government office and few participants are expected to get involved (Sidney, 2006).  
Law, regulation, administrative rules, notifications, standards, projects, programs, plans, 
strategies, and even the call from a political leader are all considered public policy in China 
(Wang, 2004). Sometimes, for a simple public decision, an administrative order or ‘words’ 
from political leaders would replace policy drafting. But usually, there would be a complex 
and scientific process (Hu, 1998). Considering the drafting of ‘13th Five-year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (2016-2020)’ as an example. The formulation of 
this plan took three years (from 2013 to 2016), divided into four stages and ten steps. 
Multiple stakeholders got involved in this process, including the department chief executives 
from the National People’s Congress, CPPCC, and State Council, as well as local government 
chief executives and scholars (Wang & Yan, 2015).  
“China’s macro-level five-year planning moved from the early 
reform era mode of centralized, closed, intra-state bargaining, and 
coordination to controlled multiple advocacies that is based on 
carefully orchestrated consultations of state, non-state, and even 





procedures that are intended to support ‘scientific’ policymaking” 
(Heilmann & Muse, 2018, pp. 179-180).  
4.2.3 Policy adoption 
Policy adoption refers to the “action by some official person or body to adopt, modify, or 
reject a preferred policy alternative” (Anderson, 2003, p. 119). This section introduces the 
policy adoption process and policy legitimization in China, both of which are relevant aspects 
of policy adoption.  
Policy adoption process 
“Although private individuals and organizations also participate in making policy decisions, 
the formal authority to decide rests with public officials” (Anderson, 2003, p. 119). In China, 
the actual policymakers are the political elites of the CCP leadership (Hu, 1998; Shih, 2005). 
The CCP committees existing in government and its subordinated departments act as the 
actual policymaker (Dai, 2014). This is especially the case for four key issues, referred to as 
‘Three Important and One Large’: important decision making, appointment and removal of 
important officials, the arrangement of important projects, and the use of large amounts of 
funds (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2005).  
The policy adoption process follows certain principles, namely: the principle of collective 
leadership, democratic centralism, individual consultations, and decision by meetings (Lin, 
2013). The CCP Constitution states:  
“Party committees at all levels function on the principle of 
combining collective leadership with individual responsibility based 
on the division of work. All key issues shall be decided upon by the 
party committees after discussion in accordance with the principle 
of collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual 
consultations, and decision by meetings. The members of the party 
committees should earnestly exercise their functions and powers in 
accordance with the collective decisions taken and division of work” 
(The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
2017a).  
The CCP Constitution regulates the decision-making rules:  
“When discussing and making decisions on any matter, party 
organizations must keep to the principle of subordination of the 
minority to the majority. A vote must be taken when key issues are 
decided on. Serious consideration should be given to the differing 
views of a minority. In case of controversy over key issues in which 





except in emergencies where action must be taken in accordance 
with the majority view, the decision should be put off allowing for 
further investigation, study and exchange of opinions followed by 
another vote. Under special circumstances, the controversy may be 
reported to the next higher Party organization for a ruling” (The 
19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2017a).  
‘Regulations on local committees of the Communist Party of China’ sets out the decision-
making procedure of the party Standing Committee:  
“Meetings of the Standing Committee are usually held twice a 
month and may be convened at any time in case of important 
circumstances. The Standing Committee meeting shall be convened 
and presided over by the secretary of the party committee. The 
topics of the meeting shall be proposed by the secretary or can be 
proposed by other members of the Standing Committee after 
comprehensive consideration by the secretary. Voting can be 
conducted by means of raising hands, secret voting, or open voting 
according to the differences in the matters discussed and decided. 
The affirmative vote shall be passed by more than half of the 
committee members. Opinions from party committee members 
that are not present at the meeting shall not be counted in the 
votes. The alternate member has no right to vote. The meetings of 
the Standing Committee shall be faithfully recorded by specialized 
personnel, and the minutes of the meetings shall be prepared and 
issued for decisions. Documents submitted or issued in the name of 
the party committee after discussion at the meeting of the Standing 
Committee shall be issued by the secretary” (The Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2016).  
However, the party Standing Committee institution has challenges. The party secretary is the 
core leader (Chen, 2004). He/she may become too powerful and act arbitrarily (Jing, 2011). 
The centralisation of power also makes it difficult to supervise the power of the Standing 
Committee (Dai & Ye, 2010).  
In general, the more important the decision, the more likely it is to follow a complete 
decision-making process. For minor decisions or day-to-day decisions, it is not possible to 
use a full set of decision-making procedures. More decision-making functions adopt flexible 
or even non-procedural means. Therefore, Hu (1998) summarised the Chinese policy 
adoption process as a combination of order and disorder of elite decision-making. 
Policy legitimization 
Policy legitimization is an important stage of policymaking process (Chen, 2004; Zhang, 





leader can be legitimate, due to the personification of power11 (Pei, 2009). Second, the 
People’s Congress is the authoritative institution that could legitimate a policy/law (The 
National People's Congress of PRC, 2013). However, in practice according to an informal rule 
that exists widely in the legislative work, the CCP leads the legislative process in the People’s 
Congress (Han, 2001). Third, more commonly, policy and top-down programs are managed 
through the government system, not through the enactment of laws (Johnson, 2017). 
According to ‘Regulation on major administrative decision-making procedures’, the policy 
legitimization process can occur in government agencies (The State Council, 2019). This 
means the policy legitimization process does not necessarily occur in the legislature as in a 
parliamentary system (Chen, 2004), where the “policy decisions made by the legislature are 
usually accepted as legitimate” (Anderson, 2003, p. 119). Chief executives in the government 
system have the power to approve and promulgate policy, if it is not necessary to report to 
the upper-level government for approval. Prior to the approval and promulgation by chief 
executives, the government Legislative Affairs Office may review the policy options, but for 
reference only (Chen, 2004). In particular, major issues12 must be reviewed by the Legislative 
Affairs Office and discussed and decided in the government Standing Committee meeting or 
plenary meeting (The State Council, 2019). The above practice is considered the policy 
legitimization process in the government system (Chen, 2004). However, the public pays 
little attention to the legitimization process in China. Hu (1998, p. 251) concluded that:  
“In China, compared with policy agenda-setting and policy 
formulation, the importance of policy legitimacy ranks secondly. It 
is not that policy legitimacy itself is not important, but a legislating 
process is just a form. Society and the public do not place much 
value in this form. Agenda-setting and policy formulation process 
are much more substantial. As long as these two processes are 
completed, policy legitimacy is a matter of course.” 
4.3 Policy implementation 
Once a policy proposal is adopted and legitimized, it needs to be implemented. Three 
generations of international implementation research have used different theoretical 
 
11  Pei (2009) described it as a unique political power structure that is closely connected with the 
interpersonal relationship between political roles in the process of government decision-making. 
12 Major issues refer to (1) Important plans for economic and social development; (2) Major public 
policies and measures concerning public services, market supervision, social management, and 
environmental protection; (3) Major public policies and measures for the development, utilization and 
protection of important natural resources; (4) Major public construction projects to be implemented 
in the administrative region; (5) Major matters that have a major impact on economic and social 






approaches to study policy implementation, namely: top-down theories, bottom-up 
theories, and hybrid theories (Agyei, 2017). Top-down theories place the emphasis on 
policymakers, bottom-up theories focus on local bureaucrats, and hybrid theories 
incorporate the elements of top-down and bottom-up theories (Pülzl & Treib, 2007). This 
section uses the hybrid theory, namely, the Communications Model of Intergovernmental 
Policy Implementation (CM Model), to briefly introduce China’s policy implementation. In 
the CM Model, the state would put an already-decided federal policy into effect, and this 
could be affected by three factors (Goggin, 1990).  
The first factor in the CM Model refers to federal-level (central government who makes 
policy) inducements and constraints, such as “policy type, financial arrangements, clarity of 
the provisions of the decision, the consistency of the decision with other policy objectives, 
flexibility of goals and procedures, legitimacy and credibility of officials and agencies, and the 
existence of a provision for citizen participation” (Goggin, 1990, p. 35). In terms of policy 
type, Wei (2012) used a multiple-case comparison to analyse Chinese policy implementation, 
based on Lowi’s (1972) policy typology, namely: distributive policy, constituent policy, 
regulative policy, and redistributive policy. He indicated that the implementation deviation 
of a distributive policy was usually caused by the policy content. The implementation of a 
constituent policy relied on communication and cooperation among different levels of 
government and government departments. The implementation of the regulative policy was 
affected by the target groups and was constrained by a potential conspiracy between 
regulators and target groups. The implementation of the redistributive policy was influenced 
by local stakeholders who got involved in a competition for benefits. Zhu (2013) investigated 
the ‘housing monetization policy’ in Gui Zhou Province. This research indicated that the 
financial arrangements from central government became the biggest obstacle in the 
implementation of this policy. On the other hand, a provincial government would not 
question the legitimacy of this policy, which was made by the State Council. The central 
government only proposed a number of principles for the policy without substantive 
content. Detailed implementation plans were formulated by local governments. This meant 
the policy had great flexibility to fit local conditions and facilitate the implementation of 
local plans. 
The second factor in the CM Model refers to state and local-level (province, city, county 
government) inducements and constraints: interest groups, state and local officials, and 





represent their own interest and preference. They are independent, but also communicate 
and cooperate with each other (Goggin, 1990). Xie and Jiang (2007) studied China’s policy 
implementation and described it as an ‘interest game’ between higher and lower-level 
governments leading to the exchange of financial rights and political interests, and an 
interest game between governments at the same level to attract resources needed for 
economic growth. Guo and Yang (2019) studied China’s cross-domain governance of 
environmental policy. Four kinds of conflicts of interest (personal, institutional, 
jurisdictional, and regional), and lack of effective communication and cooperation between 
cross-domain governments resulted in the ineffective implementation of environmental 
policy.  
The third factor in the CM Model refers to: how state (provincial) decision-makers interpret 
the information they receive; the organizational capability to take actions; and ecological 
capacity concerning socioeconomic and political conditions (Goggin, 1990). In China, there 
was little literature on provincial-level decision-makers and the capacity of a provincial 
government. Most research has focused on the lower level. O'Brien and Li (1999) analysed 
Chinese street-level bureaucrats13 and found many policies from central government were 
misunderstood or partially implemented. The decision outcomes of local bureaucrats could 
turn a well-liked central policy into a disliked local policy. Lin and Jin (2012) surveyed 40 
villages about compensation for land acquisition in Jiang Su Province. They indicated that the 
socio-economic and political conditions, such as the characteristics of the families, the level 
of economic development, and the characteristics of the acquisition land, affected farmers’ 
degree of satisfaction. 
4.4 Characteristics of China’s policy process 
Heilmann (2017) discussed the crucial elements of China’s political system. One successful 
element ascribed was: a flexible bureaucratic system that was willing to experiment. “Almost 
any major Chinese policy had to go through a trial phase” (Zhou, 2012, p. 45). A policy might 
follow the ‘test and promotion’ pattern, which means policymakers took the experience 
gained in one area and popularized it in the whole area (Han & Wang, 2012). For example, 
the ‘Agriculture Film Recycling Action Plan’ set up 100 demonstration counties in Gan Su 
province, Xin Jiang Province, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Ministry of 
 
13 Street-level bureaucrats refers to “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the 






Agricultural and Rural Affairs, 2017). Another example is the regulation of government 
information disclosure. In 2001, Guang Zhou City was the first city that legislated the 
‘Government Information Disclosure Regulation’. This was followed by the ‘Regulation of the 
People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information’, issued by the 
State Council in 2007 (Liu, 2015).  
Wang and Lai (2013) summarised such policy experiments as four policy diffusion models: 
Top-down Hierarchical Diffusion Model, Bottom-up Policy Adoption and Promotion Model, 
Regional and Sectoral Diffusion Model, and Leader-laggard Model. First, the ‘Top-Down 
Hierarchical Diffusion Model’ was commonly seen in China. Policies formulated by 
governments and relevant departments at higher levels were directly adopted by 
governments from lower levels. Second, the ‘Bottom-up Policy Adoption and Promotion 
model’ means ‘local policy innovation – higher-level government adoption – push policy 
innovation widely’. This was an ‘absorption – radiation’ type of public policy diffusion (Zhou, 
2012). Third, a policy could diffuse among regions and sectors horizontally, indicated by the 
‘Regional and Sectoral Diffusion Model’. A government might facilitate easy access to 
information about policy innovations in adjacent areas. Due to the competitive relationship 
between adjacent governments, governments tended to actively track such policy 
innovation, either to learn or imitate, thus promoting the spread of the policy. Fourth, the 
‘Leader-laggard Model’. Since the ‘Reform and Opening-up’ in 1992, China's economic 
development has adopted an unbalanced development strategy, allowing some regions and 
people to get rich first. The eastern areas were in the leading position and became the 
template for economic development and public policy for the central and western regions.  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter briefly introduced China’s policy process and its key characteristics. This 
introduction is far from sufficient to illuminate China's complex policy processes. However, it 
provides a sufficient overview of China's policy process to help further understand how 
McConnell's framework could be considered in the Chinese context. Based on China’s policy 
process, the next chapter evaluates McConnell’s framework from a theoretical point of view 








Does McConnell’s Framework Fit the Chinese Context? 
– A Theoretical Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction 
This research uses McConnell’s (2015) framework to assess one environmental policy and its 
implementation in China, and then to interpret and understand the ensuing data. However, 
there are questions about whether McConnell’s framework fits the Chinese context. 
Therefore, it needs to be tested, through theoretical consideration and then applied and 
empirical field testing in China.  
Chapter 4 provided an overview of China’s policy process to provide the basis for this 
chapter which analyses, interprets, and critically evaluates McConnell’s framework from a 
theoretical point of view, in the Chinese context. The purpose is to lay the theoretical 
foundation for further testing and potential revision of the framework to fit this context. The 
chapter concentrates on responding to this question: what does the literature tell us about 
the potential application of McConnell’s criteria in the Chinese context? It is thus the 
preliminary step of adaptive learning and is part of the triangulation methodology applied in 
this research.  
The chapter begins with a literature review of the 13 evaluation criteria used in McConnell’s 
framework. Based on the theoretical evidence, improvements to the framework that would 
potentially aid in its application to China are discussed. Guidelines for evaluating degrees of 
success/failure using the criteria across the ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ realms in 
China are then developed. Finally, the causes of policy failure in the Chinese context are 
briefly reviewed. 
5.2 Evaluation of McConnell's Framework  
In this section, the 13 criteria used in McConnell’s (2015) framework are reviewed. The 
review is based on the Chinese political background and policy process. A standard template 
is used to present each of the review results, e.g., (1) McConnell’s criterion; (2) Literature 





5.2.1 Preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘preserving goals and policy instruments’ to 
judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “From a policymaker's perspective, a 
legislative process during which a bill is scrutinized, but the outcome is the preservation of 
the broad values and detailed policy instruments, is likely to be considered a success” 
(McConnell, 2010b, p. 41). This criterion targets the policy adoption process and uses the 
extent of changes between a policy proposal and its final blueprint as a benchmark.  
Literature review findings and implications 
A policy proposal can be rejected, revised, and/or adopted (Anderson, 2003). Policy 
adoption procedures may follow a democratic process in congress, legislature, city council, 
or other government structure. Participants, such as government officials, interest groups, 
political parties, and experts, may influence the adoption of a policy proposal (Anderson, 
2003). The public may have access to the information process, from which they could learn 
how and why a provision of the policy was rejected, accepted, or modified.  
As stated in 4.2.3, in China ‘a legislative process during which a bill is scrutinized’ more 
commonly occurs in government agencies as part of the policy adoption process, through 
defined deliberation procedures in government meetings. The decision is made by political 
elites through collective discussion in these meetings. Such processes may lack transparency 
and there is little (or no) need for the public to have input (Hu, 1998). The public may not 
know whether there have been any changes between a draft policy proposal and an 
approved policy, and if there have been, what they are (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, 
Criterion 1 may not apply to the Chinese political system. It is not supported by the 
literature. 
5.2.2 Securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘securing legitimacy’ to judge the success or 
failure of a policy/program. “The policymaking process failure can comprise of…being 





Literature review findings and implications 
As stated in section 4.2.3, in China the policy legitimization process more commonly occurs 
inside government agencies. Thus, there is a lack of public participation in the policy 
legitimization process (Huang & Wang, 2007). The public may not know whether the policy 
legitimization process is appropriate because of the non-transparent policy adoption process 
(Liu, 2004). However, when a political system loses public acceptability due to failures of 
equal distribution of benefits, inefficient administration, or severe conflicts of interest, it 
would trigger the so-called ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Huang, 2012). For example, proposals to 
construct facilities that are likely to have negative effects on their neighbours have often 
generated a NIMBY response and attracted public attention. There have been several cases 
of protests in China, such as a refuse incineration power plant program in Ji County of Tian 
Jin City. People were concerned about the missing or irregular process of Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) in these circumstances (L. He, 2016). In other words, ‘securing 
legitimacy’ is a critical question, especially when a political system loses public acceptability. 
Criterion 2 may apply in the Chinese context and it is supported in the literature. However, 
Anderson (2003, pp. 119-120) notes that “legitimacy is affected both by how something is 
done (i.e., whether proper procedures are used) and by what is being done”. Thus ‘securing 
legitimacy’ does not only refer to whether the policymaking process conforming to laws or 
rules, but also refers to the policy content or the actions of government. This broader 
interpretation may be most applicable in China.  
5.2.3 Building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘building sustainable coalition’ to judge the 
success or failure of a policy/program. “A successful process from the perspective of policy-
makers and policy-supporters can be the building of sustainable alliances. Obtaining formal 
approval is a key goal. A strong alliance that supports a particular policy initiative can be 
portrayed as the basis of successful policy” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 44). McConnell believes 
that building a coalition between policy stakeholders helps to obtain policy approval, and 
this is considered a success.  
Literature review findings and implications 
“Coalitions are temporary, means-oriented, alliances among individuals or groups which 
differ in goals” (Gamson, 1961, p. 374). Scholars have proposed theories to explain coalition 





coalition formation theory, and the advocacy coalition framework (Riker, 1962; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Coalitions seek to translate their beliefs or interests into policy by 
using strategies to influence government decision-makers and obtain preferred policy 
outcomes (Aksoy, 2010; Nelson & Yackee, 2012).  
However, “what constitutes a sustainable coalition is far from an exact science” (McConnell, 
2010b, p. 44). We do know that the ability to create coalitions is constrained by institutional 
arrangements (Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Institutional arrangements, 
especially participation rules, shape stakeholders’ influence on the policymaking process 
(Bryson et al., 2013; Fung, 2015; Nabatchi, 2012). Therefore, it is possible to judge from 
participation rules whether there are conditions conducive to the formation of coalitions, 
and to infer the influence of coalitions on decision-making based on the role of stakeholders 
in the policymaking process. 
Participation rules are defined as “shared understandings by participants about enforced 
prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted” 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 18). Among participation rules, boundary rules, choice rules, aggregation 
rules, and information rules are particularly relevant to participants’ interaction in 
administrative policy (Baldwin, 2019; Fung, 2006). Boundary rules shape the eligibility of 
stakeholders to enter or exit a position (Ostrom, 2005). Who participates in and how to 
select participants are the “primary features of any public decision-making device” (Fung, 
2006, p. 67). Choice rules shape “what a participant occupying a position must, must not, or 
may do” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 200). Aggregation rules specify how the interaction of 
participants shape the decision Ostrom (2005). For example, the public may not have the 
ability to influence the decision-making process or have the authority to shape the decision 
(Nabatchi, 2012). Information rules shape the way information flows and affect information 
availability for participants (Ostrom, 2005).  
Research into coalition formation in the field of public administration has not been a major 
focus of Chinese scholars. Some researchers have used the Advocacy Coalition Framework to 
explain the success of coalitions in obtaining preferred policy outcomes in the field of 
poverty alleviation policy, sport policy, and environmental policy (Hong, 2014; Jia, 2018; D. Li 
et al., 2019; Li & Wang, 2018; Wang & Li, 2016). Most of the literature has generally 
described national policy changes, but no meaningful empirical studies that clearly illustrate 
how a coalition is formed, and how institutions shape the influence of a coalition in terms of 





Chinese context needs further research. It is not clearly discussed in the literature and lacks 
empirical study.  
5.2.4 Attracting support for process (Criterion 4) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘attracting support for process’ to judge the 
success or failure of a policy/program. ‘Process’ in this context refers to the policymaking 
process, including agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption. McConnell 
indicated that attracting support for the policymaking process from stakeholders is essential 
for policymakers. A policy is considered a success if opposition to the policymaking process is 
outweighed by support. 
Literature review findings and implications 
The government may face an unsupportive public and this can result in the failure to 
develop a policy. However, attracting widespread support for the policymaking process 
(agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption) may not be essential in the Chinese 
political system. First, the government agenda can be set without public support. For 
example, in a closed-door model of agenda-setting (see Table 4.1), there is no place for 
stakeholder engagement in the policymaking process and their participation was not or is 
little needed (S. Wang, 2008), while elite politics is a typical characteristic of a closed-door 
agenda-setting process (Hu, 2013). Secondly, Hu (1998) found the public were rarely 
consulted and their influence on policy formulation was low. It was difficult to find a way to 
become involved in shaping policy, and local officials prefer to exclude stakeholders to make 
this process easier and quicker (Peters & Zhao, 2017). Thirdly, “the decision-makers of 
contemporary China are the power elites of the communist leadership” (Hu, 1998, p. 254), 
and the public have limited capacity to impact decision (Brombal et al., 2017). However, for 
key issues that strongly relate to the public interest, or that have a strong negative impact, 
key stakeholders may be invited and be consulted. But, there was concern that the public 
could not have a consistent influence on the policy process because the interaction among 
actors failed to be translated into policy decisions (Baldwin, 2019). 
China has been undergoing a transition from managerialism public administration to 
participatory public administration since the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China in 2002. Citizens have increasingly acted in ways that range from passive protest to 





regulations on major administrative decision-making procedures’ in 2019 secured this 
legitimacy and provided an opportunity for public participation in key administrative 
decisions (The State Council, 2019). Therefore, it is possible that attracting support for the 
policymaking process from stakeholders has become more important for policymakers 
nowadays in China. Therefore, criterion 4 may be suitable to judge the policymaking process 
in the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.5 Implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘implementation in line with objectives’ to 
judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “This is a classic ‘we did what we set out to 
do' measure of success” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 46). A policy/program that is implemented 
consistent with its objectives is considered a success. 
Literature review findings and implications 
In China, local governments carry out policies initiated by a higher authority (Chen, 2011; J. 
Wang, 2014). But they design and implement local policies/programs that meet local 
conditions (Chen, 1994), and “local governments have primary control over behaviour, policy 
and economic outcomes with each autonomous in its own sphere of authority” (Saich, 2004, 
p. 170). Therefore, it is possible that local programs may not meet or be implemented in line 
with policy objectives initiated by a higher authority, which is considered policy/program 
failure. First, fragmented bureaucracy may create a permissive environment that causes 
conflicts. Not only at the national level, but also at the local level - none of the fragmented 
bureaus in China, from which policies are initiated, can dominate the trans-department 
policymaking and policy implementation, e.g., more than ten departments were at 
loggerheads over China's health care reform plan, which was discussed national wide 
between 2005 and 2009 (Chen et al., 2010; Lieberthal & Lampton, 2018). Fragmented 
bureaucracy exacerbates institutional misalignments that “drive a wedge between policy 
directives and implementation” (Cai & Aoyama, 2018, p. 75). Second, the interest orientation 
of the local office may influence the implementation of a policy. The central government 
empowers local governments with defined degrees of flexibility in the light of local realities 
to avoid the ‘One Size Fits All’ metaphysical mistakes (Chen, 1994; Ding, 2003; Zhu & Pu, 
2001). But empirical studies show that local offices prioritize their own economic and 
political interests that stray from policy objectives (Fang, 2009; J. Zhao et al., 2013). For 





pollution fee, thus weakening the anti-pollution policy (Bao, 2015). Third, local governments 
may lack experience, professional staff, and the necessary resources to implement a policy 
program (Zhu & Pu, 2001). An empirical study of 334 division directors in Tian Jin City 
indicated that knowledge, professionalism, and experience of local decision-makers severely 
affected their judgment in terms of implementing local programs (Zhu & Tian, 2008). 
Therefore, a policy/program can be implemented inconsistently with its objectives, and 
criterion 5 could be used to judge policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. It 
is supported in the literature. 
5.2.6 Achieving desired outcomes (Criterion 6) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 233) proposed the criterion ‘achieving desired outcomes’ to judge the 
success or failure of a policy/program.  
“The nature of programmatic success can also encapsulate the 
subsequent impact on society; that is, outcomes…beyond specific 
targets or the bureaucracy of implementation, the broader impact 
or outcome that policy actually has can be used as an identifier of 
policy success” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 47).  
McConnell identified the need to think beyond the outputs or objectives of a 
policy/program, and include also the impacts on the economic, social and environmental 
aspects, such as ecological improvement (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 1991) 
and human behaviour changes (Dunn, 2003). 
Literature review findings and implications 
Outcome indicators are commonly considered in policy evaluations, in fields such as 
education, public health, and environmental protection. For example, changes in human 
behaviour and the ecological system can be used as indicators to judge the success or failure 
of a policy/program (Hargreaves, 2011; Soderholm, 2013; Whitmarsh et al., 2012; Wilson & 
Buller, 2001; Young et al., 2015).  
In China, most policy evaluations focused on describing policy/program outputs and whether 
these outputs had met policy objectives (T. Li, Y. Shen, et al., 2019; T. Li, Z. Yang, et al., 
2019). Much literature explains the influential factors in meeting policy objectives and causal 
relationships between policy objectives and policy approaches (Bao, 2015; Chen et al., 2011; 
Harris, 2006; Heberer & Senz, 2011; Simões, 2016; F. Wang, 2008; Wang & Yin, 2010; Wang 
& Zhang, 2004; Zhao & Wu, 2019).However, outcome indicators, such as social and 





policy/program, due to the lack of a standard evaluation system, necessary information, and 
a complete theoretical framework (Li et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it is 
possible to use outcome indicators to judge the success or failure of a policy/program in the 
Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.7 Benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 234) proposed the criterion ‘benefiting target group(s)’ to judge the 
success or failure of a policy/program. “Program success is the benefit it brings to a 
particular target group, interest or actor, based on issues such as class, territory, gender, 
religion and race” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 48). Benefit is defined as “any gain in human 
wellbeing” (Pearce, 1998, p. 86). It could come from the output, outcome, or impact of a 
policy/program. The success of a policy encapsulates the benefit it brings to target groups. 
Literature review findings and implications 
Public policy implementation may exert a positive or negative impact on the target group 
(Xie & Zhang, 2015). Providing benefit to the target group could be the objective of 
government, but also be a trade-off with the target group to facilitate the implementation of 
a policy/program (Gao, 2007; Zhang & Tan, 2014). Empirical studies in China further 
indicated that the conflicts between policy objectives and the interests of target groups 
impeded the implementation of public policies/programs (Bai, 2012; X. Ye, 2014). Therefore, 
criterion 7 could be a critical identifier of policy/program implementation success or failure 
in the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.8 Satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain (Criterion 8) 
McConnell (2015, p. 234) proposed the criterion ‘satisfying criteria highly valued in policy 
domain’ to judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “Policy sectors have values that 
are widely held by its community of actors” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 48). However, McConnell 
(2010a, 2010b, 2015) did not state clearly which criteria might be highly valued in particular 
policy sectors, giving only the example of efficiency which he considered particularly 
important. Besides, it is likely that the criteria that are valued will vary in different contexts. 
To apply the framework in a particular policy context, it is therefore important to identify 





There is much literature discussing the criteria for evaluating public policy in public policy 
sectors. Poister (1978) proposed seven criteria for policy assessment: effectiveness, 
efficiency, adequacy, appropriateness, equity, responsiveness, and executive capability. 
Nagel (2002) arranged a list of criteria in order of importance, namely from highest to 
lowest: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, public participation, predictable rules and 
procedural due process, and political feasibility. Dunn (2003) divided policy evaluation 
criteria into six aspects: effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, equity, responsiveness, and 
appropriateness. Patton et al. (2015) believed that the major criteria fall into four 
categories: technical feasibility, economic and financial possibility, political viability, and 
administrative operability. Scholars in China have also put forward their own standards for 
policy evaluation. The standards proposed by Zhang (1992) include effectiveness, efficiency, 
fairness, and feasibility (political acceptability, economic affordability, social acceptability, 
and management feasibility). Chen (2004) proposed five standards: productivity, efficiency, 
efficiency, equity, and responsiveness. Ning (2011) proposed seven standards: efficiency, 
effectiveness, policy influence, responsiveness, development of social productivity, social 
justice, and sustainable development of society. Xie and Zhang (2015) suggested six 
standards: effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency, adequacy, equity, and appropriateness. 
To apply McConnell’s framework in China, it was necessary to identify which criteria are 
highly and generally valued in public policy sectors. As discussed in section 3.3, a focus group 
discussion was conducted with five policy professionals in public policy and public 
administration. Drawing on the diverse literature identified above, a variety of criteria were 
identified, and of these, five were recognised as important in the Chinese context, namely: 
effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency, equity, and appropriateness. In line with these five 
principles: 
• Effectiveness evaluates whether “the valued outcome has been achieved” (Dunn, 2003, 
p. 358). This determination is consistent with criterion 6 and thus is considered under 
that criterion.  
• Responsiveness evaluates “do policy outcomes satisfy the needs, preferences or values of 
particular group” (Dunn, 2003, p. 358). This determination is consistent with criterion 7 
and thus is considered under that criterion. 
• The remaining three principle-based criteria, namely: efficiency, equity, and 





highly valued in policy domain’ in the Chinese context. It is proposed to use Criterion 8A 
(efficiency), Criterion 8B (equity), and Criterion 8C (appropriateness) in place of 
McConnell’s original Criterion 8 (satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain). 
However, giving them separate numbers (e.g., 8, 9, 10) would make it much harder to 
make comparison with McConnell’s criteria as originally numerated, so they are here 
referred to as 8A, 8B, and 8C. These three criteria are each considered in their own right 
and equally weighted with other McConnell’s criteria.   
a. Efficiency (Criterion 8A) 
Efficiency describes the amount of effort invested in a program to achieve the desired 
objectives (Dunn, 2003). Such effort includes (1) activities performed by program personnel 
and equipment used in the service of objectives, and (2) resources that support the 
performance of activities (Deniston et al., 1968). Therefore, efficiency incorporates two 
kinds of ratios: objectives attained to resource expended, and activities performed to 
resource expended (Deniston et al., 1968, p. 605). Program implementation is supposed to 
result in the attainment of policy objectives in an efficient way, which is considered a 
success. 
Efficiency is a critical indicator of policy/program evaluation. Access efficiency measured 
through a cost-benefit ratio, net benefit, unit cost, and cost-effectiveness analysis are the 
prevailing methods used in OECD countries, but also in China (Chen, 2004; European 
Environment Agency, 2001; National Center for Environmental Economics Office of Policy, 
2010; OECD, 2008; Pearce, 1998; Song, 2008). Empirical studies found inefficient public 
spending for environmental programs in China (Chen & Pei, 2013; Jin & Zhang, 2012; Pan, 
2013). Low efficiency resulted in government failure and potential policy failure (Chen, 2006; 
Qi, 2000), which indicated “government interventions lead to waste or redistribute income in 
an undesirable fashion” (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2009, p. 309). Therefore, criterion 8A could 
be one means of evaluating policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. It is 
supported in the literature. 
b. Equity (Criterion 8B) 
Equity concerns the question, “are the costs and benefits distributed equitably among 
different groups” (Dunn, 2003, p. 358). Equity includes distributive justice and procedural 
justice. Distributive justice concerns fair allocation, and procedural justice concerns fair 
procedures (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). Successful policy implementation ensures distributive 





The literature reviewed indicated that a lack of equality in public policy is one of the main 
reasons for public disputes and policy failure in China (D. Chen, 2014; Ren, 2008; Sun & Ma, 
2013). Public participation can help to improve social equity (Clark, 2018; Fung, 2015). It is 
necessary to not only ensure distributive equity, but also because the public require 
procedural justice (Li, 2009; Y. Yu, 2007). Therefore, criterion 8B could be a useful criterion 
for helping to evaluate policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. It is 
supported in the literature. 
c. Appropriateness (Criterion 8C) 
Appropriateness evaluates the tenability of assumptions underlying a policy’s objectives. 
Wedell-Wedellsborg (2017) indicated that an organisation needs to understand the basic 
needs of the target group, consider approaches that have been tried and the alternatives, as 
well as to find a solution that fits within internal and external constraints. More importantly, 
appropriateness refers to “whether desired outcomes (objectives) are actually worthy or 
valuable” (Dunn, 2003, p. 358). Therefore, a successful policy is able to meet policy 
intervention needs and propose sufficient and feasible solutions. More importantly, 
according to Dunn’s interpretation, appropriateness could imply a moral judgment on 
‘goodness’, such as consideration of sustainable development and human rights protection.  
Evaluating appropriateness is applied in multiple public sectors in China, such as government 
performance evaluation, city planning evaluation and land requisition compensation 
evaluation (see Mao & Liu, 2008; Wu et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2013). Most of the literature 
reviewed focused on program adaptation to the local environment and seeking potential 
alternative measures (see Cheng & Wang, 2002; Hao, 2011; Wang et al., 2010; Yu et al., 
2011). Chinese scholars considered appropriateness as a necessary evaluation criterion (Xie 
& Zhang, 2015). Therefore, criterion 8C could be a useful criterion for helping to evaluate 
policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.9 Attracting support for program (Criterion 9) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 234)  proposed the criterion ‘attracting support for program’ to judge 
the success or failure of a policy/program. ‘Program’ in this context refers to the policy 
implementation process. A policy is considered a success if opposition to the policy 





Literature review findings and implications 
Public policies are mainly implemented by administrative organizations which use a range of 
control techniques on the target groups in order for them to comply or act in a desired way, 
so as to garner their support for program “aims, values, and means of achieving them” 
(McConnell, 2014, p. 19). Anderson (2003) produced a list of control techniques for the 
effective implementation of a policy, including: non-coercive forms of action, inspection, 
licensing, loans, subsidies, and benefits, contracts, general expenditures, market and 
proprietary operations, taxation, directive power, services, informal procedures, and 
sanctions. Public support may occur from implementing one or more of these techniques 
(Peng & Zhang, 2015; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). 
These control techniques are widely applied during policy implementation in China and are 
introduced to attract public support and facilitate policy implementation. Much literature 
has discussed the effectiveness of these techniques. In terms of environmental policy, 
empirical studies indicated that economic measures and services, e.g., subsidies and 
information disclosure, were more effective than command and regulatory measures, e.g., 
directive power and sanctions (X. He, 2016; Wang & Wang, 2016; Yang, 2009; C. Yu, 2014). 
Empirical studies also indicated that failure to attract public support might reduce the 
quality and increase the difficulty of policy implementation (Cao et al., 2004; Jiang & Liu, 
2010; Wang & Chen, 2006; Wen, 2006; H. Zhao et al., 2013). Therefore, criterion 9 could be 
used to evaluate policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. It is supported in 
the literature. 
5.2.10 Enhancing electoral prospects/reputation (Criterion 10) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 234) proposed the criterion ‘enhancing electoral prospects/reputation’ 
to judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “Parties holding political office want to 
stay elected. Governments want to continue to govern. A policy that helps sustain, or even 
boost their prospects at the ballot box can be considered successful” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 
50). A policy is considered a success if it enhances the electoral prospects of a party or 
government. The support/opposition to policy implementation could be reflected through 
the ballot box. 
Literature review findings and implications 
The political party system China has adopted is multi-party 





Communist Party of China, which is different from both the two-
party or multi-party competition systems of western countries…The 
CCP holds the leading and ruling position (National People's 
Congress, 2018). 
In the Western world, the electorate can express their view about the performance of a 
party and government officials via their ballot choices (Boyne et al., 2008). However, China's 
political system is different from that of western countries, so electoral prospects of the 
party and government is not a relevant criterion for this study. In order to comply with 
McConnell’s interpretation of this criterion, the discussion is therefore focused on the 
promotion of officials, because the promotion incentive is the key factor in explaining 
China’s socio-economic reform and development over the past few decades (Zhou et al., 
2005). In this section, the logic of how government officials get promoted in China is 
discussed first. Whether this logic applies in terms of environmental performance is then 
discussed. Finally, reputation is considered.  
The logic of getting promotion in China 
In China, bureaucrats play a decisive role. The power of appointment, removal, or promotion 
of personnel is actually in the hands of CCP organizations. Government officials perform to 
influence higher officials (rather than voters) in order to achieve promotion (Chow, 1988). 
The literature indicates five factors that significantly influence whether government officials 
get promoted. These factors include: (1) the economic performance of the area they are 
responsible for; (2) their personal relationships in the political system; (3) their education 
level; (4) their working experience; and (5) their personal characteristics (X. Yu, 2014).  
First, economic performance is a key factor. Zhou et al. (2005) examined the turnover of 
provincial governors between 1979 and 2002. A positive correlation was found between 
economic performance and promotion. Zhou (2007) then summarised economic 
performance and promotion correlation as being a ‘Promotion Tournament Mechanism’, 
which indicated the potential link between economic growth and a competitive institution 
set by the upper-level government to stimulate local governments. Other studies supported 
the ‘Promotion Tournament Mechanism’. An empirical study of 31 provinces between 1978 
and 2008 argues that economic performance has a strong impact on the likelihood of 
promotion of deputy provincial governors (Feng & Wu, 2013). However, there were 
challenges to this perception. Bo (2002) examined the provincial leadership of 30 provinces 
since 1949. He found that central government focused more on the amount of tax collected 





prefectural level between 1990 and 2000 and found economic performance had little impact 
on their promotion.  
Second, ‘personal relationships matter’ is an unspoken rule in the Chinese political system. 
The study of the secretaries of provincial governors showed that personal relationships and 
political networks established were the key determinants that influenced their promotion. 
Secretaries with good relationships and networks could be assigned to a region where they 
might achieve better economic performance more easily (Opper & Brehm, 2007; Tao et al., 
2010).  
Third, educational credentials also lead to prestigious administrative posts or professional 
posts in China. ‘Regulations on the selection and appointment of leading party and 
government cadres’ requested local government officials should have a bachelor’s degree 
(The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2002). The higher the education 
level, the easier it is to be promoted. This is the reason why government officials were 
passionate about pursuing a higher degree (Sun & Hu, 2012). Walder (1995) proposed a 
dual-path model to illuminate how the political reward mechanisms operated in China. He 
indicated the bureaucracy emphasized the importance of knowledge and education, which 
was the basis for expert statecraft (Wang & Liu, 1990).  
Fourth, the promotion of Chinese government officials is greatly influenced by their previous 
working experience (Teiwes, 1967). Panel data of provincial and municipal governments 
from 1978 to 2010 indicated that working experience in a party committee or government 
would significantly increase the chances for promotion (Qiao, 2013). For example, working 
experience in the Chinese Communist Youth League Committee (Yang & Zheng, 2014) and 
working experience in economically well-developed areas or in important central level 
bureaus significantly affected the positive chances of promotion, especially at the provincial 
level (Huang, 2002).  
Fifth, personal characteristics, such as age, ethnic group, and gender, influence promotion. 
The ‘2009-2013 Party and Government Leading Group Plan’ clearly regulated the age limit 
and the constitution of the age group in the government and party systems (Naughton, 
2012). Qiao (2013) proved that with increased age, the odds of promotion decrease. The 
younger government officials are, then the easier they get promoted (Shen, 2013). Ethnic 
group membership was another factor. “In Xinjiang and Ningxia Province [in northwest 





(Landry, 2005, p. 43). Gender was another key factor. ‘Opinions on further training and 
selecting female cadres and developing female party members’ issued by the Organization 
Department of the Central Committee of the CCP requested at least 10%, 15%, and 20% of 
leaders be female in provincial, prefectural, and county-level CCP organizations and 
governments (Organization Department of the Communist Party of China, 2001).  
Environmental performance and getting promotion 
There is limited evidence on whether and how environmental performance influences the 
promotion of officials in China. An empirical study of 86 major Chinese cities between 2004-
2009 showed that environmental assessment had a positive effect on the probability of local 
officials’ promotion. But this result may only fit in major cities (Sun et al., 2014). However, 
the literature indicated that most environmental policies are often at odds with the 
preferences of politicians seeking re-election, and it is natural for utility maximisers to 
reduce subsidies or limit environmental projects (Schneider & Volkert, 1999). Zhang and Lu 
(2016) found similar results in their empirical study by interviewing 109 city mayors and CCP 
secretaries: spending on pollution control reduced the likelihood of officials being promoted. 
Empirical research also found that some officials took action which led to environmental 
pollution in order to get promoted, as stated by Jia (2017, p. 28): “politicians motivated by 
strong promotion incentives would like to promote growth, regardless of its social costs such 
as pollution”. More recent research further confirmed that the pressure on officials' 
performance to get promoted aggravated environmental pollution (Chu & Wang, 2019) and 
government officials’ turnover significantly aggravated PM2.5 pollution in prefecture-
level cities (Zhang & Tang, 2019). Therefore, it is questionable whether a successful 
environmental policy/program can contribute to the promotion of officials. Especially in 
rural areas, environmental policy/program covers a wide range of areas, but the cycle is 
long, and the effect is slow. At present, it is difficult to conduct rural environmental 
performance audits to assess officials' performance (Ge & Li, 2020).  
Reputation and getting promotion 
Jøsang et al. (2007, p. 5) defined reputation as “what is generally said or believed about a 
person’s or thing’s character or standing”. There is no denying that reputation is a factor 
influencing the behaviour of officials (Xu & Chen, 2018). For example, at the village level, the 





tighter the village cultural network, the more the villagers’ committee14 or village CCP 
branch committee members are willing to carefully consider and ensure the long-term 
benefit of the village. Although there is very limited room for village officials to get 
promoted (Hou, 2013), the purpose of doing so was to pursue prestige and ‘face’ (He & A'gu, 
2006). 
However, “political success can stem from programme implementation” (McConnell, 2010b, 
p. 51). This is what McConnell emphasized in Criterion 10, i.e., gaining reputation through 
policy/program implementation may help government officials to be promoted. But this may 
not be the case in China. As stated above, reputation is not one of the five factors that 
significantly influence government officials to be promoted, and in particular, reputation 
gained from environmental policy/program implementation may not contribute to the 
promotion of officials in China, especially in rural areas. On the contrary, spending on 
pollution control (which enhanced reputation with the pubic) reduced the likelihood of 
officials being promoted (Zhang & Lu, 2016). 
To sum up, the logic of getting promotion for Chinese and western officials is quite different 
(Wu & Ma, 2009). There was no evidence to show that environmental performance and 
reputation is an important factor in deciding the promotion of officials in China, especially in 
rural areas. Therefore, criterion 10 may not be suitable to judge environmental policy 
success or failure, in terms of government officials staying elected or getting promoted in 
the Chinese context. It is not supported by the literature. 
5.2.11 Easing the business of governing (Criterion 11) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 234) proposed the criterion ‘easing the business of governing’ to judge 
the success or failure of a policy/program. “An aspect of the business of government involves 
producing programs that might arguably leave much to be desired in terms of dealing with 
policy problems but help sustain its capacity to govern and pursue its other high-priority 
items” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 51). Governments seek to ease the business of governing by a 
range of means, such as controlling the policy agenda, narrowing the scope of a problem, or 
 
14 A villagers’ committee is a mass organization of self-government at the grassroots level, in which 
villagers administer their own affairs, educate themselves and serve their own needs and in which 
election is conducted, decision adopted, administration maintained and supervision exercised by 





implementing a placebo program. Successfully keeping an issue off the government agenda 
through the policy program can be considered a political success for the government.  
Literature review findings and implications 
In China, local governments tend to ease the business of governing through multiple 
measures. First, local governments prioritize issues that central government believes 
important because policymakers are obligated to follow the orders from the upper-level 
government to set the policy agenda (Heilmann, 2017). On the other hand, social issues can 
be excluded from the government agenda by being manipulated (Yang, 2013). Second, local 
governments prioritize issues that are easy to act on. For problems off the ‘safe range’, 
namely issues that are difficult to solve, involving multiple stakeholders, and concerning the 
redistribution of interests, local governments might ignore or not respond to public appeals 
(Yang, 2016). Such activities might cause social conflicts and negative political impact (Gan, 
2018). Third, local governments ease the business of governing through implementing 
programs that could achieve short-term effects. For example, in order to fulfil the objectives 
of the air pollution control policy, Zheng Zhou City, the capital city of He Nan Province, had 
identified 539 polluting companies in March 2017. But this number increased to more than 
10,000 four months later, due to pressure from the inspection and executive accountability 
(Zhou et al., 2017). “The haste to fulfil pollution-control targets may also reveal a greater 
interest in satisfying the demands of short-term campaigns than in undertaking long-term 
structural changes.” (Huang, 2018). Therefore, criterion 11 could help to explain a 
government’s activity in the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.12 Promotion of government’s desired trajectory (Criterion 12) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 235) proposed the criterion ‘promotion of government’s desired 
trajectory’ to judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “Policies can be politically 
successful if they promote the values desired by government and help maintain the broad 
trajectory of government and its programs” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 52).  
Literature review findings and implications 
In China, the government’s desired trajectories guide the objectives and direction of the 
country. They help a party to form common values, reach consensus, constrain party 





and its existence, make long-term planning pervasive, and keep society stable (Cai & Dong, 
2012; X. Chen, 2014; H. Li, 2011; K. Yu, 2007).  
In China, economic growth has been the fundamental government trajectory since the 
advent of the ‘Economic Reform and Open Up’ initiative in 1978. In 2012, environmental 
protection became another key trajectory, when the concept of ‘Ecological Civilization’ was 
first proposed at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (The 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2012). In 2015, it became one of the 
government trajectories and was written into the ‘Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the 
National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2015-2018)’ 
(National People's Congress, 2015). In 2018, ‘Building Ecological Civilization’ was further 
considered as a national goal for sustainable development in China (The 19th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2018). Besides economic growth and 
environmental protection, since 2017, poverty alleviation and government debt reduction 
have become the focus of the central government (The 19th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, 2017b).  
To follow or promote national trajectories are matters of political correctness for local 
governments. However, local governments are inevitably caught in the ‘dilemma’ between 
these trajectories (Zhang & Li, 2014). For example, since 2016, the so-called ‘Environmental 
Storm Act’ that aims to manage heavy polluting enterprises has shut down thousands of 
enterprises nationwide. This is the ‘One Size Fits All’ approach that caused widespread 
controversy, which is essentially a battle between economic development and 
environmental protection (Huang, 2018; Zhou et al., 2017). Therefore, criterion 12 is a 
meaningful policy measure in the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature. 
5.2.13 Providing political benefits for government (Criterion 13) 
McConnell’s criterion 
McConnell (2015, p. 235) proposed the criterion ‘providing political benefits for government’ 
to judge the success or failure of a policy/program. “There can be failure for government in 
the sense that any political benefits it may have accrued are outweighed by substantial 
opposition which is critical of government and accuses it of not acting in the public interest” 
(McConnell, 2016, p. 674). A policy is considered successful if political opposition is 





Literature review findings and implications 
The intention of many political actions is to gain political benefits. Li and Deng (1989, pp. 15-
16) define political benefit as “a kind of political need that has been satisfied during a 
people’s political life. It manifests itself in the acquisition or partial acquisition of political 
rights, political status, political honours, political preferences and political claims. Subjects 
have the practical feeling in terms of the extent that need is fulfilled”. Cao and Rong (2009, p. 
104) defined political benefits as “earning the right to participate in political life”.  
In China, government, party, government officials, and citizens can all get political benefits 
through public policy (Hong et al., 2006). At the government level, a government rationally 
allocates public resources and fulfils the public interest, in order to establish, maintain, and 
consolidate the economic, political and cultural order that is needed for society. This is 
considered a political success if a government successfully doing so (Huang, 2012; Yuan, 
2011; Yuan, 2014; Zhao, 2004). At the party level, in a democratic political system, a party is 
looking to benefit from vote-maximization (Downs, 2005). In China, the ruling party is 
looking for possible support for its government and considers such support as a political 
success (Cao & Rong, 2009). In terms of government officials and politicians, they will pursue 
power, political position, political influence, and reputation which are considered indicators 
of political successes (Cao & Rong, 2009). In terms of citizens, “the political interest of the 
citizen refers to their status in social and political life and the various social democratic rights 
they have gained” (Hong et al., 2006, p. 483), so that the successful acquisition of 
democratic rights is considered a political success. 
It should be noted that providing political benefit for government may not be the only 
indicator for evaluating support/opposition to policy. Failure to provide political benefits for 
the above groups can cause controversy or even opposition to a policy. When support is 
outweighed by the opposition, a policy/program may fail in terms of political impact. 
Therefore, criterion 13 can be used to evaluate the political impact of a policy/program in 
the Chinese context. It is supported in the literature.  
5.3 Overall evaluation of the criteria based on literature 
The literature provides insights into the 13 criteria originally used in McConnell’s framework. 
Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C are proposed to replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8 with these 





insights suggest the evaluation criteria can be grouped into three categories in terms of their 
relevance to the Chinese political environment.  
• Supportive: Twelve criteria were supported in the literature, namely: securing legitimacy 
(Criterion 2), attracting support for process (Criterion 4), implementation in line with 
objectives (Criterion 5), achieving desired outcomes (Criterion 6), benefiting target 
group(s) (Criterion 7), efficiency (Criterion 8A), equity (Criterion 8B), and 
appropriateness (Criterion 8C), attracting support for program (Criterion 9), easing the 
business of governing (Criterion 11), promotion of government’s desired trajectory 
(Criterion 12), providing political benefits for government (Criterion 13).  
• Unclear: One criterion was not clearly discussed in the literature and lacked empirical 
study, namely: building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3). The application of this 
criterion in the Chinese context needs further research.  
• Non-supportive: Two criteria were not supported by the literature, namely: preserving 
goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) and enhancing electoral prospect/reputation 
(Criterion 10). It may not be practical to investigate criterion 1 in the Chinese context as 
the process of setting policy is not open to the public. Criterion 10 reflects an opposing 
logic to the prevailing Chinese political environment.  
Preliminary insights into McConnell’s framework from other scholars are not adequate for a 
complete evaluation, especially regarding their potential utility in the context of China. Some 
criteria need further evidence to validate the findings. Evidence from a field investigation 
could provide deeper insights and may yield different results. The next section discusses 
potential improvements and adjustments to McConnell’s framework, for the purpose of 
utilizing it in the Chinese context.   
5.4 Potential improvements to McConnell’s framework  
First, as discussed in 5.2.8, in terms of efficiency, McConnell did not state clearly what is 
included in Criterion 8 (satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain). Therefore, 
efficiency, equity, and appropriateness were identified as criterion 8A, 8B, and 8C to 
elaborate Criterion 8 in the Chinese context. Therefore, the creation of 8A, 8B, and 8C is an 





Second, McConnell (2015) used a set of qualitative considerations to judge overall policy 
success/failure and success/failure with respect to individual criteria. If a policy failed, 
certain degrees of failure (Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success; Conflicted Failure = 
Conflicted Success; (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success) in each criterion could be 
observed. McConnell claimed that policy failure is not “all or nothing”, and “the three 
categories with ‘failure’ terminology helps to grasp the real politick of failure” (pp. 236-237). 
While it might be appropriate to evaluate overall policy success/failure via these three 
categories, this approach appears to be limited. Insights from the literature indicated there 
will be situations of absolute failure and absolute success for individual criterion. For 
example, in an authoritarian political system, there might be situations that no coalition 
among stakeholders was formed during the policymaking process, which indicated that 
Criterion 3 is an absolute failure. Therefore, it is proposed that Absolute Success and 
Absolute Failure be added to build on McConnell’s framework, but only with respect to 
individual criteria, not the overall policy.  
This research will use qualitative guidelines as per McConnell (2015, pp. 233-235) modified 
based on literature findings and as described above. The language of some items has been 
tweaked to make them easier to understand. Table 5.1 shows these modified guidelines for 
criteria evaluation as a basis to measure the degree of success/failure for each criterion 










Table 5.1 Guidelines for measuring degrees of success/failure for each of McConnell’s modified framework criteria across realms of ‘process’, ‘program’, 
and ‘politics’ (modified based on McConnell (2015, pp. 233-235) 
Key: AF = Absolute Failure; OF/MS: (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success; CF/CS: Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success; TF/RS: Tolerable Failure = Resilient 
Success; AS = Absolute Success. 











Government unable to 
produce its desired policy 
goals and instruments 
Preferred goals and 
instruments proving 
controversial and 
difficult to preserve. 
Some revisions needed. 
Policy goals and 
instruments 
preserved, despite 
minor failure to 
achieve goals 
All policy goals 
and instruments 
preserved 
2 Securing legitimacy Policy 
illegitimate 
Great challenges to 
legitimacy and of lasting 
significance 
Difficult and contested 
issues surrounding 
policy legitimacy, with 
some potential to taint 
the policy in the long-
term 
Some challenges to 
legitimacy but of little 
or no lasting 
significance 
No challenges to 
policy legitimacy 




No building of a 
sustainable coalition 
Coalition intact, 
although strong signs of 
disagreement and 
some potential for 
fragmentation 
Coalition intact, 









process or not 
to seek for 
support 
Criticism to process is 
virtually universal and/or 
support is virtually non-
existent 
Criticism to process and 
support are equally 
balanced 
Criticism to process is 















5 Implementation in 
line with objectives 
No objectives 
achieved 
Despite minor progress 
towards implementation 
as intended, program is 
beset by chronic failures, 
proving highly 
controversial and very 
difficult to defend 
Mixed results, with 
















Some small outcomes 
achieved as intended but 
overwhelmed by 
controversial and high-
profile failure to produce 
results 
Some successes, but 
the partial achievement 
of intended outcomes 
















Small benefits are 
accompanied and 
overshadowed by damage 
to the very group that was 
meant to benefit. Also, 
likely to generate high 
profile stories of 
unfairness and suffering 
Partial benefits 
realised, but not as 
widespread or deep as 
intended because of 
substantial failings 
A few shortfalls and 
possibly some 
anomalous cases but 










A few minor successes but 
plagued by failures 
Partial achievement of 
goals, but accompanied 
by failures to achieve, 
with possibility of high-
profile examples 
Not quite the 
outcome desired, but 
despite flaws, close 
enough to lay strong 
















not to seek for 
support 
Criticism to program aims, 
values and means of 
achieving them outweighs 
small levels of support 
Criticism to program 
aims, values and means 
of achieving them is 
equally balanced with 
support for same 
Criticism to program 
aims, values and 
means of achieving 
them is stronger than 
















Despite small signs of 
benefit, policy proves an 
overall electoral and 
reputational liability 
Policy obtains strong 
support and 
opposition, working 
both for against 
electoral prospects and 













11 Easing the business 
of governing 







Clear signs that the agenda 
and business of 
government struggles to 




taking up more political 
time and resources in 
its defence than was 
expected 
Despite some 
problems in agenda 
management, 
capacity to govern is 
unperturbed 
Successfully 
control on policy 
agenda to ease 
the business of 
governing 







Entire trajectory of 




broadly in line with 
goals, but clear signs 
that the policy has 
promoted some 
rethinking, especially 
behind the scenes 
Some refinements 
needed but broad 
trajectory unimpeded 
Government’s 






13 Providing political 
benefits for 
government 
There is no 
agreement 




Political disbenefits for 
government outweigh the 
political benefits 
Political benefits for 
government are 
balanced with political 
disbenefits 
Political benefits for 
government 
outweigh the political 
disbenefits 
There is no 
disagreement 
that there are 
political benefits 
for government 
Note. In the phase II study, Criterion 2 was defined more broadly to include the legitimacy of policy content or actions taken by the government. The scope 










5.5 Causes of policy failure 
McConnell (2016) distinguished between what could be observed if a policy failed and the 
cause of the policy failure. The causes of policy failure were categorized into three frames, 
namely: individual actor centred frame, institution/policy process centred frame, and 
societal centred frame (Table 2.3). McConnell extracted key points of the causes of policy 
failure from various theories and literature, and these key points provide an opportunity for 
further study. However, they may not be sufficient to unveil a Chinese policy story. 
Therefore, there is still a need to merge other scholars’ ideas regarding the cause of policy 
failure into McConnell’s explanation and to find empirical evidence to better understand the 
causes of policy failure.   
Policy failure may be caused by complex interactions of individual behaviours, institutional 
deficiency, and prevailing values of the society. Several theories shed light on such complex 
interactions, such as path dependency (Pierson, 2000), punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2010; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), complexity theory (Paul, 2012), 
self-organizing networks (Rhodes, 1996, 1997), and street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 2010; 
Moore, 1987, 1990). For example, Scott (1997, pp. 35-36) indicated three factors, namely: 
‘characteristics of the client, organizational characteristics, and attributes of the service 
provider, are the determinants of bureaucratic discretion in street-level bureaucracies’.  
 In China, the main focus of the formal institutional policy process is political stability (Chen, 
2016; Lawrence & Martin, 2012, p. 2). This ideology will drive an individual actor’s behaviour 
towards ‘blame avoidance’, which may lead to ‘deliberate cultivation of failure’ (Hood, 2002, 
2007, 2010; Shi, 2014; Weaver, 1986). This kind of failure may be the outcome of a complex 
policy process that is characterized by the interaction among actors as a ‘game or arena’ and 
a ‘trade-off’ (Zheng et al., 2010). And the ideology may be coloured by so-called ‘Local Crony 
Capitalism’,  which indicates that local governments will benefit from using their political 
and economic power to support businesses linked to political leaders (Bai et al., 2014).  
The situation may be more complex in rural China (Ku, 2003). ‘Guanxi (personal 
relationship)15’, ‘renqing (favour)16’, ‘bao (reciprocity)17’, and ‘guanliao zuofeng 
 
15 “guanxi” refers to “interpersonal relationships or connections in almost every realm of life in the 
Chinese culture, from kinship to friendship and from politics to business” (Chan, 2006).  
16 “renqing”, partly refers to “the social norms by which one has to abide in order to get along well 
with other people in Chinese society” (Gabrenya Jr & Hwang, 1996, p. 314).  





(bureaucratic)18’ may also be the key reasons for policy success or failure, especially in 
policymaking and implementation processes (Chan, 2006; Ho, 1976; Hu, 1944; Hwang, 1987; 
Jacobs, 1979; King, 1980; King & Myers, 1977; Liu, 1982).  
5.6 Summary 
This chapter evaluated McConnell’s (2015) framework from a theoretical point of view in the 
Chinese context. Using insights from the literature and a focus group, Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C 
are proposed to replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8, and all criteria were grouped into 
three categories, namely: supportive, unclear, and non-supportive for potential applicability 
in the Chinese context. However, further investigation is needed to provide complementary 
evidence to support McConnell’s framework application. Consequently, absolute success 
and absolute failure have been added to complement tolerable failure, conflicted failure, 
and (outright) failure, to fully evaluate the criteria. Guidelines for measuring degrees of 
success/failure against each criteria across the realms of ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ 
were developed, based on McConnell and modified, for the purpose of testing McConnell’s 
framework through field investigation in China. Finally, the causes of policy failure in the 
Chinese context are briefly reviewed to complement McConnell’s (2016) explanations on 
policy failure. The next chapter reports on the first phase of the field investigation of 
McConnell’s framework in China. It involves a trial to assess the framework’s utility and gain 
preliminary insights into the criteria applied in the Chinese context. 
 
 






 Evaluation of McConnell’s Framework - Phase I Case Study 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 reported the theoretical findings underpinning potential application of 
McConnell’s (2015) policy evaluation criteria in the Chinese context and McConnell’s (2016) 
explanations on policy failure are briefly reviewed. Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C were used to 
replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8. Insights from literature grouped the evaluation 
criteria into three categories, namely: supportive, unclear, and non-supportive. Guidelines 
for evaluating degrees of success/failure of these criteria across the ‘process’, ‘program’, and 
‘politics’ realms were also developed. 
As the next step of the adaptive learning and triangulation approach, this chapter reports on 
the first phase of the case studies evaluation of the modified set of McConnell’s policy 
evaluation criteria. The first phase case application was a trial to assess the criteria’s utility 
and gain preliminary insights into the policy evaluation criteria applied in the Chinese 
context, as well as draw conclusions about policy success or policy failure. Two cases studies 
were conducted in in rural China with different socio-political and geographical contexts. 
One type of the Comprehensive Environmental Treatment (CET) policy program that deals 
with rural domestic waste was selected. The policymaking process of the two case studies 
occurred at the township level. 
The chapter begins with a description of the case studies. The application of each criterion to 
these case studies is considered individually within the context of a standard reporting 
template and an overall evaluation of the criteria is then presented. Finally, the findings 
from the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (the policy effect evaluation 
guideline for the CET policy from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Appendix C) 
evaluation undertaken as a third-party investigator of these cases is then presented. 
6.2 Case studies 
- Case 1: 
V1 village (at T1 township in CT1 county of CY1 city in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) 





permanent households, and 1,000-2,000 residents. The village was an important potato 
planting and processing base. Domestic waste, domestic wastewater, fertilizer pollution, 
animal excreta, and especially plastic film used for potato planting were the key 
environmental problems.  
A CET policy program (P1 program) targeting rural domestic waste management was 
initiated and implemented for this village. This program aimed to construct public waste 
collection points and manage street cleaners to clean and collect garbage.  
The P1 program was proposed, designed, and approved by the T1 township government. 
The villagers’ committee (VC) was then informed about the decision and requested to 
provide suggestions to the T1 township government. A village meeting was held with the VC 
or village CCP branch committee (VPBC) members, and villagers’ representatives (VR) to 
discuss the site choice of the waste collection points. The T1 township government then 
constructed garbage collection points (see Plate 6-1), and the Environmental Sanitation 
Department of T1 township government operated the program.  
 
Plate 6-1 One garbage collection point in V1 village 
- Case 2: 
V2 village (at T2 township in DS2 district of Beijing City) was selected as Case 2. V2 village 
covers an area between 5-10 km2, contains 50-100 permanent households with 100-500 
residents. Tourism is the supporting economy with peach production being the traditional 
business of the village. Domestic waste (including garbage produced by tourists), 
groundwater pollution, and river pollution are the key environmental problems. In V2 





initiated and implemented. This program aimed to construct a public waste collection point 
and manage street cleaners to clean and collect garbage.  
The P2 program was proposed, designed, and approved by the T2 township government. 
The VC was then informed about the decision and required to provide suggestions for the 
location of the waste collection point. The T2 township government then constructed 
garbage collection points (see Plate 6-2). A sanitation company contracted by T2 township 
operated the program with the collaboration of V2 villages’ committee.  
  
Plate 6-2 Garbage collection point in V1 village 
6.3 Criteria evaluation 
The results of the case studies are presented in the following format for each criteria: (1) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2; (2) Overall findings and implications. The respondent codes 
used in reporting the results are in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. A set of standard phrases at the 
end of each section is used to judge how much extent a criterion fit the Chinese context (see 
Table 3.4). 
6.3.1 Preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
An internet search was used to in an attempt gather general information such as summaries 
of township CCP Standing Committee meetings, township government executive meetings, 
and township government plenary meetings about the policy adoption process of both P1 
and P2 programs. These meeting summaries may contain discussions, decisions made, and 
dissenting opinions. However, the meeting summaries could not be located. Interviewees 
also indicated that they knew little of the policy adoption process, including the content of 





about the lack of participation of the local office in this process: “Township government just 
told us to build one [waste collection point]. We were not sure who would build it and how it 
would be built.”  
Overall findings and implications 
Without access to the information needed to assess Criterion 1 (see Table 5.1), Criterion 1 
could not be measured in either case. Criterion 1 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context, due to 
lack of information and non-transparent policy adoption process at the township level. 
Whether this criterion fits the Chinese context needs further research.  
6.3.2 Securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, it was unclear whether the process legitimacy of both programs was secured. 
Most interviewees focused on the very existence of the program or the fact that the 
programs had been approved, as interviewee 1VR noted: “If the program was illegitimate, it 
would not be approved.” However, this is a false argument because interviewees did not 
know whether the policy legitimization process is proper. The interviewees rarely 
consider/lack interest in whether these programs conforming to laws or rules because their 
interests were not violated. ‘Conflict’, ‘benefit’, and ‘interest’ are the keywords used in the 
interviews, which indicated that the public may neglect process legitimacy as long as the 
programs ‘benefit them’, ‘don’t cost me a penny’, or ‘there is no interest violation’, e.g., “we 
do trust the government as long as it is a good program that benefits and serves the public 
without charging us any money. If the program violated our interests, it would influence the 
public trust of the government (interviewee 2BR).”  
Overall findings and implications 
“Legitimacy is affected both by how something is done (i.e., whether proper procedures are 
used) and by what is being done” (Anderson, 2003, pp. 119-120). ‘Whether proper 
procedures are used’ refers to whether the policymaking process conforming to laws or 
rules. ‘What is being done’ refers to policy content or actions of the government. When 
legitimacy is considered in this first sense of ‘whether proper procedures are used’ 
(McConnell focuses on this aspect, see section 5.2.2), it was unclear whether the process 
legitimacy of either program was secured. Without access to the information needed to 
assess process legitimacy (see Table 5.1), Criterion 2, if assessed solely in terms of process 





broadly to include legitimacy of actions taken, it ‘potentially fits’ the Chinese context. As 
found in case studies, the idea of ‘focusing on content, less on procedure’ always exists in 
the public mind in China (Guo & Peng, 2014). “No matter what the procedure was, as long as 
the public accepted and endorsed the content, it would be considered legitimate” (Chen, 
2004, p. 227; Zhang, 1992, pp. 23,172). Though not obviously observed in both cases, 
legitimacy may be challenged by the stakeholders in other programs when stakeholders 
challenge the policy content or actions of the government.  
6.3.3 Building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, the policymaking process took place at the township government level. Table 
6.1 shows the participation rules. Policymaking at this level was more exclusive. Most of the 
public, including the villagers, VR, and village CCP members could not participate in such a 
process. The public had little expectation of influencing a public action and as noted by 
interviewee 1FR: “Villagers did not know this [the policymaking process]”. The VC or VPBC 
members could propose suggestions and influence the decision-making of the township 
governments, but they cannot vote. The township governments preserved their authority 
and power to accept, revise, or deny suggestions. In this centralized authority, decision-
making was concentrated in the hands of township government officials. The VR, village CCP 
members, VPBC members, and VC members mainly acted as information intermediaries 
between villagers and the township government. In both cases, a coalition among 
stakeholders was not formed. Boundary rules restrict most of the public from entering the 
policymaking process, choice rules defined their possible actions, and aggregation rules 











Table 6.1 Participation rules recorded in the policymaking process at the township level in 
Cases 1 and 2 
Participants Boundary 
Rules 
Choice Rules Aggregation 
Rules 
Information Rules 
Villager No Entry None None Provide information 
through VR and village 
CCP members 
VR No Entry None None Intermediary 
Village CCP 
member  
No Entry None None Intermediary 
VPBC and VC 
member 













from the above sources 
and send feedback to 
the members of the 
VPBC and the VC 
 
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, coalitions were not formed. Criterion 3 was 
deemed Absolute Failure in both cases. Criterion 3 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context when 
the policymaking process occurs at the township level. However, there is the possibility that 
a coalition could be formed at the village level to facilitate the approval or denial of a 
program. Most of the public, namely villagers, may enter the policymaking process, 
especially for major issues that broadly affect them. Interviewee 2HT used the example of a 
controversial sewage treatment program that was not allowed to continue in this village to 
make the point:  
For major issues, the VR, VC members, or the villagers may propose 
their demand and provide suggestions. They will conduct a 
democratic appraisal in the VR meeting or village CCP meeting to 
decide. If villagers think the program is needed, they will endorse 
with their signature to confirm, and then report to the township 
government…I think they [township government] should coordinate 
with the VC first about how to build, whom to build and how it [the 
sewage treatment facility] looks like. The construction team just 
came and dug [pipelines]. I said I can’t let you work here, because I 
have to be responsible for our villagers. 
 
19 “Democratic centralism emphasizes the dialectical unity between democracy and centralism, which 
is reflected in practice as the decision-making mechanism of the leaders that fully respects the 
collective discussion” (Chen et al., 2010, p. 61). The principle of ‘democratic centralism’ is written in 





Therefore, further investigation is needed to examine coalition formation at the village level, 
and even at the county level as a complement to the first phase study. 
6.3.4 Attracting support for process (Criterion 4) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, attracting public support during the policymaking process was not essential. 
Both township governments had not sought support by seeking advice from the public 
during agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption processes. Most of the public 
could not participate in such processes. Although both villages were requested to provide 
site choice suggestions for the waste collection point, they were not informed about the 
decision until program implementation.  
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the township governments had not sought 
public support during the policymaking process. Criterion 4 was deemed ‘Absolute Failure’ in 
both cases. Reflecting on public policy process is the value of public policy evaluation (Van 
der Knaap, 1995). Ignoring consultation feedback from the public or local officials may lead 
to potential implementation problems or result in political backlash (McConnell, 2015). So, 
not seeking support for the policymaking process is considered a failure. If public 
policymaking in China does not require public support, then this criterion does not apply in 
China. However, as stated in 5.2.4, China has been undergoing a transition from 
managerialism public administration to participatory public administration 2002. There is 
the possibility that for other programs, attracting widespread public support is essential. 
Therefore, Criterion 4 ‘may fit’ the Chinese context. Besides policymaking at the township 
level, further investigation at the village and county levels is needed to supplement the first 
phase study.  
6.3.5 Implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5) 
‘Building Ecological Civilization’20 is the core concept of the CET policy. There are two specific 
policy objectives: (1) control the most prominent environmental pollutions in rural areas; (2) 
educate the target groups on environmental protection and help the target groups to 
participate in rural environmental protection (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010a). 
 
20 Resource conservation and circular development are two important concepts of Ecological 





Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
- Case 1: 
The P1 program partially met the first objective. In V1 village, domestic waste, domestic 
wastewater, fertilizer pollution, animal excreta, and especially plastic film used for potato 
planting were considered the key environmental problems by interviewees (see Plate 6-3). 
The P1 program targeted one of the problems (domestic waste), but four other long-term 
and tricky problems remained unsolved.  
  
Plate 6-3: Plastic film left on the farmland (left) and a self-use sewage well without leakage 
protection (right) 
The P1 program did not meet with the second objective. There was no evidence that the 
program educated the villagers on environmental protection to establish the concept of 
ecological civilization and helped villagers to participate in rural environmental protection. 
The program did not educate the public to sort waste and facilitate such behaviour. There 
were also no incentives to encourage household waste recycling to control the rural 
domestic waste generated. This is a chronic failure. After all, measures that help changes in 
thoughts and behaviours are prerequisites for sustainable development (Dobson, 2007; 
Hofman-Bergholm, 2018). 
- Case 2: 
The P2 program partially met the first objective. In V2 village, domestic waste (including 
garbage produced by tourists) was considered one of the major environmental problems by 
the interviewees. But the long-term and tricky problems in this village, such as groundwater 





The P2 program met the second objective. The program educated the villagers on 
environmental protection. The street cleaner would always remind the villagers to use the 
garbage can provided to them. Interviewee 2SC noted: “When we collect garbage, we told 
them [villagers] don’t dump garbage conveniently as you have a garbage can. And we will 
collect them.” In addition, an award called ‘Civilized Household’ was offered NZ$60 to a well-
performed family to educate the public and guide their behaviours. The program also helped 
the villagers to participate in rural environmental protection, through providing free 
services, such as free garbage cans to each household for collecting and roughly sorting 
waste (see Plate 6-4 right), and collecting large appliances and furniture for free. 
  
Plate 6-4 A broken sewage treatment facility (left) and garbage collected from households 
are roughly sorted (right). 
Overall findings and implications 
In Case 1, the P1 program partially met the first objective, but not the second objective. In 
terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, despite progress towards implementation as 
intended, the program was beset by chronic failures, proving highly controversial and very 
difficult to defend. Criterion 5 was deemed (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success in Case 1. In 
Case 2, the P2 program partially met the first objective and met the second objective. In 
terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the implementation objectives of the program 
were broadly achieved, despite minor failures and deviations. Criterion 5 was deemed 
Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success in Case 2. It is necessary to evaluate the whether a 
policy/program is implemented consistent with its objectives to fully judge its success or 





6.3.6 Achieving desired outcomes (Criterion 6) 
The objectives indicated in section 6.3.5 are intended to achieve the following outcomes: (1) 
improve the rural environment and sanitation; (2) increase environmental awareness and 
pro-environmental behaviours of the target groups (The State Council, 2009).  
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
- Case 1: 
The P1 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent. Interviewee 1VR 
stated: “No one cleans the garbage before, and now the street cleaners clean the garbage. 
The environment [sanitation] has improved (see Plate 6-5 left).” However, the potential 
outcome was weakened by poor program management. Waste collected from V1 village was 
not transferred to the waste disposal facility but dumped into the pits near the village (see 
Plate 6-5 right). Interviewees indicated that the garbage truck driver probably embezzled the 
fund that was supposed to pay for the landfill. But the VC and VPBC did not participate in the 
implementation of the P1 program, thus they had no authority to manage this matter.  
  
Plate 6-5 The rural environment has improved (left) and one of the illegal dumping site 
(right) 
The P1 program failed to achieve the second desired outcome. The potential outcome was 
damaged by design flaws at garbage collection points. Some garbage collection points were 
not close to villagers’ homes and the entrances to the garbage collection points were too 
small to use a wheelbarrow to dump waste. As interviewee 1VS stated: “The entry of 
garbage collection points is too small, and garbage can’t be collected by the rubbish 
collector. It was a design problem (see Plate 6-6 top left).” Thus, some villagers did not use 





top right). The potential outcome was also damaged by the implementation pathway, such 
as poor management of street cleaners. Interviewee 1FR stated: “The street cleaners did not 
collect the garbage routinely but wait till the garbage collection points were full. Only before 
the inspection from the upper-level government, the street cleaners would then actively 
transfer the garbage from the collection points.” The street cleaners, who were hired by the 
Environmental Sanitation Department of the T1 township government, were not local 
residents. They travelled from T1 township to V1 village to do the service. This was one 
reason why the street cleaners did not actively collect waste on time. Some interviewees 
indicated that on several occasions the garbage collection points were full, but no street 
cleaners came to do the job, thus further reducing their willingness to use the facilities (see 
Plate 6-6 bottom). The potential outcome was further damaged by the missing of education 
on sorting waste, necessary equipment and incentives to recycle waste. Domestic waste in 
V1 village remained unsorted and mixed (see Plate 6-6 bottom).  
  
  
Top: The newly built garbage collection point (left) and the pit dug by villagers to dump waste (right). 
Bottom: Waste left in the garbage collection point (left) and uncollected waste in the village (right). 
Plate 6-6 Rural waste management in V1 village 
 
- Case 2: 
Most interviewees thought the P2 program had achieved a very high level of success in 
terms of the first desired outcome, e.g., the rural environment had been greatly improved 





environment is much better. This is the truth.” The reason why the program achieved a very 
high level of success was because the VC and VPBC of V2 village got involved in the program 
implementation. Although a sanitation company contracted with T2 township operated the 
P2 program, the VC and VPBC of V2 village had negotiated with the T2 township government 
and insisted on hiring local residents as street cleaners under their supervision. The VC 
strictly then monitored the job of street cleaners. The street cleaners were requested to 
collect the garbage from each household every day (see Plate 6-7 bottom).  
  
  
Top: Rural environment has improved. 
Bottom: Street cleaners collect waste from every household (left), and waste collected from every 
household were transferred (right). 
Plate 6-7 Rural waste management and outcome in V2 village 
 
The P2 program successfully achieved the second desired outcome. Villagers roughly sorted 
the garbage. In addition, they did not throw trash around but actively cooperated with the 
job of street cleaners. Interviewees indicated that villagers felt it was more of a disgrace to 
litter when the street cleaners, who would have to pick up the litter, were locals. 
Overall findings and implications 
In Case 1, the P1 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent, and it 
failed to achieve the second desired outcome. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, 
the program achieved some outcomes as intended, but was overwhelmed by controversial 





Marginal Success in Case 1. In Case 2, the P2 program significantly achieved the first desired 
outcome, and it successfully achieved the second desired outcome. In terms of the 
evaluation items in Table 5.1, the program successfully achieved all desired outcomes. 
Criterion 6 was deemed Absolute Success in Case 2. It is necessary to evaluate the achieved 
outcomes of a program to fully judge its success or failure. Criterion 6 ‘clearly fits’ the 
Chinese context. It was further noted that an adequate solution for rural domestic waste 
management needed multiple and complementary measures to facilitate and encourage 
pro-environmental behaviours. The participation of local residents and appropriate 
delegation of authority to the local office during the implementation produced better 
outcomes. 
6.3.7 Benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
‘Benefit’ is a key word mentioned several times by interviewees. It is considered the core 
basis to judge program success or failure.  
- Case 1: 
The P1 program benefited the target group, but the benefit was reduced by poor program 
management. Interviewee 1VR stated: “Now garbage is collected. And the garbage 
collection points are not too close to any household, so they don’t smell.” However, 
interviewees indicated that there were several times when the garbage collection point was 
full, and the street cleaners did not transfer the garbage on time. Villagers would have to 
dump the garbage somewhere else. Interviewee 1FR stated: “They [the garbage collection 
points] benefited us a little because of this [the above reasons].”  
- Case 2: 
The P2 program benefited the target group to a very high extent. In V2 village, the street 
cleaners collected garbage from each household and transferred it to the garbage collection 
point daily and on time. Some program measures, such as providing a free garbage can to 
each household and collecting large appliances free of charge, also benefited villagers. 
Meanwhile, all street cleaners hired by the P2 program were local residents. The P2 program 





Overall findings and implications 
The P1 program benefited the target group, but the benefit was reduced by poor program 
management. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, partial benefits were realised, 
but not as widespread or as deep as intended because of substantial failings. Criterion 7 was 
deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 1. The P2 program benefited the 
target group to a very high extent. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the 
intended target group benefited without damage. Criterion 7 was deemed Absolute Success 
in Case 2. Benefit is central for the target group to judge the success and failure of a 
program. Criterion 7 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
6.3.8 Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C 
Criterion 8A (efficiency), Criterion 8B (equity), and Criterion 8C (appropriateness) are 
proposed to replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8 (satisfying criteria highly valued in 
policy domain). These three criteria are each considered in their own right and equally 
weighted with McConnell other twelve criteria. 
Efficiency (Criterion 8A) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
Both programs were designed and implemented by the township government, and they 
were provided free to the public. However, it was unclear whether efficiency was achieved. 
The interviewees did not know or did not care about the cost of the programs. Interviewee 
2VR stated: “It [the program] did not charge us and affect us. It gave us all the good things. 
So, we don’t care about these things [efficiency].” Meanwhile, program cost data of both 
programs could not be located and retrieved. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate the 
ratio between objectives attained and resource expended, or the ratio between activities 
performed to resource expended in either case.  
Overall findings and implications 
Without access to the information needed to assess Criterion 8A (see Table 5.1), Criterion 8A 
could not be measured in either case. However, although the public lack the necessary 
information to judge efficiency or may not care about this criterion, it is possible this 
criterion matters to the public, especially in programs that are more transparent and having 
active public participation in the policy process, or in programs that charge the target group. 





Equity (Criterion 8B) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
- Case 1: 
Most interviewees considered the P1 program distributed benefits equally because most 
villagers benefited from the programs. However, interviewees also indicated that it was hard 
to reach absolute equity, thus distributive equity might not be their priority concern. 
Interviewee 1VC stated: “There is no absolute equity in rural areas. Some households are far 
away from the garbage collection points, and some are closer.” On the other hand, 
interviewees indicated that local residents were excluded from program operation. This 
might be considered a procedure inequity.  
- Case 2: 
Most interviewees considered the P2 program distributed benefits equally because most 
villagers benefited from the programs. However, distributive equity might not be their top 
concern. Interviewee 2HT stated:  
As far as I know, we haven’t reached this step [considering equity]. 
The environmental program can fulfil the basic needs of the public. 
But the villages are different. Some are richer, some are located in 
the mountain areas, and some are large. For example, in T2 
township, two villages account for 80% population of the township. 
It is hard to achieve absolute fairness, but only relative fairness. 
Conversely, interviewees complained that V2 village should be paid to build the garbage 
collection point, rather than the construction team contracted by the T2 township 
government. Interviewee 2VS stated: “I just think it was a waste to find a company to do the 
business [build the garbage collection points]. In the end, the VC actually did the 
management job.” This might be considered by interviewees as a procedure inequity.  
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, both the P1 and P2 program secured 
distributive equity but was accompanied by failures in achieving procedural equity. Criterion 
8B was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in both cases. Distributive equity 
might not be a prioritized concern for villagers and local authorities, but they might pay 
some attention to procedural equity. However, evidence was insufficient to ascertain 





Further research is needed to investigate other types of programs, especially when inequity 
caused conflicts. 
Appropriateness (Criterion 8C) 
As discussed in section 5.2.8, in terms of appropriateness, a successful policy should: (1) 
meet the policy intervention needs; (2) propose sufficient and feasible solutions; (3) and 
more importantly, imply a moral judgment on ‘goodness’, such as consideration of 
sustainable development. 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In China, ‘household sort, village collect, township transfer, and county disposal’ is the basic 
mechanism of rural domestic waste disposal (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2016). At 
each village, domestic waste should be sorted and then collected.  
- Case 1: 
The P1 program met policy intervention needs and provided basic infrastructure and 
services for rural waste collection. However, the program was not implemented in a 
sustainable way. The program did not educate the public to sort waste and facilitate such 
behaviour. Domestic waste in V1 village was unsorted and mixed. There were also no 
incentives to encourage household waste recycling to control the rural domestic waste 
generated.  
- Case 2: 
The P2 program met policy intervention needs and provided sufficient infrastructure and 
comprehensive services for rural waste management. The program was also implemented in 
a sustainable way. Garbage cans were given to each household to facilitate waste collection 
and allow the villagers to roughly sort the waste. Sorting was done by householders in a 
sustainable way. They separated organic kitchen waste to use as fertilizer or feed animals.   
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the P1 program was considered partially 
appropriate but accompanied by failures to implement it in a sustainable way. Criterion 8C 
was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 1. In terms of the evaluation 
items in Table 5.1, the P2 program was considered appropriate and implemented in a 





can meet policy intervention needs, propose the adequate/right solutions, and more 
importantly, imply a moral judgment on ‘goodness’. Criterion 8C ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context.  
6.3.9 Attracting support for program (Criterion 9) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, similar ‘control techniques’ (see section 5.2.9) were applied to attract support 
from the public and government officials. First, as discussed in Criterion 7, both programs 
provided benefits to the target groups to attract their support. Second, direct power was 
used to bind private parties and lower-level government officials to achieve compliance. In 
both cases, the VS, VC, township government officials, and some villagers were CCP 
members. They would inevitably support orders from higher party organization levels to 
secure program implementation. Third, the performance of the VPBC and VC would be 
assessed by the township government, and environmental condition is one key performance 
indicator. The VPBC could be rewarded by the successful implementation of a program, such 
as the title of ‘Five Good CCP Branch’21.  
- Case 1: 
Few control techniques were used in the P1 program other than those stated above. The 
village officials stated that most villagers supported program implementation, e.g., “Most 
villagers supported the program because there was no conflict (interviewee 1VS); If villagers 
did not support, the program could not be done (interviewee 1VR).” However, criticism to 
how the program was implemented might be equally balanced with support for the same. 
There were many complaints by villagers about design flaws at garbage collection points and 
the poor management of street cleaners that caused the failure to achieve desired 
outcomes.  
- Case 2: 
More control techniques were applied in the P2 program than the P1 program, and the 
interviewees strongly supported implementation of the P2 program. Local households that 
performed well during program implementation would be honoured with the title 
‘Environment Five Good Household’ by the village committee. As stated in 6.3.5, there was a 
 
21 ‘Five Good CCP Branch’ refers to a special honour awarded to the local CCP branch committee by 





similar award called ‘Civilized Household’. These awards were program measures to 
encourage pro-environmental behaviours. The P2 program also provided free services to 
attract public support, such as providing garbage cans and collecting large appliances for 
free. The above actions of the village committee resulted in a high level of public support for 
program implementation.  
Overall findings and implications 
Fewer control techniques were applied in the P1 program. In terms of the evaluation items 
in Table 5.1, criticism to how the program was implemented might be equally balanced with 
support for it. Criterion 9 was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 1. 
More control techniques were applied in the P2 program. In terms of the evaluation items in 
Table 5.1, the program resulted in a high level of public support for its implementation. 
Criterion 9 was deemed Absolute Success in Case 2. Control techniques were necessary to 
attract public and government officials’ support. Criterion 9 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
6.3.10 Enhancing electoral prospects/reputation (Criterion 10) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, participants believed that local officials gained honour and recognition from 
program implementation. The pursuit of a good reputation may in turn contribute to 
successful program implementation. However, there was no evidence to indicate any local 
officials got promoted as a result of program implementation or as a result of the reputation 
gained from program implementation.   
Overall findings 
Without access to the information needed to assess Criterion 10 (see Table 5.1), no evidence 
to support Criterion 10 was available in either case. Criterion 10 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese 
context. Further research is needed to establish whether this criterion fits the Chinese 
context. 
6.3.11 Easing the business of governing (Criterion 11) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, township governments prioritized their agenda on domestic waste. All 
interviewees stated that domestic waste was a major and visible environmental problem in 
rural areas, and compared with other environmental problems, it was easier to respond to. 





require only small investments. Therefore, domestic waste became the priority of both the 
T1 and T2 township government agendas. But the remaining environmental problems in 
both case study areas, such as domestic sewage, plastic film, and river pollution were left 
unsolved. These environmental problems are severe, long-term, and tricky problems for 
local governments, but might lack suitable solutions, such as how to deal with a large 
amount of plastic film left in farmland after harvest. Such problems might be beyond the 
capacity of a township government and thus failed to be listed on the government agendas 
in both places.  
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, local governments successfully controlled the 
policy agenda to ease the business of governing. Criterion 11 was deemed Absolute Success 
in both cases. Local governments can prioritize the government agenda on an environmental 
problem that is easy to act on, may achieve obvious effects in the short-term, and require 
only a small amount of investment. Criterion 11 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
6.3.12 Promotion of government’s desired trajectory (Criterion 12) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
All interviewees believed both programs had sustained the broad value and direction of 
central government to build the ‘Ecological Civilization’. There was also no evidence to show 
that both programs conflicted with other national trajectories. On the contrary, a better 
rural environment could contribute to marketing V1 village as a potato trading centre, and 
to the development of tourism in V2 village.  
Overall findings 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the government’s trajectory was fully met. 
Criterion 12 was deemed Absolute Success in both cases. Local programs can help to 
maintain the central government’s ‘vision and promise’. Criterion 12 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context.  
6.3.13 Providing political benefits for government (Criterion 13) 
Results from Case 1 and Case 2 
In both cases, local governments gained much political benefit. All interviewees indicated 
their support for township governments was ‘considerably more’ or ‘much more’ as a result 





They also maintained political order by controlling the agenda and implementing programs 
to meet the national trajectory.  
Overall findings and implications 
In both cases, local governments gained many political benefits. In terms of the evaluation 
items in Table 5.1, there was no disagreement that there were political benefits for the 
government. Criterion 13 was deemed Absolute Success in both cases. Criterion 13 ‘clearly 
fits’ the Chinese context. However, politics is contested and there is always a concern of 
‘success for whom’ (Marsh & McConnell, 2010). As stated in 5.2.13, failure to provide 
political benefits for policy stakeholders could cause controversy, or even opposition to a 
policy. The stakeholders do not only refer to the government. A party, government officials, 
and citizens, may also gain political benefits and thus influence their level of support for the 
policy. Therefore, it is proposed that in the phase II study, the scope of Criterion 13 is 
expanded from ‘providing political benefits for government’ to ‘providing political benefits’ 
to evaluation political benefits. 
6.4 Evaluation of the modified set of criteria applied to Cases 1 & 2 
Phase I of the study empirically tested and evaluated criteria of revised McConnell’s 
framework in two Chinese case studies. Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C were used to replace 
McConnell’s original Criterion 8. All three criteria have their own distinguishing 
characteristics and are considered equal with other criteria. A summary of the evaluation 
findings based on analysis of the data collected during phase I is shown in Table 6.2. All 
criteria can be grouped into four ‘extent-of-fit’ categories (see section 3.4.5), related to the 
context of the Chinese policy environment:  
• Clearly Fit: eight criteria were fully supported by evidence and clearly fit the Chinese 
context, namely: implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5), achieving desired 
outcomes (Criterion 6), benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7), appropriateness 
(Criterion 8C), attracting support for program (Criterion 9), easing the business of 
governing (Criterion 11), promotion of government’s desired trajectory (Criterion 12), 
and providing political benefits for government (Criterion 13). 
• Potentially Fit: two criteria were not clearly observed to confirm they applied, namely: 
securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) and efficiency (Criterion 8A). However, based on the 





and likely do fit the Chinese context. Further investigation is needed and may provide 
evidence to support these suggestions. 
• May Fit: evidence in support of two criteria was not adequate, namely: attracting 
support for process (Criterion 4), and equity (Criterion 8B). But based on the theory, 
they may still be important and may fit the Chinese context. It is considered that 
evidence may be found in other programs to support these two criteria which may 
demonstrate they fit the Chinese context. Further investigation is needed. 
• May Not Fit: no evidence was found to support the following three criteria and they may 
not fit the Chinese context, namely: preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 
1), building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3), and enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation (Criterion 10). These criteria were not supported by the literature. 
It is highly possible that further investigation in other programs will reach the same 





Table 6.2 Summary evaluation of the modified set of policy evaluation criteria applied to Cases 1 & 2 
No. Criterion Conclusion Summary evaluation of criteria and needs for further Investigation 
1 Preserving goals and policy 
instruments 
May not fit It may not be practical to investigate this criterion in China due to a lack of information and non-
transparent policy adoption process. Further research is needed to establish whether this criterion fits 
the Chinese context.  
2 Securing legitimacy Potentially 
fits 
When legitimacy is considered in McConnell’s sense of ‘whether proper procedures are used’, it was 
unclear whether the process legitimacy of both programs was secured. However, although concerns 
about legitimacy were not observed in either case, discussion about the legitimacy of a program cannot 
be neglected. Legitimacy may be challenged by the stakeholders in other programs when the policy 
content or the actions of government violates their interests or causes disputes. 
3 Building sustainable 
coalition  
May not fit In both cases a coalition was not formed. However, there is a possibility that a coalition can be formed 
at the village level or county level to facilitate the approval and denial of a program. Therefore, further 
investigation is needed. 
4 Attracting support for 
process 
May fit In both cases, attracting widespread public support may not be essential for agenda setting, policy 
formulation, and policy adoption at the township level. However, there is the possibility that in other 
programs, attracting widespread public support is essential. A further investigation at the village and 
county level is needed as supplements to the phase I study. 
5 Implementation in line 
with objectives 
Clearly fits The P1 program partially met the first objective, but not the second objective. The P2 program partially 
met the first objective and met the second objective. It is necessary to evaluate the whether a 
policy/program is implemented consistent with its objectives to fully judge its success or failure. 
6 Achieving desired 
outcomes 
Clearly fits The P1 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent, and it failed to achieve the 
second desired outcome. The P2 program successfully achieved all desired outcomes. It is necessary to 
evaluate the achieved outcomes of a program to fully judge its success or failure. 
7 Benefiting target group(s) Clearly fits The P1 program benefited the target group, but such effect was reduced by poor program 
management. The P2 program benefited the target group to a very high extent. Benefit is central to 





Although the public lack necessary information to judge the efficiency or they may not care about this 
criterion, it is possible this criterion matters to the public. Further research is needed to investigate 





8B Equity May fit In both cases, distributive equity was not a prioritized concern for villagers and local authorities, but 
they might pay some attention to procedural equity. Further research is needed, especially when 
inequity caused conflicts of interest. 
8C Appropriateness Clearly fits The P1 program met the needs of the target group, but the program failed to be implemented in a 
sustainable way. The P2 program met the needs of the target group, and it was a more appropriate 
solution. An adequate solution needs multiple and complementary measures to meet local conditions 
and in a sustainable way. 
9 Attracting support for 
program 
Clearly fits Control techniques were applied to attract support from the public and government officials. Fewer 
control techniques were applied in the P1 program. and the opposition to how the program was 
implemented might be equally balanced with support for it. More control techniques were applied in 
P2 program and resulted in higher support.  
10 Enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation 
May not fit The implementation of both programs enhanced the reputation of government officials. But there was 
no evidence to indicate any government officials got promoted as a result of this program 
implementation or as a result of the reputation gained from program implementation. Further research 
is needed to establish whether this criterion fits the Chinese context. 
11 Easing the business of 
governing 
Clearly fits Local governments that prioritized the government agenda on an environmental problem that was 
easier to act on, might achieve obvious effects in the short-term, and require a small amount of 
investment.  
12 Promotion of 
government’s desired 
trajectory 
Clearly fits Both programs helped to maintain the ‘vision and promise’ of the central government and they did not 
conflict with other national trajectories. Local programs can help to maintain the central government’s 
‘vision and promise’. 
13 Providing political benefits 
for government 







6.5 Analysis of policy success or failure 
The modified McConnell’s framework was applied in case studies to draw conclusions about 
policy success or policy failure. McConnell used (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success, 
Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success, Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success as reference 
points to judge the success/failure of each of the 13 criteria. However, there is the possibility 
that some criteria can be scored as Absolute Failure and Absolute Success. Therefore, two 
additional reference points, namely Absolute Failure and Absolute Success, were added to 
complement McConnell’s framework for evaluating degrees of success/failure of the 13 
criteria across the ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ realm (see section 5.4). Guidelines were 
presented in Table 5.1 as the basis for measure relative success and failure. Table 6.3 
summarises the success/failure in Case 1 and 2 for each of the 13 criteria.  
Table 6.3 Summary of success/failure for each of the modified set of McConnell’s criteria 
when applied to Cases 1 & 2 
Key. AF = Absolute Failure; OF/MS: (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success; CF/CS: Conflicted 
Failure = Conflicted Success; TF/RS: Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success; AS = Absolute 
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Preserving goals and policy 
instruments 
Y Y                     
2 Securing legitimacy Y Y                     
3 Building sustainable coalition      Y Y                 







Implementation in line with 
objectives 
        Y         Y     
6 Achieving desired outcomes         Y             Y 
7 Benefiting target group(s)             Y         Y 
8A Efficiency Y Y 
 
   
 
      
  
  
8B Equity             Y Y         
8C Appropriateness             Y         Y 








Y Y                     
11 Easing the business of governing                    Y Y 
12 Promotion of government’s desired 
trajectory 
                    Y Y 
13 Providing political benefits for 
government 





Table 6.3 shows that in Case 1 and 2, there were varying degrees of success and failure for 
each of the 13 criteria. A method was developed (see section 3.4.5) to analyse the success 
and failure of each individual realm (process, program, and politics) and the overall policy 
program based on the success/failure of each criterion. Table 6.4 shows the score for each 
criterion, each realm, and the overall scores of Case 1 and Case 2.  
Table 6.4 Summary scores for each criterion, realm, and the policy program to Cases 1 & 2 
Key. An ordinal five-point scale is used to capture the different levels of success/failure, 
showing the success/failure of a criterion, a realm, and the overall policy program, namely: 
Absolute Failure = 1; (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success = 2; Conflicted Failure = Conflicted 
Success = 3; Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success = 4; Absolute Success = 5. The extent of 
success or failure of each realm and the overall program are determined by the mean score.  
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2 5 
7 Benefiting target 
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3 5 
8A Efficiency Unclear Unclear 
8B Equity 3 3 
8C Appropriateness 3 5 
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Based on Table 6.4, it can be concluded that: 
• In Case 1, the ‘process’ realm was deemed Absolute Failure, the ‘program’ realm was 
deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success, and the ‘politics’ realm was deemed 
Absolute Success. In total, Case 1 was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success.  
• In Case 2, the ‘process’ realm was deemed Absolute Failure, the ‘program’ realm was 
deemed Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success, and the ‘politics’ realm was deemed 
Absolute Success. In total, Case 2 was deemed Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success. 
6.6 Evaluation using MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework 
As stated in 3.2.3, evaluation results that are based solely on McConnell’s framework may 
not be valid. This research applies triangulation methodology to help ensure analytical 
validity. The researcher used the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework as a third-party 
investigator to independently evaluate both case studies. The original intention was to 
compare the results of three different evaluation methods: the results presented above 
using McConnell’s framework, this researcher’s evaluation using the MEE [2010] 136 
evaluation framework as a third-party investigator, and government department evaluations 
that employ the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework. However, the researcher was not 
able to access the evaluation reports for either Case 1 or Case 2 undertaken by government 
departments.  
The MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (Appendix B) provided indicators and illustrated 
relative weighting of each indicator used for evaluating ‘objective achievement’ and ‘overall 
output’, depending on the type of pollution that the program targeted. A revised MEE [2010] 
136 evaluation framework (Appendix C) was developed for domestic waste programs, and a 
set of methods and rules were created as the basis to judge these indicators. Findings from 
applying the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (Appendix C) as a third-party 
investigator in Case 1 and Case 2 are presented in Table 6.5. The findings were based on 
public documents, on-site observation, and qualitative visual assessments, and in-depth 
interviews. The MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework regulates that the assessment results 
are divided into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The corresponding assessment 
scores are: ≥ 90 = Excellent, ≥ 70 - <90 = Good, ≥60 - <70 = Fair, and < 60 = Poor. Therefore, 






• Case 1 scored 38.8 and was deemed ‘Poor’ 
• Case 2 scored 94 and was deemed ‘Excellent’ 
It should be noted that the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework addresses only the 
matters covered by Criteria 5 (Implementation in line with objectives) and Criterion 6 
(Achieving desired outcomes) in McConnell’s framework. The average score using 
McConnell’s Criteria 5 and 6 from each of the two cases is: Case 1 = (2+2)/2 = 2, Case 2 = 
(4+5)/2 = 4.5. The evaluation results using McConnell’s Criteria 5 and 6 are consistent with 
the evaluation results using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in Case 1 and Case 2. 
This further confirms the validity of the research findings.  
6.7 Summary 
Phase I of the empirical study was conducted to test the modified set of McConnell’s policy 
evaluation criteria in two selected areas in rural China. The findings grouped the evaluation 
criteria into four ‘extent-of-fit’ categories in relation to the Chinese context, namely: ‘clearly 
fit’, ‘potentially fit’, ‘may fit’, and ‘may not fit’. Eight criteria ‘clearly fit’, two criteria 
‘potentially fit’, two criteria ‘may fit’, and three criteria ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context. The 
modified set of McConnell’s policy evaluation criteria were also applied in case studies to 
draw conclusions about policy success or policy failure. Case 1 was deemed Conflicted 
failure = Conflicted Success and Case 2 was deemed Tolerable failure = Resilient Success. 
Based on the researcher’s own application of the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation 
framework (Appendix C), Case 1 was deemed ‘Poor’ and Case 2 was deemed ‘Excellent’. The 
evaluation results using Criteria 5 and 6 in McConnell’s framework are consistent with the 
evaluation results using the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in Case 1 and 
Case 2.  
Further investigation is needed to provide complementary evidence for application of the 
modified set of McConnell’s policy evaluation criteria in the Chinese context. Informed by 
the findings of phase I, some of the criteria were considered essential to evaluate 
policy/program success or failure in the Chinese context, regardless of the program type and 
the context, for example producing desired outcomes (Criterion 6) and creating benefit for 
target group (Criterion 7). But the context and the type of programs may greatly impact 
some evaluation criteria, especially those grouped as ‘potentially fit’, ‘may fit’, and ‘may not 
fit’. The phase I study did not provide sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion. In the phase 





considered. And the study focuses on the policymaking process that occurred at the village 
and county level to complement the findings from the phase I study, where policymaking 
occurred at the township level. The next chapter reports the second phase application and 





Table 6.5 Researcher application of the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework as a third-party investigator to Cases 1 & 2 
 No. Indicators Relative 
Weighting 
(out of 100)  
Requirements Case 1 Evaluation Scores 
(Assessed against 
weighting) 







































8 ≥95% 87.5% 4 90% 4 
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4 Domestic waste 
transfer rate 
23 =100％ 60% 13.8 100% 23 
5 Hazard-free 
treatment rate of 
domestic waste 
23 ≥70％ Garbage transferred 
was not disposed in 
official landfill but 
dumped, e.g., 0%. 





6 Domestic waste 
facility operation 








Facility operation not 
stable. Follow-up 
managing and operating 
expense was 
guaranteed 






   100   38.8/100 = Poor  94/100 = Excellent 
Note. For indicators 1, 3, and 6, partially meeting one of the requirements gets a 50% score; for indicator 2, less than 50% satisfaction rate gets a 0 score, 
50%-94.9% would be considered partial success and get 4 points, above 95% would get 8 points; for indicators 4 and 5, the calculation was based on the 
actual waste transfer rate, e.g., 23x60% = 13.8. Findings were derived from interviews, on-site observation, and qualitative visual assessments. The MEE 
[2010]136 evaluation framework regulates that the assessment results are divided into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The overall 












Evaluation of McConnell’s Framework - Phase II Case Study 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 reported on the initial evaluation of the modified set of McConnell’s (2015) policy 
evaluation criteria in the Chinese context. The findings from the phase I evaluation grouped 
the evaluation criteria into four ‘extent-of-fit’ categories, namely: ‘clearly fit’, ‘potentially fit’, 
‘may fit’, and ‘may not fit’. The Chinese context lessons from that evaluation then informed 
a revision of the criteria. This revision is the subject of a further empirical application and 
evaluation as reported in this chapter.  
As the next step of the adaptive learning and triangulation approach, this chapter reports on 
the second phase of the case study evaluation of the modified set of McConnell’s policy 
evaluation criteria. The aim of the phase II case application was to gain deeper insights into 
the policy evaluation criteria and draw conclusions about policy success or policy failure. The 
evaluation considered whether the criteria could be considered as ‘partially fit’, ‘potentially 
fit’, ‘may fit’, ‘may not fit’, and ‘does not fit’ in the phase II case study. It aimed also to 
establish whether the criteria that were assessed as ‘clearly fit’ in the phase I case study 
would show the same results. Two cases studies were conducted in rural China with 
different socio-political and geographical contexts. One type of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Treatment (CET) policy program that mainly dealt with rural domestic 
wastewater was selected in the phase II study. The policymaking process in the two case 
studies occurred at the village level in Case 3 and county level in Case 4, in contrast to Case 1 
and Case 2 where policymaking occurred at the township level. 
The chapter begins with a description of the case studies. The application of each criterion to 
these case studies is considered individually within the context of a standard reporting 
template and an overall evaluation of the criteria is then presented. Finally, the findings 
from the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (the policy effect evaluation 
guideline for the CET policy from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Appendix D) 





7.2 Case Studies 
- Case 3: 
V3 village (at T3 township in DS3 district of CY3 city in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) 
was selected as Case 3. It covers an area between 5-10 km2 with 200-500 permanent 
households and 1,000-2,000 residents. Agriculture, especially garlic, was the main economic 
produce of this village. Agricultural residues, especially straw, was the key environmental 
problem.  
In V3 village, a CET program called Rebuild Toilets Inside Villagers’ Houses (P3 program) was 
implemented. This program aimed to install a flush toilet (plus a handwashing sink and a 
showering system if possible) inside villagers’ houses (see Plate 7-1), along with the pipe 
connecting to an underground storage pit in the front yard. Around one-third of the village 
households had participated in the program.  
The policymaking process of this program occurred at the village level, which was initiated 
by V3 village and first implemented as a trial program. The program was discussed and 
approved at the villagers’ committee (VC) meeting, the village CCP branch committee (VPBC) 
meeting, and the villagers’ representatives (VR) meeting. The T3 township government and 
the Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau (AAHB) in DS3 district supervised the 
implementation of the P3 program.   
  
Plate 7-1 Flush toilet, handwashing sink, showering system inside villagers’ houses 
- Case 4:  
In CT4 county, rural domestic sewage was one of the major pollution sources of 
underground water and XX Lake. XX Lake is a nature reserve, but the lake has been shrinking 





comprehensive improvement of rural living environment in CT4 County (P4 program)’ was 
implemented. One major aim of the P4 program was to control the indiscriminate discharge 
and disposal of domestic sewage to prevent pollution of XX Lake. To do so, the program 
intended to extend the urban sewerage network to surrounding villages. Besides, three 
kinds of domestic sewage treatment facilities were used for villages that are far away from 
urban sewerage network, namely: sewage treatment plant, integrated sewage treatment 
equipment (see Plate 7-2 left), and medium-scale Johkasou (see Plate 7-2 right)22. Domestic 
sewage treatment facilities needed to be connected to rural housing, and relevant facilities 
such as flush toilets, washbasins, and bathrooms should be installed. Villagers were 
encouraged to use recycled water23 from these facilities to irrigate their farmland.  
The policymaking process of the P4 program occurred at the county level. It was proposed 
by CT4 county government. The Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (BHUD) of 
CT4 county was assigned to draft the proposal and implement the program. The director of 
the Rural and Township Department (RTD) in BHUD managed the job. The Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) of CT4 county and the Environmental Inspection Team (EIT) in EPB 
cooperated with the BHUD to implement the P4 program.  
V4 village (at T4 township in CT4 county of CY4 city in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) 
was one of the targeted villages of the P4 program because it is very close to XX lake. 
Therefore, V4 village was selected as Case 4. It covers an area between 5-10 km2. There 
were 200-500 permanent households and 1,000-2,000 residents. Selling vegetables grown in 
solar greenhouses was the main economy of the village. The annual vegetable trade was 
between 15,000-30,000 tons with NZ$2-4 million income, which was the reason why it was a 
wealthy village compared to other villages in T4 township.  
A Sewage Treatment Container (STC) container (see Plate 7-2 left) that had a total capacity 
of 50 tons per day was installed in V4 village. Sewage pipes were connected from a 
 
22Sewage treatment plant is used in villages with sewage above 50 tons per day. Integrated sewage 
treatment equipment refers to Sewage Treatment Container, with the daily treatment capacity 
ranging from 10 to 50 tons. It is used in villages with sewage less than 50 tons per day. Johkasou is a 
kind of septic tank. Every Medium-scale Johkasou serves 15 households, around 60 people. The 
treatment capacity is about 5 tons per day (People's Government of CT4 County, 2018).  
23 Recycled water is “for non-potable uses, such as open space irrigation and industrial use, or for 
augmentation of drinking water supplies though aquifer and reservoir recharge. Recycled water is also 
being used to enhance the environment with schemes such as reduction of salt water intrusion and 





sightseeing park and a restaurant. However, domestic sewage from village households and 
public toilet was not piped to the STC.  
  
Plate 7-2 Sewage Treatment Container in V4 village (left) and Johkasou (right) 
7.3 Criteria evaluation 
The results of the case studies are presented in the following format for each criteria: (1) 
findings from the phase I study; (2) Results from Case 3 and Case 4; (3) Overall findings and 
implications. The respondent codes used in reporting the results are in Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3. A set of standard phrases at the end of each section is used to judge how much extent a 
criterion fit the Chinese context (see Table 3.4). 
7.3.1 Preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 1 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context due to a lack of 
information and non-transparent policy adoption process at the township level. This 
criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
The P3 program was adopted at V3 village. Proposal revision happened through making 
phone calls or meeting with T2 township and DS3 district government officials, chatting with 
colleagues, and visiting villagers. These kinds of informal communication replaced the formal 
proposal formation process. But they were not recorded and there was no formal draft 
proposal. The public could not know what exactly had changed between the draft proposal 





- Case 4: 
The P4 program was discussed several times and adopted in the CT4 county government 
executive meeting, but the meeting summaries could not be retrieved. Interviewees from 
the government indicated that there were no major changes between the program proposal 
and its final blueprint on goals and instruments, except changes on the amounts of program 
investment and selected priority villages. However, the public had little information about 
these changes, including what had changed and how the proposal was adopted.  
Overall findings and implications 
In both cases, the public had little information about which part of the proposal had been 
changed and why such changes happened. Without access to the information needed to 
assess Criterion 1 (see Table 5.1), Criterion 1 could not be measured in either case. Phase II 
study built on the findings from phase I and confirms finally that Criterion 1 ‘does not fit’ the 
Chinese context.   
7.3.2 Securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 2 ‘potentially fits’ the Chinese context. Though 
legitimacy concerns were not obvious in either Case 1 or Case 2, discussion about the 
legitimacy of a program cannot be neglected. Legitimacy may be challenged by the 
stakeholders in other programs when the public challenge the policy content or the actions 
of government. Criterion 2 was retained for the phase II study, but Criterion 2 was defined 
more broadly to include the legitimacy of policy content or actions taken by the 
government. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
A 532 Working Methods24 was applied in Case 3. Interviewee 3VS stated:  
 
24 ‘532 Work Methods’ refers to the decision-making, including the management, organization, and 
implementation of major issues at the village level, which must strictly implement the ‘Five 
Procedures’, successively pass the ‘Three Audits’, and implement ‘Two Disclosures’. The ‘Five 
Procedures’ are: (1) the VPBC proposes the proposal; (2) The VC and the VPBC discuss; (3) the CCP 
member congress deliberation; (4) make a decision on the VR meeting or the villagers’ meetings; (5) 
and the VC and the VPBC jointly organize and implement. The ‘Three Audits’ means that township 
government should establish a ‘village affairs coordination steering group’ that the township CCP and 





After we proposed the P3 program, we held the VC meeting, VPBC 
meeting, and the VR meeting. The proposal was approved at these 
meetings. According to the 532 Working Methods, if any issue is 
vetoed at any of these meetings, we cannot do it. Therefore, the 
program was legitimate. 
The village official thought the policymaking process was legitimate because the right 
policymaking procedure was used. Nevertheless, villagers were not concerned about the 
formal policymaking process. They emphasised that the program did not violate their 
interests and cause any conflict, which were considered the key reasons that they did not 
question the policy legitimacy. In other words, villagers accepted and endorsed the program 
content or actions of the government.  
- Case 4: 
Interviewees believed that it was not so relevant whether the policymaking process is 
conforming to the law or rules. Interviewee 4FR stated: “There is no violation of the law 
considering it is an order from the upper-level government.” However, villagers severely 
questioned the policy content and actions of the government. One example was that 
villagers felt angry because there were no compensation clauses in the P4 program. Villagers 
sought redress from the government for setting up electric poles on their farmland for the 
STC, but their requests were not satisfied. Instead, such conflicts and disputes were solved 
through an authoritative approach. Villagers complained that the VPBC secretary, township, 
and even county government officials tried to persuade them to reach a consensus on 
compensation, through multiple visiting, which was considered as ‘soft violence’. Another 
example was that the VC spent three days negotiating with villagers over the location of a 
sewage treatment facility to be installed. Initially, it was placed on public land, but close to a 
family cemetery. A few days later, this family appealed to the county government for help 
and filed a complaint. They believed that the sewage treatment facility would ruin their 
fortune or ‘feng shui’. The facility was forced to move to another location while thousands of 
dollars have been spent on levelling the ground. Interviewee 4VR sighed and said: “Trust is 
built up over small issues [disputes].” As a result, the government's follow-up actions may 
also be questioned by villagers. For example, CT4 county government tried to lay sewage 
 
and economy bureau, land bureau, justice bureau, police bureau, and other related units serve as 
members. The ‘village affairs coordination steering group’ shall audit (1) the proposal proposed by the 
VC and VPBC; (2) audit the decision-making procedure on the CCP members meeting, the VR meeting, 
and the villages’ meetings; (3) audit the financial account after the program is implemented. The ‘Two 
Disclosures’ are: (1) the implementation plan shall be open to the public before implementation; (2) 





pipes under the farmland of some villagers. However, villagers did not allow the government 
to do so. “We promised the villagers to restore the farmland, but they did not allow [trust] us 
to lay the pipeline,” interviewee 4DR said, “They accuse us of setting up such facilities beside 
their farmland.” 
Overall findings and implications 
The above research findings show that ‘securing legitimacy’ depended more on the policy 
content or actions of the government, but less not on whether the policymaking process 
conforming to laws or rules. As long as the public accepted and endorsed the policy content 
or actions of the government, the policy legitimacy was secured. When legitimacy was 
considered in the sense of ‘what is being done’, in terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, 
there were no challenges to the legitimacy of the P3 program. Criterion 2 was deemed 
Absolute Success in Case 3. However, in Case 4, again considering legitimacy in the sense of 
‘what is being done’, in terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, there were great 
challenges to legitimacy, and this had lasting significance. Criterion 2 was deemed (Outright) 
Failure = Marginal Success in Case 4. The phase II study further indicated that, in most cases, 
Criterion 2 ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context in terms of the policy content or actions of the 
government. 
7.3.3 Building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 3 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context. A coalition 
among the stakeholders that was supposed to facilitate the approval of a policy/program 
was not formed. This criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
In V3 village, the P3 program was discussed and approved at the VC, VPBC, and VR meetings. 
In this process, the VPBC and VC “preserved their authority and power, but committed 
themselves to receiving input” (Fung, 2006, p. 69). The VR and village CCP members could 
enter the decision-making process and become key intermediaries, which indicated a more 
inclusive boundary rule that involved more benefitted groups. They would listen to the 
suggestions from stakeholders and deliver feedback to the VPBC and VC, thus exerting much 
influence on the decisions made by the VPBC and the VC through communication, advice, 





the P3 program, there was an intact coalition formed without disagreement. According to 
Table 5.1, Criterion 3 was deemed Absolute Success in Case 3. 
Table 7.1 summarises the participation rules of the policymaking process at the village level. 
At this level, a coalition among stakeholders could be formed through broad public 
participation, which might be a necessity for the approval or veto of a proposal initiated at 
the village level. For example, a land transfer proposal initiated by the VC of V3 village was 
rejected because of widespread opposition from stakeholders. Interviewee 3VS stated: “If 
there is an issue that the VPBC had already discussed and proposed, but the others [villagers] 
disagree to, what shall we do? The minority is subordinate to the majority.”  
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- Case 4: 
The P4 program was drafted by the BHUD of CT4 county with the assistance of the Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region Research Academy of Environmental Sciences (IMES). The 
program was then discussed and approved by CT4 county government. Decision-making at 
the county level is more exclusive than at the village level. Most of the public were excluded 





government officials had participated in the policy formulation process through providing 
basic information on the local environmental conditions and environmental protection 
facilities. They may influence the decisions made by county governments by making 
suggestions, but they could not vote. The third-party institution was invited by the county 
government to provide professional suggestions and inform decisions. They act as expert 
administrators, but cannot “exercise direct authority over public decisions or resources” 
(Fung, 2006, p. 69). In terms of the P4 program, there was no coalition formed among the 
stakeholders. According to Table 5.1, Criterion 3 was deemed Absolute Failure in Case 4. 
Table 7.2 summarises the participation rules of the policymaking process at the county level. 
At this level, a coalition might not be formed because boundary rules restricted most of the 
public from entering the policymaking process, choice rules defined their possible actions, 
and aggregation rules limited the influence of those who had participated. The county 
government preserves its authority and power to accept, revise, or deny suggestions. 
Decision-making is concentrated in the hands of county government officials and its sub-
departments officials.  
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Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, there was an intact coalition formed without 
disagreement in Case 3. Criterion 3 was deemed Absolute Success. In terms of the 
evaluation items in Table 5.1, there was no coalition formed in Case 4. Criterion 3 was 
deemed Absolute Failure. In both cases, the institutional design outlined stakeholder 
involvement through participation rules. At the village level, a coalition could be formed to 
facilitate approval or denial of a proposal that is proposed by village officials. But because 
most of the public are restricted from entering the policymaking process at county level, 
coalitions among stakeholders are not possible in county level policymaking. The phase II 
study indicated that Criterion 3 ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context when policy is made at the 
village level, but not when policymaking is at the county level.  
7.3.4 Attracting support for process (Criterion 4) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 4 ‘may fit’ the Chinese context. Attracting public 
support may not be essential for the policymaking process at the township level. This 
criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
The following sections discuss Criterion 4 from different stages of the policymaking process, 
namely: agenda setting, policy formation, and adoption. 
a. Agenda setting  
In China's ‘top-level design and local implementation’ political system, local governments 
follow the agenda put forward by the superior government as a political task. Therefore, 
village and county level agenda-setting may not require broad public support. First, villagers 
rarely bring up agenda items. Agenda items are usually proposed by the VPBC or VC 
following the agenda set by the superior or central government. The P3 program, for 
example, is a response to the 2015 ‘Toilet Revolution Champion’. Second, most items on the 
county-level environmental policy agenda are pre-determined by the central government. 







b. Policy formulation 
- Case 3: 
Local officials learned from stakeholders about how to better shape policy. Interviewee 3VS 
said he often chatted with villagers to get their opinions on the P3 program. VR and CCP 
party members also communicated with villagers to learn their needs, concerns, grievances, 
and possible problems, all of which had been carefully considered. Corresponding solutions 
were then introduced during the policy formulation process by soliciting public opinions. The 
actions of government attracted broad public support.  
- Case 4: 
At the county level, public opinion was not sought in the policy formulation process. The P4 
program was drafted by the BHUD of CT4 county with the mandate of the government of 
CT4 county. However, interviewee 4DR said: "no one in the department [BHUD] has expertise 
in this area." IMES was thus hired as a third-party organization. A meeting of all township 
officials responsible for environmental issues was then held in BHUD. They were asked to 
provide basic information on environmental conditions and facilities. The information had 
been provided to the IMES as the basis for drafting the program. In this process, the public 
was not invited to provide suggestions and comments. The lack of public participation had 
created serious problems in implementation of the program. 
c. Policy/program adoption 
- Case 3: 
At the village level, policy adoption attracted widespread public support. The 532 Working 
Methods regulation stipulates that on major issues, it is necessary to attract support from 
the villagers to adopt a program proposal. Interviewee 3VS stated: "the workflow [532 
Working Methods] stipulates that decisions made by the VPBC must be approved by the 
village party congress and VR congress before further implementation." 
- Case 4: 
At the county level, as shown in Table 7.2, the decision-making process at the county level is 
more exclusive than that at the township level. Most stakeholders were excluded. Township 
governments can participate in the process, but aggregation rules limit their influence. 





governments, or technical experts. The county government did not seek support from the 
public or other stakeholders to make decisions. 
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, there was widespread support to the 
policymaking process, in terms of the P3 program. Criterion 4 was deemed Absolute Success 
in Case 3. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the county government had not 
sought public support during the policymaking process. Criterion 4 was deemed Absolute 
Failure in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 4 ‘partially fits’ the Chinese 
context. Agenda-setting may not need widespread public support at both the village and 
county levels. But the policy formulation and adoption processes had tried to seek public 
advice and attract public support at the village level, but not at the county level.  
7.3.5 Implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 5 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. The CET 
programs in phase I had partially met the policy objectives. This criterion was not changed 
for phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
‘Building Ecological Civilization’ is the core concept of the CET policy. There are two specific 
policy objectives: (1) control the most prominent environmental pollutions in rural areas; (2) 
educate the target groups on environmental protection and help the target groups to 
participate in rural environmental protection (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010a). 
- Case 3: 
The P3 program might not have met the first objective – interviewees argued that rural 
sewage was not the most prominent pollution in V3 village. Interviewee 3FR describes rural 
sewage this way: “[Sewage in] rural toilets are unsanitary, but do not seriously pollute the 
environment in our village.” Drinking water in V3 village comes from wells 170 metres deep, 
far from the village, and is stored in reservoirs. Villagers can get water directly from their 
home pipes, with no risk of contamination. Instead, interviewees identified straw as a key 
environmental issue, but issue was not addressed (see Plate 7-3). Interviewee 3HT stated: 





how to dispose straws was tricky. Although forbidden, some villagers still burn straw in 
autumn.” 
 
Plate 7-3 Straw left in the farmland 
The P3 program did not meet the second objective. There was no evidence that the program 
educated the villagers about resource conservation and circular development. As stated in 
7.3.3, the design of this program is based on co-governance and collective decision-making. 
If villagers had been educated about resource conservation and circular development, then 
the program design could have paid more attention to this aspect. However, the program 
did not consider sustainable resource utilization in the program design. For example, 
nutrient recycling was not considered in this program. A 3.5-meter-deep, impermeable 
domestic sewage collection facility was built underground in the villagers' front yard to store 
manure (see Plate 7-4). Collection facilities are sealed, and a manure suction truck would be 
used every 1-2 years to suck out the manure and take it away. This manure was considered a 
valuable fertilizer in the past 4,000 years of traditional Chinese agriculture (King, 2004).  
  
Plate 7-4 Under the green manhole cover is the domestic sewage collection facility (left), 






- Case 4: 
The P4 program met the first objective. The haphazard discharge of domestic sewage in rural 
areas has caused a large area of water pollution, making water pollution a more and more 
serious problem (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2012c). Both Interviewee 4CE 
(deputy captain of Environmental Inspection Team) and interviewee 4DR (director of the 
Rural and Township Department) indicated: “What should be done most and the most 
difficult to implement is the disposal of sewage.” (see Plate 7-5) 
  
Plate 7-5 XX Lake has been shrinking rapidly and almost turned into a salt flat (left) and a 
sewage channel connected to the XX Lake (right) 
The P4 program did not meet the second objective. Using underground water to irrigate 
could exacerbate local water shortages and local officials were aware of this issues (see Plate 
7-6). Therefore, villagers were encouraged to use recycled water from the STC to irrigate 
their farmland. However, there was no evidence that the program educated the villagers. 
Villagers lacked knowledge about the STC and the P4 program. Without educating them 
about its content, benefits, and risks in the community, villagers might fail to reach a 
consensus with the county officials on the use of recycled water.  
 





Overall findings and implications 
The P3 program did not meet both policy objectives. In terms of the evaluation items in 
Table 5.1, there were no objectives achieved. Criterion 5 was deemed Absolute Failure in 
Case 3. The P4 program met the first objective, but not the second objective. In terms of the 
evaluation items in Table 5.1, the success of was accompanied by controversial failings of 
reaching policy objectives. Criterion 5 was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in 
Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 5 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
7.3.6 Achieving desired outcomes (Criterion 6) 
The objectives indicated in section 7.3.5 are intended to achieve the following outcomes: (1) 
improve the rural environment and sanitation. (2) increase environmental awareness and 
pro-environmental behaviours of the target groups (The State Council, 2009).    
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 6 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. The CET 
program in Case 1 had partially achieved the desired outcomes, and Case 2 fully achieved 
the desired outcomes. This criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
The P3 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent. "Pit-latrines are not 
environmentally friendly [clean], " said interviewee 3FR, “Maggots are everywhere in 
summer. Now the pollution [insanitation] has been well controlled." But the program effect 
may not be significant as pit toilets had been replaced by several public toilets. Interviewee 
3VS stated: “Several public toilets were built in 2016. Public toilets in rural areas are no 
longer dirty." On the other hand, only around one-third of rural families had participated in 
the program, which was clearly not enough to make an impact on the entire village. 
The P3 program achieved the second desired outcome to a limited extent. Although the P3 
program was not designed for sustainable use of resources, it helped to regulate the 
behaviour of discharging rural domestic sewage. In rural China, the discharge of rural 
domestic sewage is haphazard. Rural houses are basically self-built and scattered in villages 
with no planning. There are various ways for residents to discharge domestic sewage. Some 
sewage is discharged into open ditches or culverts, and some into nearby streams, rivers, 





Some of the sewage was spilled on the ground to evaporate or seep into the soil. The P3 
program had upgraded pit-latrines to flush toilets (some households had installed 
washbasins and shower systems), and thus changed the program participants’ wastewater 
treatment habits. Wastewater from showers, cooking and hand washing was not dumped 
conveniently anymore. But it is noted that around two-third of rural families did not 
participate in the program, so for them the program impact was unclear. 
- Case 4: 
The P4 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent. The STC treated 50% 
of the sewage in this village. However, the treated sewage came mainly from a ‘XXX 
sightseeing and demonstration park’ and a large restaurant. Domestic sewage from village 
households was untreated. They still used their private pit toilets in front of their household 
or public toilets, neither of which was piped to the STC. The domestic sewage from rural 
households and public toilets in V4 village was still unsolved (see Plate 7-7). And some 
sewage was still being discharged into open ditches, culverts, and nearby streams, thus 
polluting XX Lake. 
  
Plate 7-7 Rural pit toilets in front of household (left) and rural public toilet (right) 
The P4 program did not achieved the second desired outcome. Villagers refused to use 
recycled water. Interviewee 4DR stated:  
The sewage has been treated to meet the national standard. 
Recycled water does not contaminate groundwater and 
ecosystems. It can be used to irrigate farmland [or greenhouses]. 
However, villagers do not use it. They said it was dirty water. We 







Plate 7-8 Greenhouses (left) and farmland do not use recycled water (right) 
Overall findings and implications 
The P3 program achieved the both desired outcomes to a limited extent. In terms of the 
evaluation items in Table 5.1, the partial achievement of intended outcomes is 
counterbalanced by unwanted results, Criterion 6 was deemed Conflicted Failure = 
Conflicted Success in Case 3. The P4 program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited 
extent, but it did not achieve the second desired outcome. In terms of the evaluation items 
in Table 5.1, the P4 program achieved some outcomes as intended, but was overwhelmed by 
controversial and high-profile failure to produce results. Criterion 6 was deemed (Outright) 
Failure = Marginal Success in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 6 ‘clearly fits’ 
the Chinese context. 
7.3.7 Benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 7 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. Benefit was 
considered by the interviewees as the core and basis to judge the success or failure of the 
phase I study programs. This criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
The P3 program would increase spending among the target groups, though not in the short 
term. For example, pumping from the sump cost NZ$44 per household every two years, but 
such cost was not included in the CET scheme. Repairing pipes that burst during freezing 
winters would be another extra cost. In addition, villagers would need to buy more fertiliser, 





participated in the program benefited broadly from the P3 program. They were happy to use 
their new toilet because it was much more convenient, especially for older villagers, and 
cleaner than a pit toilet. 
- Case 4: 
Most interviewees doubt the benefits they got and replied: “I don't know.” First, 
implementation of the program conflicted with the interests of the target groups, as stated 
in section 7.3.2. Second, sewage from V4 village households was untreated, and the villagers 
refused to use recycled water to irrigate their farmland as stated in section 7.3.6.  
(3) Overall findings and implications 
Villagers who had participated in the P3 program were happy to use their new toilet, 
although program would increase their spending. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 
5.1, the target group broadly benefited, despite a few shortfalls. Criterion 7 was deemed 
Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success in Case 3. The villagers in V4 village did not perceive 
clear benefits, and the implementation of the P4 program violated the interests of some 
villagers. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the target groups were damaged 
without any benefit. Criterion 7 was deemed Absolute Failure in Case 4. The phase II study 
indicated that Criterion 7 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
7.3.8 Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C 
Criterion 8A (efficiency), Criterion 8B (equity), and Criterion 8C (appropriateness) are 
proposed to replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8 (satisfying criteria highly valued in 
policy domain). These three criteria are each considered in their own right and equally 
weighted with McConnell’s other twelve criteria. 
Efficiency (Criterion 8A) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 8A (efficiency) ‘potentially fits’ the Chinese 
context, but the interviewees were not able to clearly judge the efficiency of the programs 







Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
The P3 program cost NZ$116,000 for water-based toilets, sewers, and a sump for 108 
households. The average cost per household was NZ$1,074. Villagers paid close attention to 
the cost because they had to pay half of the bill. All interviewees agreed that the fund was 
being used effectively. Interviewee 3VS stated: “It is highly unlikely to waste money because 
of a highly transparent process that under public scrutiny. Everything done was posted on the 
bulletin board.” At the same time, expenditure is monitored by the Audit Bureau of T3 
township conducted and a third-party audit firm was hired to do the work. 
- Case 4: 
According to the ‘Program on comprehensive improvement of rural living environment in 
CT4 County’ (People's Government of CT4 County, 2018), the P4 program intended to spend 
NZ$51.37 million on sewage treatment facilities, sewers, and subsidies to install flush toilets 
for 10,000-20,000 homes in 90-110 villages. The average cost per family was NZ$4,308. 
However, the target groups did not know how the fund was being used. Even government 
officials at CT4 county do not know exactly how the fund was used. Interviewee 4DE stated 
that: “The use of money is chaotic. The city or provincial government may not know what it is 
being used for.” 
Overall findings and implications 
It was hard to calculate the average cost of a rural sewage system in China and to compare it 
with the P3 program and the P4 program. However, it was noted that the P3 program was 
more efficient than the P4 program, because of transparent program expenditure and a 
more inclusive public participation during the policymaking process. Interviewees paid close 
attention to the efficiency of the P3 program, while the public might lack the necessary 
information to judge the P4 program. In this sense, the P3 program can lay a strong claim to 
meet the requirement of efficiency, and Criterion 8A was deemed Absolute Success in Case 
3. While the P4 program was far less efficient and accompanied by failures, Criterion 8A was 
deemed (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that 






Equity (Criterion 8B) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 8B (equity) ‘may fit’ the Chinese context. It was 
concluded that equity might not be a prioritized concern for stakeholders. This criterion was 
not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
In rural China, there are social problems such as aging populations and poverty. How to 
provide public services fairly in the complex Chinese rural context is a difficult task for local 
governments. Some villages are close to the urban areas, some have larger populations, and 
some have adequate water supplies, while others do not.  
- Case 3: 
The P3 program ensured distributive equity. In V3 village, the VC raised money for elderly 
villagers who cannot afford to participate. And villagers who worked outside the village all 
year round could not participate in the program and receive a CET subsidy. The program also 
ensured procedural equity. Villagers have the opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process and express their concerns and needs. “Addressing equity is the biggest 
challenge.” said interviewee 3HT, “The P3 program is fair because it is voluntary. Whether or 
not the villagers participate in the program depends entirely on their willingness and their 
housing conditions.”  
- Case 4: 
The P4 program did not guarantee the distributive equity. Although the STC container was 
installed and sewage pipes were built in V4 village, the villagers did not have access to the 
sewage systems and the sewage from their homes was untreated. From a countywide 
perspective, the program was first implemented in 90-110 villages in ‘four priority areas’25, 
but many other villages in CT4 county were excluded. Interviewee 4DR points out why some 
 
25 The P4 program targeted 90-110 villages and was to be implemented step by step in ‘four key 
areas’: (1) expand the urban sewage network to surrounding villages that are close to the T4 
township, in which the county government is located; (2) construct sewage treatment facilities and 
supporting pipeline in populous villages around XX Lake; (3) construct sewage treatment facilities and 
the supporting pipeline in towns where township governments are located and their surrounding 
villages; (4) construct sewage treatment facilities and supporting pipeline in populous villages 





villages were not included in the program: “If there are only 30 households in a village…In a 
few years, older villagers may leave the village because of poor conditions. It [building a 
sewage treatment system] is a waste”. Meanwhile, the program did not guarantee 
procedural equity. The policymaking process for this program was more exclusive. Target 
groups could not participate in the process. Consequently, their preferences and needs 
might be ignored.  
Overall findings and implications 
The P3 program guaranteed distributive equity and procedural equity, but the P4 program 
did not. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the P3 program fulfilled the criterion of 
equity. Criterion 8B was deemed Absolute Success in Case 3. In terms of the evaluation 
items in Table 5.1, the P4 program failed to fulfil the criterion of equity. Criterion 8B was 
deemed Absolute Failure in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 8B ‘clearly fits’ 
the Chinese context. 
Appropriateness (Criterion 8C) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 8C (appropriateness) ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context. An adequate solution needs multiple and complementary measures to meet local 
conditions and be undertaken in a sustainable way. This criterion was not changed for the 
phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
As discussed in section 5.2.8, in terms of appropriateness, a successful policy should: (1) 
meet the policy intervention needs; (2) propose sufficient and feasible solutions; (3) and 
more importantly, imply a moral judgment on ‘goodness’, such as consideration of 
sustainable development. 
- Case 3: 
First, the P3 program met policy intervention needs, especially for children and elderly 
villagers. Interviewee 3VS stated: “The problem was the grandson and granddaughter of 
villagers would not want to visit and stay in their grandpa’s house for just one night because 
they did not want to use the old-style toilet at the courtyard.” Interviewee 3FR said: “Some 





It was very hard for me to squat down and stand up every time I 
went to the toilet [pit-latrine], sometimes I might need someone to 
assist me. Now we have installed the new toilet, it is more 
convenient than in the past. 
Second, the P3 program considered the problems that might arise from program 
implementation and proposed sufficient and feasible solutions. For example, for a house 
that did not have the condition to build a bathroom, such as an old-fashioned house built of 
adobe, residents could choose to attend the program voluntarily. For those who were short 
of money, they could get paid for their labour from this program. Besides, the VC had 
purchased a pipe jacking machine to avoid damaging to the courtyard floor. 
Third, the P3 program was not designed and implemented in a sustainable way. The Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region lacks adequate water resources, with only 68 percent of 
villages having running water (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, 2017). 
The use of flushing toilets could exacerbate local water shortages and it is a waste that 
excreta were not treated locally and reused. In fact, there are better options in terms of 
sustainable development. Public dry toilets, such as composting toilets and urine-diverting 
dry toilets, can be used as alternatives, depending on local contexts, to meet the goal of 
sustainable use of resources. Dry toilets use facilities such as waterless urinals and use less 
or no water. They do not mix excrement with water and do not contaminate groundwater, 
so they do not contribute to eutrophication of surface water. After further treatment, such 
as drying or composting, the manure can be safely used as fertilizer. They can also provide 
more construction flexibility than flush toilets (Platzer et al., 2008). Unlike flush toilets, there 
is no need to connect to a septic tank or sewer system (Tilley, 2014), especially for the arid 
region.  
- Case 4: 
First, the P4 program met policy intervention needs, despite villagers had different opinions 
on rural sewage. Interviewee 4FR said:  
Wastewater in the countryside is different from that in cities and it 
is not that complicated. Villagers do not use much cooking oil or 
cook much meat. So, they don't use a lot of cleanser essence. 
Villagers use little soap to wash hands. In arid areas, they don't 
even wash their hands with soap. Wastewater can water sheep or 





Despite these opinions, domestic sewage was considered one of the causes of the severe 
pollution of XX Lake (Guo et al., 2007; People's Government of CT4 County, 2018). As the 
statement by interviewee 4CE and 4DR shown in 7.3.5, the indiscriminate discharge and 
disposal of domestic sewage in CT4 county should be under control.  
Second, the P4 program failed to propose sufficient and feasible solutions. The P4 program 
intended to build sewage treatment facilities, lay pipe networks on a large scale, and install 
relevant facilities such as flush toilets, washbasins, and bathrooms in villagers’ homes. 
However, this might not work in the countryside. The construction of sewage treatment 
facilities and large-scale pipe networks in rural areas required villagers to rebuild drainage 
facilities in their houses, but not all houses were fit to do so. Moreover, for villages that did 
not have running water, it was difficult to use flush toilets. Low temperatures could also 
cause pipes to freeze and break during the cold winter months, if the pipes are not buried 
deep enough (Fan Chuan Xiao Yi Ge, 2019). However, the P4 program did not specify how to 
solve the above problems. Interviewee 4FR stated:  
It is very inconvenient and impractical to build sewage treatment 
systems in rural areas because the cost is too high. The VC and 
villagers have no money. This is not an easy program, because the 
sewage system needs pipes under the yard, just like water pipes. 
Third, it was questionable whether the P4 program was designed and implemented 
sustainably. The P4 program intended to encourage the villagers to use recycled water from 
sewage treatment facilities to irrigate their farmland. Although the program did not achieve 
the desired outcome, the program was considered sustainable in this sense. However, 
facilities, such as flush toilets, washbasins, and bathrooms, could exacerbate local water 
shortages because they used tap water from underground aquifers. But water recycling was 
not considered in the P4 program. Recycled water was only used for irrigation but not for 
augmentation of drinking water supplies though aquifer recharge. This might further decline 
the water table, which had dropped from 40-50 meters to below 100 meters  in the 
northern foot of Yinshan mountain (where V4 villager located) in the past few years (Xu & Li, 
2020). Moreover, the P4 program did not specify how to treat the sludge from sewage 
treatment facilities and whether the sludge would be reused.  
Overall findings and implications 
The P3 program met the policy intervention needs, propose sufficient and feasible solutions, 





items in Table 5.1, the P3 program was considered appropriate but was accompanied by 
failures. Criterion 8C was deemed Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 3. The P4 
program met the policy intervention needs. But it failed to propose sufficient and feasible 
solutions. More importantly, it was questionable whether the P4 program was designed and 
implemented in a sustainable way. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, there were 
a few minor successes but plagued by failures. Criterion 8C was deemed (Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 8C ‘clearly fits’ the 
Chinese context. 
7.3.9 Attracting support for program (Criterion 9) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 9 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. Control 
techniques were applied to attract support and achieve compliance to ensure program 
success in phase I cases. This criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
In both cases, direct power constrains CCP members and lower-level government officials. 
The VPBC secretary, township and county government officials, and some villagers were CCP 
members that were bound to support orders from higher party organizations to ensure the 
project went ahead. In addition, a series of control techniques were used in each case to 
attract public support. 
- Case 3: 
The first method used to attract support for the program was to provide subsidies to the 
target groups to encourage their participation. Participants in the P3 program could receive 
a NZ$538 subsidy to install flush toilets and plumbing. The second was publicity. VR and 
village CCP members acted as intermediaries between the VC and villagers. They spread the 
concept of the program and persuaded the villagers to take part. Meanwhile, banners were 
hung on street walls to publicize the program. Third, a small trial was conducted to show the 
results to other villagers. Interviewee 3VS stated: “The VC and CCP members are more 
politically aware than villagers. So, they run a pilot. Then they encouraged others to 
participate.” Fourth, participants in the program signed a voluntary agreement with the VC 
to avoid disputes and ensure their participation. The above actions of the village committee 





- Case 4: 
The implementation of the P4 program used less control technology than the P3 program. 
The P4 program provided a similar amount of subsidy as in Case 3 for villagers to install flush 
toilets and plumbing, but no village household was piped to the STC in Case 4, so that there 
was no subsidy given to villagers. The P4 program implementation relied mainly on 
executive orders and subsidies to attract stakeholders’ support. The technique of 
exhortation was also used. Land disputes are resolved through informal procedures. 
Government officials would visit and persuade villagers to reach a consensus. There was 
widespread criticism to the program implementation.  
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the control techniques used in the P3 program 
resulted in a high level of public support for its implementation. Criterion 9 was deemed 
Absolute Success in Case 3. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the P4 program 
was highly controversial and there was widespread criticism from the public. Criterion 9 was 
deemed Absolute Failure in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 9 ‘clearly fits’ 
the Chinese context. 
7.3.10 Enhancing electoral prospects/reputation (Criterion 10) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 10 ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context. It is hard to 
find evidence that any government officials got promoted as a result of the CET program 
implementation or as a result of the reputation gained from program implementation. This 
criterion was not changed for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
The implementation of the program had enhanced the reputation of local officials. But much 
depends on whether the target group benefits from the project. However, program 
implementation and a good reputation gained from the program had no impaction on the 
VC members’ promotion. The Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees regulated: “A 
villagers' committee is a mass organization of self-government at the grassroots level” 
(National People's Congress, 2010). This means the villagers’ committee is a self-managing 





promoted to higher levels of government. Interviewee 3VS stated: “It's impossible for 
villagers’ committee members [to get promoted]. They are not government officials.”  
- Case 4: 
The P4 program did not enhance the reputation of county government officials. 
Interviewees hold negative attitudes towards the government officials who carried out the 
program. Villagers believed that implementing an environmental program is what the 
government should do. On the other hand, program implementation had no impact on the 
government officials’ promotion. Interviewee 4DR said: “The institution limits my room to 
get promoted. I work overtime every day. No matter what my performance is, I can't get the 
promotion, since I am a staff of government-affiliated institutions. The county government 
made this rule.”  
Overall findings and implications 
An environmental program may increase or decrease the reputation of local government 
officials. However, there was no evidence to indicate any government official got promoted 
as a result of program implementation or reputation gained from program implementation 
Without access to the information needed to assess Criterion 10 (see Table 5.1), no evidence 
to support Criterion 10 was available in either case. The Phase II study, building on the 
findings from phase I, confirms finally that Criterion 10 ‘does not fit’ the Chinese context.  
7.3.11 Easing the business of governing (Criterion 11) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 11 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. A local 
government may prioritize an issue that is easier to act on. This criterion was not changed 
for the phase II study. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
- Case 3: 
Local governments did not prioritize the policy agenda for issues if they lacked suitable 
solutions for these issues. The P3 program aimed to solve rural sewage pollution. However, 
another serious environmental problem, namely straw disposal, was not on the 
government’s agenda, because local governments and villagers could not find a way to 





by burning was used to improve seedbed preparation and seedling establishment, but this 
practice is now strictly prohibited. Straw was also used to feed livestock, but now the 
villagers have almost no livestock. Straw gathered and stored in a straw bale could be a 
valuable addition to the compost pile, but this practice had failed because seedlings would 
not grow in compost made from straw in V3 village. Interviewee 3HT stated: “This is a 
headache from above [central government] to below [local governments] because there is no 
good way to recycle it. At present, no method is acceptable to the public.”  
- Case 4: 
Local governments prioritized the policy agenda items that the political leadership considers 
important to ease the business of governing. Mr. Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the CCP 
and the president of the People’s Republic of China, announced the ‘Toilet Revolution 
Campaign’ in 2015. More than 68,000 public toilets were built in China from 2015 to 2017, 
and 64,000 more will be built from 2018 to 2020 (Cheang, 2017). CT4 county government 
‘jumped on the bandwagon’ as it was a good opportunity to advance the program on 
preventing XX Lake pollution. Therefore, CT4 county put rural toilet construction and rural 
sewage treatment on the county government's agenda to get more state subsidy. 
Overall findings and implications 
A tricky issue or an issue without a technical solution would not be on the agenda. Local 
governments prioritize the policy agenda items that the political leadership considers 
important. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, both programs successfully 
controlled the policy agenda to ease the business of governing. Criterion 11 was deemed 
Absolute Success in both cases. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 11 ‘clearly fits’ the 
Chinese context. 
7.3.12 Promotion of government’s desired trajectory (Criterion 12) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 12 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. Both programs 
maintained the ‘vision and promise’ of the central government and they did not conflict with 
other national trajectories, so that they are politically successful. However, public policy 
requires making decisions among conflicting goals. This criterion was not changed for the 






Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
All respondents agreed that both programs had sustained the broad value and direction to 
build an ‘Ecological Civilization’, which is also the core concept of the CET policy. Interviewee 
3VS stated: “In the past, we focused on helping farmers increase their incomes and alleviate 
poverty. At present, we are committed to improving the rural living environment and 
farmers' happiness index.” However, environmental protection may conflict with other 
national trajectories, such as economic development and government debt reduction. 
- Case 3: 
The contradiction between economic development and environmental protection was the 
dilemma faced by local government. Interviewee 3VS stated:  
Environmental protection cannot be achieved overnight. It must be 
sustained. In the long run, the countryside must first find a way to 
develop its economy. We cannot improve the effectiveness of 
environmental projects if we insist on environmental protection 
without restructuring the economy. We should address the root 
causes, not the symptoms. 
The above statement implied that development and sustainability should go hand-in-hand, 
and the haste to fulfil pollution-control targets should not be at the expense of economic 
development. For example, T3 township government provided the villagers with a free 
environment-friendly coal stove to replace their old stoves. But the villagers may not be able 
to afford hard coal or anthracite, which was much more expensive than black coal. 
Interviewee 3VS said:  
Now we comply with the national call for environmental protection. 
Did they [upper-level governments] consider the affordability of the 
villagers? We joke about this: villagers used to be in poverty 
because of illness. But now villagers return to poverty because of 
heating [environmental protection]. 
- Case 4: 
Environmental protection may conflict with the national trajectory for debt reduction. In 
China, local governments rely heavily on debt to protect the environment (Bradsher, 2017; 
Q. Ye, 2014). Interviewee 4DE stated:  
There is no government leader who does not want development 
[Local economy and environmental protection]. But local 





accept funding. Why is that? Because we [local governments] must 
provide matching funds. Where can we get the money? It's a big 
conflict.  
The P4 program exacerbated the debt crisis in CT4 county, as the CET policy provided only 
part of the funding, while the rest had to be raised by the CT4 county government. 
Therefore, the P4 program indicated that the entire trajectory of the government was in 
danger of being compromised. According to Table 5.1, Criterion 12 was deemed (Outright) 
Failure = Marginal Success in Case 4. 
Overall findings and implications 
In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, the P3 program sustained the broad value and 
direction of the government, but it promoted some rethinking. Criterion 12 was deemed 
Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 3. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 
5.1, the P4 program conflicted with other national trajectories, e.g. debt reduction. Criterion 
12 was deemed (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success in Case 4. The phase II study indicated 
that Criterion 12 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
7.3.13 Providing political benefits (Criterion 13) 
Findings from the phase I study 
The phase I study indicated that Criterion 13 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. Local 
governments could gain more political benefits as a result of the CET programs. The phase II 
study expands the scope of Criterion 13 from ‘providing political benefits for government’ to 
‘providing political benefits’. More stakeholders were taken into account. 
Results from Case 3 and Case 4 
In both cases, the village committee and county government gained political benefits by 
distributing benefits to community members. All interviewees indicated that their support to 
the governments or village committee was ‘considerably more’ or ‘much more’ as a result of 
the programs. The CCP had also benefited politically. All interviewees indicated that their 
support for the CCP had increased or increased significantly as a result of both programs.  
- Case 3: 
As a result of program implementation, village officials gained political benefits and their 





program ensured public participation in the policy process and that the public could express 
their needs.  
- Case 4: 
County government officials gained bad reputation in implementing the P4 program. This 
may be because the villagers dissatisfactions were associated with local government 
officials, whom they believed were the cause of the problems, but not to the government, 
which had good intentions. Interviewee 4DR said sarcastically: “The Chinese believe that the 
higher level of the government, the better the officials. They believe President Xi Jinping is 
good and CCP is good. In lower-level government, no officials are good.” Meanwhile, citizens 
had not benefited politically from the pursuit of democratic rights, because the P4 program 
had failed to engage the public in the policy process and to express their needs.  
Overall findings and implications 
All stakeholders from the P3 program gained political benefits. In terms of the evaluation 
items in Table 5.1, there was no disagreement that there were political benefits for 
stakeholders. Criterion 13 was deemed Absolute Success in Case 3. In the P4 program, the 
county government and the CCP gained political benefits, but not county government 
officials and citizens. In terms of the evaluation items in Table 5.1, political benefits gained 
by county government and the CCP are balanced with political disbenefits 
gained/experienced by county government officials and citizens. Criterion 13 was deemed 
Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success in Case 4. The phase II study indicated that Criterion 
13 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
7.4 Evaluation of the modified set of criteria applied to Cases 3 & 4 
The phase II study evaluated the modified set of criteria in two Chinese case studies. A 
summary of the evaluation findings, based on the evidence collected and the underpinning 
theory, is shown in Table 7.3. All these criteria can be grouped into three ‘extent-of-fit’ 
categories (see section 3.4.5), related to the context of the Chinese policy environment: 
• Clearly Fit: ten criteria were fully supported by evidence and clearly fit the Chinese 
context, namely: implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5), achieving desired 
outcomes (Criterion 6), benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7), efficiency (Criterion 8A), 





(Criterion 9), easing the business of governing (Criterion 11), promotion of government’s 
desired trajectory (Criterion 12), and providing political benefits (Criterion 13). 
• Partially Fit: evidence was found to partially support the following three criteria: 
securing legitimacy (Criterion 2), building sustainable coalition (Criterion 3), and 
attracting support for process (Criterion 4). In most cases, Criterion 2 fits the Chinese 
context in terms of the policy content or actions of the government. Criterion 3 and 
Criterion 4 are applicable to the village level, but not the county level.  
• Does not fit: no evidence was found to support the following two criteria and they do 
not fit the Chinese context: preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) and 





Table 7.3 Summary evaluation of the modified set of the policy evaluation criteria applied to Cases 3 & 4 
No. Criterion Conclusion of the 
phase I study 
Conclusion of 
phase II study 
Summary evaluation of criteria 
1 Preserving goals and 
policy instruments 
May not fit Does not fit In both cases, the public had little information about which part of the proposal 
had been changed and why such changes happened. 
2 Securing legitimacy Potentially fits Partially fits When legitimacy is considered in the sense of ‘what is being done’, there were no 
challenges to the legitimacy of the P3 program and the P4 program was considered 
illegitimate. In most cases, Criterion 2 fits the Chinese context in terms of the policy 
content or actions of the government. 
3 Building sustainable 
coalition  
May not fit Partially fits At the village level, a coalition could be formed to facilitate approval or denial of a 
proposal. Coalitions among stakeholders are not possible in county level 
policymaking.  
4 Attracting support for 
process 
May fit Partially fits Agenda setting may not need widespread public support at both village and county 
levels. But the policy formulation and adoption process had tried to seek public 
advice and attract public support at the village level, but not at the county level. 
5 Implementation in line 
with objectives 
Clearly fits Clearly fits The P3 program did not meet both policy objectives. The P4 program met the first 
objective, but not the second objective. It is necessary to evaluate the whether a 
policy/program is implemented consistent with its objectives to fully judge its 
success or failure. 
6 Achieving desired 
outcomes 
Clearly fits Clearly fits The P3 program achieved both desired outcomes to a limited extent. The P4 
program achieved the first desired outcome to a limited extent, but it did not 
achieve the second desired outcome. 
7 Benefiting target 
group(s) 
Clearly fits Clearly fits The target group of the P3 program broadly benefited, despite a few shortfalls. The 





Potentially fits Clearly fits The P3 program was more efficient than the P4 program, because of transparent 
program expenditure and more inclusive public participation during the 
policymaking process. 
8B Equity May fit Clearly fits The P3 program guaranteed distributive equity and procedural equity, but not the 





8C Appropriateness Clearly fits  Clearly fits The P3 program partially achieved its goals but accompanied by failures. The P4 
program was not considered appropriate in terms of meeting local conditions. 
9 Attracting support for 
program 
Clearly fits Clearly fits Control techniques were applied in both cases, which resulted in a high level of 
public support for the P3 program, but there was widespread criticism for the P4 
program from the public.   
10 Enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation 
May not fit Dees not fit An environmental program may increase or decrease the reputation of local 
government officials. However, there was no evidence to indicate any government 
officials got promoted as a result of this program implementation or as a result of 
the reputation gained from program implementation. 
11 Easing the business of 
governing 
Clearly fits Clearly fits A tricky issue or an issue without a technical solution would not be on the agenda. 
Local governments prioritize the policy agenda items that the political leadership 
considers important. Both programs fully controlled the policy agenda to ease the 
business of governing. 
12 Promotion of 
government’s desired 
trajectory 
Clearly fits Clearly fits The P3 program sustained the broad values and direction of the government, but it 
promoted some rethinking of the policy. The P4 program conflicted with other 
national trajectories, e.g. debt reduction. 
13 Providing political 
benefits 
Clearly fits Clearly fits In Case 3, CCP, local government, government officials, and citizens gained political 
benefits. In Case 4, CCP and local government gained political benefits, but not 






7.5 Analysis of policy success or failure 
The same approach that was used to analyse policy success or failure in the phase I case 
study (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4) was applied in the phase II case study. Table 7.4 summarises 
the success/failure in Cases 3 and 4 for each of the 13 criteria. Table 7.5 shows the score of 
each criterion, the mean scores of each realm and overall score of Case 3 and 4. 
Table 7.4 Summary of success/failure for each of the modified set of McConnell’s criteria 
when applied to Cases 3 & 4 
Key. AF = Absolute Failure; OF/MS: (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success; CF/CS: Conflicted 
Failure = Conflicted Success; TF/RS: Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success; AS = Absolute 
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Table 7.5 Summary scores for each criterion, realm, and the policy program to Cases 3 & 4 
Key. An ordinal five-point scale is used to capture the different levels of success/failure, 
showing the success/failure of a criterion, a realm, and the overall policy program, namely: 
Absolute Failure = 1; (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success = 2; Conflicted Failure = Conflicted 
Success = 3; Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success = 4; Absolute Success = 5. The extent of 
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Based on Table 7.5, it can be concluded that: 
• In Case 3, the ‘process’ realm was deemed Absolute Success, the ‘program’ realm was 
deemed Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success, and the ‘politics’ realm was deemed 
Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success. In total, Case 3 was deemed Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success.  
• In Case 4, the ‘process’ realm was deemed (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success, the 
‘program’ realm was deemed (Outright) Failure = Marginal Success, and the ‘politics’ 
realm was deemed Conflicted failure = Conflicted Success. Case 4 was deemed (Outright) 
Failure = Marginal Success.  
7.6 Evaluation using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework  
As with Case 1 and 2, the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework was applied to Cases 3 and 
4 as a third-party investigator and the findings compared with those from applying 
McConnell’s framework. The original intention was to compare the results of three different 
evaluation methods: the results presented above using McConnell’s framework, this 
researcher’s evaluation using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework as a third-party 
investigator, and government department evaluations that employ the MEE [2010] 136 
evaluation framework. However, the researcher was not able to access the evaluation 
reports for either Case 3 or Case 4 undertaken by government departments. 
The MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (Appendix B) provided indicators and illustrated 
relative weighting of each indicator used for evaluating the ‘objective achievement’ and 
‘overall output’, depending on the type of pollution that the program targeted. A revised 
MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (Appendix D) was developed for domestic 
wastewater programs, and a set of methods and rules was created as the basis to judge 
these indicators. Findings from applying the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework 
(Appendix D) as a third-party investigator in Case 3 and Case 4 are presented in Table 7.6. 
The MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework regulates that the assessment results are divided 
into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The corresponding assessment scores are: ≥ 
90 = Excellent, ≥ 70 - <90 = Good, ≥60 - <70 = Fair, and < 60 = Poor. Based on the 






• Case 3 scored 41.96 and was deemed ‘Poor’ 
• Case 4 scored 69 and was deemed ‘Fair’ 
It should be noted that the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework addresses only the 
matters covered by Criteria 5 (Implementation in line with objectives) and Criterion 6 
(Achieving desired outcomes) in McConnell’s framework. The average score using 
McConnell’s Criteria 5 and 6 from each of the two cases is: Case 3 = (1+3)/2 = 2, Case 4 = 
(3+2)/2 = 2.5. The evaluation results using McConnell’s Criteria 5 and 6 are consistent with 
the evaluation results using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in Case 3 and Case 4. 
This further confirms the validity of the research findings.  
7.7 Summary 
The phase II study was conducted to gain deeper insights into modified set of McConnell’s 
policy evaluation criteria in two selected areas in rural China. The findings grouped the 
evaluation criteria into three ‘extent-of-fit’ categories, namely: ‘clearly fit’, ‘partially fit’, and 
‘does not fit’. Ten criteria ‘clearly fit’, three criteria ‘partially fit’, and two criteria ‘do not fit’ 
the Chinese context. The modified set of McConnell’s policy evaluation criteria were also 
applied in case studies to draw conclusions about policy success or policy failure. Case 3 was 
deemed Tolerable Failure = Resilient Success, and Case 4 was deemed (Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success. Based on the researcher’s own application of the revised MEE [2010] 136 
evaluation framework (Appendix D), Case 3 was deemed ‘Poor’ and Case 4 was deemed 
‘Fair’. The evaluation results using Criteria 5 and 6 in McConnell’s framework are consistent 
with the evaluation results using the revised MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in Case 3 
and Case 4. Based on the findings from phase I and phase II case study, the next chapter 
discusses the meaning, importance and relevance of these results. Recommendations are 






Table 7.6 Researcher application of the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework as a third-party investigator to Cases 3 & 4 
 No. Indicators Relative 
Weighting 
(out of 100) 





























No objectives met; No 
significant outcomes 
produced.  









8 ≥95% 100% 8 80% 4 




8 Full-time staff in 
charge of program 
implementation and 
management hired in 
township. 
No full-time staff in 
charge of program 
implementation and 
management hired in 
T3 township.  
0 Part-time staff in 
charge of program 
implementation and 
management were 

























stable. The follow-up 
managing and 
operating expense 
was not guaranteed.  
19 Facility operation 





Total   100   41.96/100 = 
Poor 






Note. For indicators 1, 3, and 5, partially meeting one of the requirements gets a 50% score; for indicator 2, less than 50% satisfaction rate gets a 0 score, 
50%-94.9% would be considered partial success and get 4 points, above 95% would get 8 points; for indicators 4, the calculation was based on the actual 
rate, e.g., 23x60% = 13.8. Findings were derived from interviews, on-site observation, and qualitative visual assessments. The MEE [2010]136 evaluation 
framework regulates that the assessment results are divided into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The overall corresponding assessment scores 







8.1 Introduction  
An environmental policy initiative in China was explored using McConnell’s policy evaluation 
framework (2015), and undertaken with an integrated approach involving triangulation and 
adaptive learning in multiple case study applications. Chapter 5 reported the theoretical 
findings underpinning potential application of McConnell’s policy evaluation criteria in the 
Chinese context. Chapters 6 and 7 presented the results from empirical enquiry covering 
two phases of case studies. This chapter will interpret and evaluate these results, showing 
their relationship to the literature and the research questions, and exploring their 
significance, importance, and relevance within the Chinese and global contexts.  
This chapter responds to the research questions raised in this study. Section 8.2 addresses 
the first research question: what aspects of McConnell’s framework are missing/not 
fitting/can be revised in the Chinese context? Section 8.3 then examines two research 
questions: what are the relative degrees of policy success/failure in each case study; and, 
what are the internal relationships between success/failure in the ‘process’, ‘program’ and 
‘politics’ realms. Section 8.4 responds to the final research question: what are the causes of 
policy failure? Finally, section 8.5 discusses overall the research implications of this research.  
8.2 Revisiting McConnell’s framework 
Based on a review of the literature of the Chinese policy process, it is argued that the 
underlying context in which McConnell’s framework was developed is very different from 
the Chinese political context, and that this may influence the potential application of the 
framework in China. Despite the differences in context, the framework was considered the 
most relevant and integrated of those available, and thus one of the aims of this research 
was to test its applicability in China. The framework was first evaluated from a theoretical 
point of view and then tested, and improved in the light of emergent knowledge, against 
Comprehensive Environmental Treatment (CET) environmental policy programs, in two 
phases each involving two case applications. The first phase was a trial to assess the 
framework’s utility and to gain preliminary insights for subsequent framework improvement 





selected cases. The second phase application incorporated the improvements identified in 
the first phase and was conducted to gain deeper insights into the overall applicability of the 
modified framework in the Chinese context. Rural domestic wastewater programs were 
studied in the further two selected cases in this second phase.  
This section reviews each of the 13 criteria in McConnell’s framework, based on the findings 
and results from the theoretical evaluation and the two phases of case applications. The 
purpose of this section is to respond to the research question: What aspects of McConnell’s 
framework are missing/not fitting/can be revised in the Chinese context? The above 
research findings lead to several suggested improvements to McConnell’s framework, with a 
final amended framework proposed that appears to fit the Chinese context. Additional, 
complementary evaluation results using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (the 
policy effect evaluation guideline for the CET policy from the Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment) are then discussed and compared with the evaluation results using 
McConnell’s framework. 
8.2.1 Preserving goals and policy instruments (Criterion 1) 
A policy proposal can be adopted following a defined deliberation procedure in government 
structures, where the stakeholders may exert influence. The literature review suggested 
that, in China, such processes may lack transparency and the government sees little or no 
need for public participation (Hu, 1998). The phase I study found that Criterion 1 ‘may not 
fit’ the Chinese context in the sense that it cannot be used in policy evaluation due to lack of 
information and non-transparent policy adoption processes at the township level. The phase 
II study further indicated that the public had little information about which part of the 
program proposal may have been changed and why such changes happened. It can be 
concluded that Criterion 1 ‘does not fit’ the Chinese context.  
The Chinese policy process involves ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ (Fan, 2014; 
Sheng, 1998; Zhang, 2014). Policy is therefore often trialled via small-scale policy 
experiments that replace the policy formulation process and help to make better decisions 
through adaptive learning. Given that local governments may lack experience and 
professionalism around environmental programs, repeatedly revising policies by ‘trial and 
error’ is an effective way to find the best and most feasible solutions (Zhang, 2016; Zhang & 
Song, 2018). In Case 3 (phase II), the P3 program (Rebuild Toilets Inside Villagers’ Houses) 





detected and resolved in advance of the first trial but were after the trial implementation. 
Therefore, I propose a revised criterion, based on McConnell’s thinking and study findings, 
designed to fit the Chinese context. This suggested criterion is ‘Policy Trial’, and asks the 
question: has the policy been trialled and improvements informed by stakeholders? 
8.2.2 Securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) 
“Legitimacy is affected both by how something is done (i.e., whether proper procedures are 
used) and by what is being done” (Anderson, 2003, pp. 119-120). ‘Whether proper 
procedures are used’ refers to whether the policymaking process conforms to laws or rules. 
‘What is being done’ refers to the policy content or actions of the government. 
Administrative decision-making needs to go through a normative process in order to achieve 
public recognition and acceptance (X. Wang, 2008). On the other hand, legitimacy in public 
policy can be “the product of satisfying felt needs and solving perceived problems” (Anders, 
2003, p. 257). The phase I study indicated that, if policy legitimacy was assessed solely in 
terms of process legitimacy, it could not be measured in either Case 1 or Case 2. The 
stakeholders rarely considered/lacked interest in whether these programs conformed to 
laws or rules because their interests were not violated. However, legitimacy may be 
challenged by the stakeholders in other programs when the policy content or actions of the 
government violates their interests or causes disputes. If Criterion 2 is defined more broadly 
to include legitimacy of policy content or actions taken by the government, it ‘potentially 
fits’ the Chinese context. Therefore, the phase II study expanded the scope of legitimacy to 
include the policy content or actions taken by the government. Findings from Case 3 and 
Case 4 indicated that, as long as the public accepted and endorsed the policy content or 
actions of the government, the policy legitimacy was secured. It is then concluded that, in 
most cases, Criterion 2 ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context, in terms of the policy content or 
actions of the government. 
“Legitimacy is an important factor in developing public support and acceptance for both 
government and the policies that it adopts” (Anderson, 2003, p. 120). In China, it is not so 
relevant whether the policymaking process is conforming to the law or rules, but if the policy 
content or actions of the government are not considered legitimate, it is more likely there 
will be disputes. Therefore, administrative procedure should effectively coordinate social 
conflicts and maintain social stability and balance (Zhai, 2017). In this sense, Criterion 2 





better, namely: Disputes Settlement. It asks the question: does the government have fair 
and reasonable measures to settle disputes?  
8.2.3 Building a sustainable coalition  (Criterion 3) 
The ability to create coalitions is constrained by institutional arrangements that outline the 
participation rules involved in the policymaking process (Bryson et al., 2013; Fung, 2015; 
Nabatchi, 2012; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). However, there is little literature on 
how a coalition is formed, and how institutions constrain the influence of a coalition in terms 
of policymaking in the Chinese context. Thus, the question about whether building a 
coalition between policy stakeholders helps to obtain policy approval was discussed further 
in the case studies. The phase I study indicated that Criterion 3 ‘may fit’ the Chinese context 
because a coalition was not formed when the policymaking process occurred at the 
township level. Therefore, further investigation was conducted at the village and county 
level in phase II. This study indicated that Criterion 3 ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context when 
the policymaking process occurred at the village level, but not at the county level. 
The research results showed that there was no coalition formed at the township and county 
level, because most stakeholders in the cases studies were not included in the policymaking 
process. Meanwhile, the Deputy Head of T3 township stated: “Without the support and 
collaboration of other departments and upper-level government, we cannot do a program. If 
we do not communicate well in advance and gain their support and recognition, you cannot 
get the program approval”. The literature review further suggested that effective 
coordination at horizontal and vertical levels of government (departments) are considered 
important to achieve program approval in the Chinese context (Wang, 2019). Therefore, an 
additional sub-criterion is proposed to more fully capture the requirements for policy 
success in China, namely: Coordinated Government, which refers to the coordination within 
the government system (B Guy Peters, 2015) that exists above the village level. It is different 
from ‘coalition’, which refers to ‘temporary alliances’ (Gamson, 1961) among stakeholders 
that may happen at the village level in China. Therefore, it is proposed Criterion 3 comprises 
of two sub-criteria: building a sustainable coalition (Criterion 3A) and coordinated 
government (Criterion 3B). These two sub-criteria are two aspects of Criterion 3 and each 





8.2.4 Attracting support for process (Criterion 4) 
The literature review suggested that attracting widespread support for the policymaking 
process (agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption) may not be essential in the 
Chinese political system (Hu, 2013; Hu, 1998). However, since 2002 China has been 
undergoing a transition from managerialism public administration to participatory public 
administration (Wang & Zhang, 2010). Thus, it is possible that policymakers in China today 
would seek support from the public. The phase I study indicated that Criterion 4 ‘may fit’ the 
Chinese context. Although the township governments had not sought public support during 
the policymaking process, there is the possibility that attracting public support is essential at 
the village and county levels. Therefore, further investigation was conducted at the village 
and county level in phase II. This further research indicated that Criterion 4 ‘partially fits’ at 
the village level, but not at the county level. ‘Partially fits’ means this criterion may not be 
necessary for China. However, as China develops, there is increasing emphasis on public 
participation, thus this criterion appears appropriate. Therefore, it is recommended that this 
criterion be retained when evaluating Chinese public policy. 
8.2.5 Implementation in line with objectives (Criterion 5) 
The review of the literature suggested that Criterion 5 could be used to judge 
policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. Results from the two phases of the 
case studies supported the argument from the literature. It can be concluded that Criterion 
5 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
8.2.6 Achieving desired outcomes (Criterion 6) 
The literature review suggested that it is possible to use outcome/impact indicators, such as 
economic, social, and environmental impact, to judge the success or failure of a 
policy/program in the Chinese context. The two phases of case studies supported the 
argument from the literature. It can be concluded that Criterion 6 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context.  
8.2.7 Benefiting target group(s) (Criterion 7) 
The review of the literature suggested that criterion 7 could be a critical identifier of 
policy/program implementation success or failure in the Chinese context. Results from the 
two phases of case studies again supported the argument from the literature. It can be 





8.2.8 Satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain  (Criterion 8) 
McConnell (2010a, 2010b, 2015) did not state clearly what attributes were included in 
Criterion 8 (satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain), except that he considered 
efficiency particularly important. Besides, it is likely that the criteria that are valued will vary 
with different national context. Therefore, identification of valued criteria that might fit for 
the Chinese context was conducted through a focus group prior to phase I (described in full 
in Chapter 3). Efficiency, equity, and appropriateness were judged as the most suitable 
criteria for evaluating ‘satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain’ in the Chinese 
context. They are considered criteria in their own right and are equally weighted with other 
criteria. 
Efficiency (Criterion 8A) 
The review of the literature suggested that ‘efficiency’ could be one means of evaluating 
policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. However, does efficiency matter to 
a policy’s target group? Phase I indicated that Criterion 8A ‘potentially fits’ the Chinese 
context. Where the policymaking process took place at the township level and most 
stakeholders were excluded from this process, they lacked the necessary information to 
judge policy efficiency. Additionally, since waste disposal services were provided for free, 
interviewees were not interested in program efficiency. Therefore, phase II targeted village 
and county level policymaking, and a different type of waste program. The phase II study 
found that the interviewees in Case 3 paid close attention to efficiency of the P3 program 
because most stakeholders had participated in decision-making and they shared in the costs 
of implementation of the program. However, while stakeholders in Case 4 lacked the 
necessary information to judge the efficiency of the P4 program (Program on comprehensive 
improvement of rural living environment in CT4 County), it is argued that the lack of 
necessary information in the policy process does not mean that policy efficiency is not 
important to the policy target group. This is because Case 3 demonstrates that in a 
transparent policy process, or if the policy requires funding from the target group, efficiency 
remains an important indicator for the target group to judge the success or failure of the 
policy. It is thus concluded that Criterion 8A ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
Equity  (Criterion 8B) 
The review of the literature suggested that ‘equity’ was a useful criterion for helping to 
evaluate policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. The phase I study 





ensured in both domestic waste programs, but it was not a prioritised concern for 
stakeholders. However, it was not clear whether or not equity was a prioritised concern for 
village and county level stakeholders, especially in situations where inequity could cause 
conflicts. Therefore, the phase II study targeted village and county level policymaking and 
focused on the potential impact of inequity to stakeholders. The phase II study found that, 
especially at the village level, the necessity to attract public support for policy formulation 
and the adoption of a policy impelled the local authority to attach significant importance to 
equity. It was concluded that Criterion 8B ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
Appropriateness  (Criterion 8C) 
The reviewed literature suggested that ‘appropriateness’ could help evaluate 
policy/program implementation in the Chinese context. The two phases of case studies 
supported that proposition and thus it can be concluded that Criterion 8C ‘clearly fits’ the 
Chinese context. 
8.2.9 Attracting support for program (Criterion 9) 
Administrative organizations gain support from the target group by using a range of ‘control 
techniques’ (see Chapter 5) during policy implementation. The literature review suggested 
that Criterion 9 could be used to evaluate policy/program implementation in the Chinese 
context. Similar control techniques were applied in the two phases of case studies, such as 
directive power that bond private parties and lower level government officials to achieve 
compliance. Research findings indicated that the more control techniques applied, the 
higher the level of public support gained for program implementation. Criterion 9 therefore 
‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. 
8.2.10 Enhancing electoral prospects/reputation (Criterion 10) 
China's political system is different from that of western countries, so the electoral 
prospects of party and government are not a relevant criteria for this study. In order to 
comply with McConnell’s interpretation of this criterion, the discussion of is correspondingly 
on the promotion of officials, because promotion incentive is key factor to explain China’s 
socio-economic reform and development in the past few decades (Zhou et al., 2005). The 
literature review suggested that Criterion 10 may not be suitable to judge policy success or 
failure in the Chinese context because the factors involved in getting a promotion are quite 
different for Chinese and Western officials (Wu & Ma, 2009). The phase I study found that 





any government official got promoted as a result of program implementation or reputation 
gained from program implementation. The phase II study built on these findings and 
confirmed that Criterion 10 ‘does not fit’ the Chinese context, at least in terms of 
environmental policy. Therefore, it is recommended that this criterion not be retained in the 
framework when it is used for evaluating Chinese environmental policy, but its retention be 
considered if the framework is used to evaluate other types of policy, such as economic 
policy. 
8.2.11 Easing the business of governing (Criterion 11) 
In China, local governments use multiple measures to ease the business of governing. The 
literature reviewed suggested that Criterion 11 could help to explain government activity in 
the Chinese context. In both phases of the case studies, local governments were found to 
prioritize their government agendas to ease the business of governing. It is therefore 
concluded that Criterion 11 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context.  
8.2.12 Promotion of government’s desired trajectory (Criterion 12) 
To follow or promote national trajectories are matters of political correctness for local 
governments, but they may be caught in a ‘dilemma’ between these trajectories (Zhang & Li, 
2014). Thus, the literature review suggested that Criterion 12 is a meaningful policy measure 
in the Chinese context. The phase I study found that Criterion 12 ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context. Both programs in phase I helped to maintain the central government’s ‘vision and 
promise’ and they did not conflict with other national trajectories. However, public policy 
requires making decisions among conflicting goals. Therefore, the phase II study focused on 
potential conflicts between national trajectories. The research findings indicated that 
environmental protection had conflicted with other national trajectories. It is therefore 
concluded that Criterion 12 is a meaningful policy measure and ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese 
context. 
8.2.13 Providing political benefits for government (Criterion 13) 
McConnell (2015, p. 235) proposed the criterion ‘providing political benefits for government’ 
to judge the success or failure of a policy/program. The review of the literature suggested 
that Criterion 13 can be used to evaluate the political impact of a policy/program in the 
Chinese context. The phase I study found the Criterion ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. In 
both cases, local governments gained much political benefit. However, the phase I study 





the policy, but also those not affected. Not only the government, but also a party, 
politicians, government officials, and citizens can gain political benefits through public policy 
(Hong et al., 2006). The phase II study found that in Case 3 all interviewees gained political 
benefits. But in Case 4 the county government that led the policy formulation and 
implementation, and the public that did not participate in the policy process, did not gain 
political benefits. It is therefore concluded that Criterion 13 is a meaningful policy measure 
and ‘clearly fits’ the Chinese context. It is also suggested that the scope of Criterion 13 be 
widened from ‘providing political benefits for government’ to ‘providing political benefits’. 
8.2.14 Overall evaluation of McConnell’s framework 
The application of McConnell’s framework was evaluated by three steps: literature review 
and the empirical phases I and II. These evaluations are summarised below.  
First, Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C are proposed to replace McConnell’s original Criterion 8. They 
are considered criteria in their own right and are equally weighted with other criteria. The 
literature review identified that that nine of McConnell’s original criteria and Criteria 8A, 8B, 
and 8C could be appropriate for policy evaluation in China. Criteria 1 and 10 were not 
supported by the literature. Criterion 3 was not clearly discussed in the literature and lacked 
empirical analysis.  
Second, phase I of the empirical enquiry then found seven of McConnell’s original criteria, 
and Criterion 8C, were fully supported by evidence and ‘clearly fit’ the Chinese context. 
Criterion 2 and Criterion 8A were not clearly observed, and not enough evidence was found 
to confirm they applied so they were considered to ‘potentially fit’ the Chinese context. 
Evidence in support of Criterion 4 and Criterion 8B was not found, but it was considered that 
evidence may occur in other programs and they ‘may fit’ the Chinese context. No evidence 
was found to support Criteria 1, 3, and 10 and they ‘may not fit’ the Chinese context.  
Third, in phase II, a revised set of criteria, based on learnings from the above, was tested 
empirically again. The scope of Criterion 2 and Criterion 13 were broadened from that tested 
in phase I. The other criteria tested in phase I were unchanged. The empirical enquiry then 
identified that six of McConnell’s original criteria, plus Criteria 8A, 8B, 8C, and Criterion 13 
were fully supported by evidence and ‘clearly fit’ the Chinese context. Evidence was found to 
partially support Criteria 2, 3, and 4 and they ‘partially fit’ the Chinese context. No evidence 
was found to support Criteria 1 and 10 and they ‘do not fit’ the Chinese context. The 





Table 8.1 Evaluation summary from iteratively applying the modified set of McConnell’s policy evaluation criteria in the Chinese context 
 McConnell’s original 
Criterion 
Evaluation from literature 
based theoretical view 
Criteria used in Phase I 
case studies 
Evaluation 
from phase I 
case studies  
Criteria used in Phase II 
case studies 
Evaluation 
from phase II 
case studies 
1 Preserving goals and 
policy instruments 
Non-supportive Preserving goals and 
policy instruments 
May not fit Preserving goals and 
policy instruments 
Does not fits 
2 Securing legitimacy 
(process) 
Supportive Securing legitimacy 
(process) 
Potentially fit Securing legitimacy 
(process; content and 
actions) 
Partially fits 
3 Building sustainable 
coalition  
Unclear Building sustainable 
coalition  
May not fit Building sustainable 
coalition  
Partially fits 
4 Attracting support for 
process 
Supportive Attracting support for 
process 
May fit Attracting support for 
process 
Partially fits 
5 Implementation in line 
with objectives 
Supportive Implementation in line 
with objectives 
Clearly fits Implementation in line 
with objectives 
Clearly fits 
6 Achieving desired 
outcomes 
Supportive Achieving desired 
outcomes 
Clearly fits Achieving desired 
outcomes 
Clearly fits 
7 Benefiting target 
group(s) 
Supportive Benefiting target 
group(s) 
Clearly fits Benefiting target 
group(s) 
Clearly fits 
8  Satisfying criteria highly 
valued in policy domain   
8A: Efficiency Supportive 8A: Efficiency Potentially fits 8A: Efficiency Clearly Fits 
8B: Equity Supportive 8B: Equity May fit 8B: Equity Clearly Fits 
8C: 
Appropriateness 
Supportive 8C: Appropriateness Clearly fits 8C: Appropriateness Clearly fits 
9 Attracting support for 
program 
Supportive Attracting support for 
program 
Clearly fits Attracting support for 
program 
Clearly fits 
10 Enhancing electoral 
prospects/reputation 
Non-supportive Enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation 
May not fit Enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation 
Does not fits 
11 Easing the business of 
governing 
Supportive Easing the business of 
governing 







12 Promotion of 
government’s desired 
trajectory 
Supportive Promotion of 
government’s desired 
trajectory 




13 Providing political 
benefits for government 
Supportive Providing political 
benefits for 
government 







8.2.15 Adapting McConnell’s framework for the Chinese context 
The above research findings answered the question: is McConnell’s framework applicable in 
the Chinese context? The evaluation of results from McConnell’s framework application in 
the two phases of case studies is basically consistent with the conclusions of the literature 
evaluation. It can be confirmed that McConnell’s framework can be used in China, with the 
following suggested revisions, amendments, and improvements. 
• Criterion 1, namely: preserving policy goals and policy instruments, ‘does not fit’ the 
Chinese context. An alternative revised Criterion 1 has been designed, namely: Policy 
Trial. It asks the question: has the policy been trialled and improvements informed by 
stakeholders?  
• Criterion 2, namely: securing legitimacy, ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context. The scope 
was defined more broadly to include the legitimacy of policy content or actions taken by 
the government. It has been amended to better fit the Chinese context, namely: 
Disputes Settlement. It asks the question: does the government have fair and reasonable 
measures to settle disputes? 
• Criterion 3, namely: building sustainable coalition, ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context. An 
additional sub-criterion is added to more fully capture the requirements for policy 
success in China, namely: Coordinated Government. It asks the question: is there 
effective coordination within and between layers of government to facilitate the 
approval of a program?  
• Criterion 4, namely: attracting support for process, ‘partially fits’ the Chinese context. 
This criterion should be retained to evaluate Chinese public policy.  
• Criteria 8, namely: satisfying criteria highly valued in policy domain, is more clearly 
articulated to focus on efficiency, equity and appropriateness via three separate criteria. 
• Criterion 10, namely: enhancing electoral prospects/reputation, ‘does not fit’ the 
Chinese context. It is recommended that this criterion not be retained in the framework 
when it is used for evaluating Chinese environmental policy, but its retention be 






• Criterion 13, namely: providing political benefits for government, ‘clearly fits’ the 
Chinese context. However, it is suggested that the scope be widened from ‘providing 
political benefits for government’ to ‘providing political benefits’. 
A modified McConnell’s framework is presented in Table 8.2. The modified framework is 
based on the research findings and is considered to now be applicable in the Chinese 
context. Overall there are 15 criteria (with sub-criteria 3A and 3B, and proposed criteria 8A, 
8B, and 8C). All are considered as observed variables for evaluating a policy or a program in 
the Chinese context. More importantly, McConnell’s framework, as modified by the results 
and implications of this research, potentially fills a gap in the Chinese policy environment, 





Table 8.2 Amendment of McConnell’s framework to fit the Chinese context 





1 Preserving goals and policy 
instruments 
Not be retained; Revised to focus on policy trial 1 Policy trial 
2 Securing legitimacy Defined more broadly; Amended to focus on dispute settlement 2 Disputes settlement 
3 Building sustainable coalition  Split and an additional sub-criterion 3B added to more fully capture 
the requirements for policy success in China 
3A Building sustainable coalition 
3B Coordinated Government 






5 Implementation in line with 
objectives 
No change 5 Implementation in line with 
objectives 
6 Achieving desired outcomes No change 6 Achieving desired outcomes 
7 Benefiting target group(s) No change 7 Benefiting target group(s) 
8 Satisfying criteria highly valued in 
policy domain   
Criterion 8A was proposed and retained 8A Efficiency 
Criterion 8B was proposed and retained 8B Equity 
Criterion 8C was proposed and retained 8C Appropriateness 





10 Enhancing electoral 
prospects/reputation 
Not be retained for evaluating environmental policy, but its retention 
be considered for other types of policy 
  
11 Easing the business of governing No change 11 Easing the business of governing 
12 Promotion of government’s desired 
trajectory 
No change 12 Promotion of government’s 
desired trajectory 
13 Providing political benefits for 
government 
Scope widened to include political benefits to any/all stakeholders 13 Providing political benefits  






8.3 Evaluating the relative success or failure of the CET policy 
McConnell’s framework (2015) was applied and tested empirically in two phases with four 
specific case examples. Aside from testing and potentially improving the design and utility of 
the framework, another aim of this study involved evaluating relative success or failure of 
the CET policy and providing insights into how the policy might be improved. This section 
responds to two research questions: (1) what are the relative degrees of policy 
success/failure in each case study? (2) what are the internal relationships between 
success/failure in the ‘process’, ‘program’ and ‘politics’ realm26?  
This section first compares and interprets the evaluation results from using an adapted 
McConnell’s framework in phase I, between Case 1 and Case 2, and then in phase II, 
between Case 3 and Case 4. Following phase I, a slightly revised set of criteria was used in 
phase II (the scope of Criterion 13 was widened). Despite this (minor) change, it was still 
considered appropriate to combine and compare the four case studies for an overall 
indicative evaluation. The comparison is conducted in a paired way and across the criteria 
realms. This approach is justified because the changes and improvements suggested are 
consistent with the overall intent of the framework and together, while significant, are 
relatively minor in terms of overall implications for the sort of evaluation reported here.  
The evaluation results using McConnell’s framework across the realms of ‘process’, 
‘program’, and ‘politics’ for each case are summarised in Table 8.3. As noted in 3.4.5 all 
three realms are given equal weighting in the analysis. For consistency, when comparing 
cases between phases I and II, Criterion 13 is used with the narrower framing of ‘providing 
political benefit for government’. It should be noted that Criterion 2 did not have a score in 
either case in phases I, so that the comparison related to this criterion is conducted between 
Case 3 and Case 4, when this criterion was defined more broadly. 
The MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework was also applied to the four case studies. 
Findings from this evaluation are, where appropriate, considered alongside the relevant 
findings from applying McConnell’s framework to provide a more integrated view of 
environmental policy success and failure in China. The evaluation results of the MEE [2010] 
136 evaluation framework are discussed at the end of this section.  
 
26 Process refers to the policymaking process, including agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy 
adoption. Program refers to the policy implementation process. Politics refers to the political 





Table 8.3 Summary of evaluation results for all four case examples (based on the 
evaluation results from Table 6.4 and Table 7.5) 
 
Realm 
Phase I Phase II 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Process Absolute Failure Absolute Failure Absolute Success (Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success 
Program Conflicted Failure =  
Conflicted Success 
Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success 
Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success 
(Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success 
Politics Absolute Success Absolute Success Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success 
Conflicted Failure = 
Conflicted Success 
Overall Conflicted Failure = 
Conflicted Success 
Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success 
Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success 
(Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success 
 
8.3.1 Comparison between Case 1 and Case 2 studies (Phase I) 
Based on McConnell’s framework, in phase I, Case 1 was deemed ‘Conflicted failure = 
Conflicted Success’, and Case 2 was deemed ‘Tolerable failure = Resilient Success’. Case 2 
thus scored higher than Case 1. A more detailed analysis of the evaluation criteria indicates 
that both cases were deemed ‘Absolute Failure’ in the ‘process’ realm, and both cases were 
deemed ‘Absolute Success’ in the ‘politics’ realm. The reason why Case 2 performed better 
than Case 1 lies in the ‘program’ realm, whereby Case 1 was deemed ‘Conflicted failure = 
Conflicted Success’, and Case 2 was deemed ‘Tolerable failure = Resilient Success’. So, what 
caused this difference in the ‘program’ realm? 
In Case 1, the Environmental Sanitation Department of T1 township government was 
responsible for garbage collection and transfer. The village office and village stakeholders 
were excluded from this process and passively accepted the implementation of the P1 
program (the CET policy program in V1 village). For example, because the local government 
did not have the right to manage the street cleaners, the local residents often complained 
about the street cleaners not cleaning up the garbage on time. It was also noticed that the 
local villagers’ committee (VC) kept quiet about the fact that the waste collected from V1 
village was not transferred to the waste treatment facility but was instead dumped into a pit 
near the village.  
In Case 2, a sanitation company contracted by T2 township operated the P2 program (the 
CET policy program in V2 village). However, the V2 village office had negotiated with the T2 
township government, and the village office insisted on hiring villagers as street cleaners and 
put them under its supervision. Therefore, the local office had participated in program 





reasons, program implementation was more detailed and comprehensive, and easy to 
monitor. For example, the VC knew the villagers’ needs and provided free garbage cans to 
each household and collected large appliances free of charge. Moreover, hiring low-paid 
local villagers not only brought income, but the public considered littering a disgrace when 
street cleaners themselves have a local connection.  
Case 2 performed better than Case 1 in the ‘program’ realm, and thus in terms of overall 
program performance. It is noted that the delegation of authority to the local office for 
policy implementation can make policy implementation more flexible, enable it to better 
meet local needs, and help facilitate local governments to supervise, thereby producing 
better performance in terms of policy implementation. This is the key lesson from the 
evaluation results, which supports the classical claims of Wildavsky and Majone (1979) that 
the discretion of the executor was essential due to uncertainty in the execution process. 
Likewise, March (1988) pointed out that the policy implementation process is a continuation 
of the decision-making process, and a decision that does not consider the implementation 
process is an incomplete decision. Therefore, the result of a policy implementation depends 
to a large extent on the organic combination of policy design and policy implementation. In 
China’s hierarchical government system, the expansion of government and extension of the 
hierarchy will inevitably generate a large number of uncertainties between policy design and 
implementation, resulting in structural separation and loose connection, and finally, the 
decision intention is likely to be distorted and misinterpreted, and the result will often 
deviate from the original intention (Zhong, 2018). Generally, one of the direct consequences 
of policymaking in China is the ‘uniformity’ and ‘One-Size-Fits-All’ nature of decisions (An & 
Xu, 2011). However, the target of the CET policy is the rural areas with diverse conditions 
and differentiated individual villages. The hardware and software conditions in rural areas 
vary widely from place to place. Differences and imbalances mean that policy 
implementation must be tailored to local conditions. It can be seen that ‘flexibility’ is an 
indispensable operating mechanism in the process of policy implementation (Zhou, 2009). 
The policy endows the local office with a certain ‘power of action’ to implement the policy, 
which provides the necessary space to execute expediently. Pierre and Peters (2000) divided 
the reconfiguration of power into three forms: moving-up, moving-down, and moving-out. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that ‘moving-down’ (delegation of) certain authority to local 





8.3.2 Comparison between Case 3 and Case 4 studies (Phase II) 
Based on McConnell’s framework, in phase II, overall Case 3 was deemed ‘Tolerable Failure = 
Resilient Success’, and Case 4 was deemed ‘(Outright) Failure = Marginal Success’ (Table 
8.3). Case 3 overall scored more highly than Case 4, performing better across ‘process’, 
‘program’, and ‘politics’ realms. However, the question is ‘why’? 
First, what are the major differences between the cases in the ‘process’ realm? In Case 3, 
most stakeholders were included in the policymaking process, through a variety of informal 
communications and formal village meetings that gave the villagers an opportunity to listen 
to suggestions, communicate with each other, provide feedback, and more importantly to 
influence decision-making. In contrast, in Case 4 most stakeholders were excluded from the 
policymaking process. It is argued that a participatory design, that is “inclusive and 
representative on the participant dimension… [can] address problems of misunderstanding 
and misperceptions”, would give the public good reasons to support or obey a policy 
initiative, or in other words, enabling policy legitimacy (Fung, 2006, p. 70). For this reason, 
there were no challenges to the legitimacy of the P3 program and Case 3 had a higher score 
for Criterion 2 (Securing legitimacy). Furthermore, the research findings indicated that this 
inclusive decision-making process, which encouraged deliberation and negotiation, made it 
easier for villagers to reach consensus and accept the programs proposed by the VC. This 
consensus is the basis for most of the public to support the program, and it is also a 
necessary condition for the program to obtain formal approval. Furthermore, this is why 
Case 3 had a higher score than for Case 4 for Criterion 3 (Building Sustainable Coalition) and 
Criterion 4 (Attracting support for process). Therefore, it can be concluded that Case 3’s 
higher score in the ‘process’ realm can be attributed to having a more appropriate set of 
institutional arrangements, or in other words, better participation rules. 
Second, what are the major differences between the two cases in the ‘program’ realm? In 
Case 3, the P3 program was implemented locally by the VC. Extensive participation of 
stakeholders in the decision-making process enabled decision-makers to actively listen to 
opinions and adopt reasonable suggestions, thus avoiding many problems that may occur 
during program implementation. Conversely, in Case 4 the P4 program was implemented 
top-down by the county government. There was no broad stakeholder involvement in the 
decision-making process, and the policymakers did not actively listen to the views of target 
groups or adopt feedback. Thus, the P4 program was somewhat divorced from the realities 





These difficulties were not identified by policymakers in advance, who also failed to identify 
a viable solution. It is argued that “when some groups cannot influence the political agenda, 
affect decision making, or gain information relevant to assessing how well policy alternatives 
serve their interests because they are excluded, unorganized, or too weak, they are likely to 
be ill served by laws and policies” (Fung, 2006, p. 70). In Case 4, the lack of public 
participation in the policymaking process caused failures in policy implementation. Case 4 
therefore scored lower for Criterion 7 (Benefiting target group), Criterion 8B (Equity), 
Criterion 8C (Appropriateness) and for Criterion 9 (Attracting support for program). 
Additionally, the higher score of Case 3 in the ‘program’ realm can also be attributed to the 
more appropriate institutional arrangements, in other words, encouraging participation 
rules.  
Third, the difference in the scores for the ‘politics’ realm between the two cases can be 
attributed to Criterion 13 (Providing political benefits), where the scores are very different. 
In Case 3, stakeholders, including the CCP, local governments, and government officials, 
have benefited politically from relatively successful policy implementation, while citizens 
had also pursued their democratic rights by participating in the decision-making process. In 
Case 4 the interviewees supported the CCP and the local government more because they 
thought the rural sewage treatment program was a form of social welfare that came from 
the CCP and local government. However, due to the villagers not being involved in the policy 
process, they had not benefited politically. At the same time, as a result of a series of 
disputes over implementation of the program, the interviewees vented their anger toward 
government officials, who were blamed for the disputes. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the failure of Case 4 in the ‘politics’ realm can be attributed to the failure of the public to 
participate in the policymaking process and the failure of government officials to properly 
resolve disputes during policy implementation. Furthermore, these disputes were essentially 
caused by inappropriate institutional arrangements, or in other words by a lack of 
encouraging participation rules. 
To sum up, the research findings indicated that the broader the level of stakeholder 
participation during the policymaking process, the better the policy program performs. This 
is another key lesson from the evaluation results. In fact, the ‘New Public Management 
Movement’ encouraged third party organizations to participate in public affairs and to 
improve government efficiency and effectiveness (Huang, 2005). It challenged the traditional 





public policy. The concept of market mechanism and market method is widely applied to the 
provision of public goods. The third sector theory holds that the government mechanism, 
which serves as a provider of public goods, has inherent limitations (Pestoff et al., 2013). 
When the government fails to allocate social resources effectively and enterprises are 
unwilling to provide public goods due to the profit motive, the third sector, as a new 
resource, can effectively make up for the deficiencies of the two major ways of resource 
allocation, namely the government and enterprises (Yu & Li, 1998). Public participation in 
specific issues greatly accelerates the promotion of public policy and has a positive impact 
on the final policy effectiveness (Box, 1997). Therefore, according to Pierre and Peters 
(2000), it can be concluded that ‘moving-out’ relevant decision-making power to more 
actors, e.g., the public, can improve the effectiveness of a public policy - in this case, the CET 
policy.  
8.3.3 Comparison across all four cases examples 
McConnell’s framework helps identify scales that delineate degrees of failure (outright, 
conflicted, tolerable) to explore the inextricable link across the ‘process’, ‘program’, and 
‘politics’ realms. Although the phase II case studies used a revised set of criteria compared to 
phase I case studies, it is still insightful to combine the four case studies to identify common 
patterns. This section discusses these relationships based on insights from the four case 
studies.  
Process vs Program 
As shown in Table 8.3, Cases 1, 2, and 4 all largely failed in the ‘process’ realm (Case 3 is 
deemed ‘Absolute Success’ in the ‘process’ realm and thus is not compared in this section). 
And in Cases 1 and 4, failures outweighed successes in the ‘program’ realm, while failures in 
Case 2 were largely considered a success, as the failure “does not fundamentally impede the 
attainment of goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is small and/or 
criticism is virtually non-existent” (McConnell, 2015, p. 237). The question to be asked 
therefore is: Why did not the failures in the ‘process’ realm result in ‘program’ realm failure 
in Case 2, whereas they did in Cases 1 and 4? 
Comparing Cases 1 and 2, as discussed in the previous section, it is argued that the 
delegation of specific authority(s) to the local office, as happened in Case 2, can help to 





in terms of policy shaping, Case 2 performed better in policy implementation because the VC 
was empowered to undertake policy implementation.  
Comparing Cases 2 and 4, it can be seen that major stakeholders, e.g., the VC and villagers, 
did not participate in policymaking. In Case 2, major stakeholders were also not involved in 
policymaking. However, the absence of major stakeholder involvement did not result in 
serious flaws in policy design, nor did it cause serious controversy in its implementation. At 
the same time, the active participation of the VC in the policy implementation process also 
eliminates potential disputes. For example, due to the VC monitoring, the problem of 
cleaners not cleaning up garbage in time did not arise. In Case 4, the absence of major 
stakeholder involvement led to defects in policy design, which were also considered the root 
cause of various disputes in policy implementation. Although the VC played the role of 
‘firefighter’ in the process of policy implementation, the VC was not empowered, but 
passively cooperated with the county government to solve disputes. Thus, the main 
difference between these two cases in the policy implementation phase was that in Case 2 
the VC was authorised to participate actively, while in Case 4 it was ordered to participate 
passively.  
This reasoning could explain why the failures in the ‘process’ realm did not result in 
‘program’ realm failures in Case 2. Therefore, this comparison further emphasizes the 
importance of proper authorization of local government in policy implementation to 
improve policy effectiveness. Finally, it can be concluded that the failures in the ‘process’ 
realm do not necessarily result in ‘program’ realm failures.  
Process and Program vs Politics 
In all four cases, there were successes and failures in the ‘process’ and ‘program’ realms, but 
all contained at least some elements of success in the ‘politics’ realm. This finding raises a 
significant policy question: does this mean that no matter what the level of success or failure 
in the ‘process’ and ‘program’ realm, a public policy can still achieve success in the ‘politics’ 
realm in the Chinese context? To address this question the following paragraphs further 
consider McConnell’s criteria concerning political impact (Criteria 11, 12, and 13).  
In terms of Criterion 11 (Easing the business of governing), all four cases were considered 
Absolute Success (see Tables 6.4 and 7.5), which means the local governments successfully 
eased their business of governing. In China, administrative elites and social elites are at the 





and have become used to making decisions with limited citizen participation (Zhu, 2008). 
Especially in rural areas, villagers are rarely involved in politics (Zhong, 2018), and they are 
generally not sensitive to environmental protection (Du et al., 2016; X. Li, 2011), so it is 
easier in these contexts for the government to control their agendas. For these reasons, all 
four cases were deemed Absolute Success in terms of Criterion 11. However, the rise of the 
New Civic Engagement Movement in China has increased the demand for the public to 
participate in the management of public affairs. The role of citizens in public organizations 
and the management of public affairs has been strengthened, and the participation of 
citizens in the formulation and implementation of public policies in many important fields 
has been increasingly legalised (Liu & Yao, 2014). Local governments, especially in the 
context of focus events or NIMBY cases that can cause negative political impact, increasingly 
understand public pressure. Such pressure spreads through the internet, but sometimes 
local governments cannot take timely measures to adjust, in terms of coping strategy and 
policy actions. Therefore, policymaking and implementation failures can result in the 
government failing to ease the business of governing in China (Wang & Wu, 2019; Yao & Liu, 
2014; Zeng & Zhu, 2016). In other words, the failure in the realm of ‘process’ or ‘program’ 
can result in failure in the ‘politics’ realm.  
In terms of Criterion 12 (Promotion of government’s desired trajectory), Cases 3 and 4 had 
lower scores than Cases 1 and 2 (see Tables 6.4 and 7.5). In fact, environmental protection 
may conflict with other desired government trajectories, e.g., economic development. Such 
kinds of conflict can be relatively intense in the short term, not only in China but also in the 
practice of environmental governance in the western world. However, conflicts triggered by 
questionable policy actions should be avoided as far as possible by government 
management, e.g., providing a matching fund to the P4 program exacerbated the debt crisis 
of CT4 county, which is considered a failure in the ‘politics’ realm in Case 4. Requiring local 
governments to provide a matching fund to the CET programs is the policy provision, 
therefore, such a failure in the ‘politics’ realm came from the ‘process’ realm and was hard 
to avoid. In this sense, the ‘politics’ realm can be related to the ‘process’ or even ‘program’ 
realm.  
Criterion 13 (Providing political benefits for government) was considered successful in all 
four cases (see Tables 6.4 and 7.5). In today's society, a government represents the interests 
of the public, and is obliged to carry out efficient, fair and reasonable allocation of public 





political and cultural order that is needed for a society (Huang, 2012; Yuan, 2011; Yuan, 
2014; Zhao, 2004). At the same time, the public evaluates the quality of the government, 
that is, “the extent to which the government benefits the people they serve, and whether the 
government makes and implements decisions in a legal and socially acceptable manner” (Fan 
et al., 2011, pp. 208-209). Criteria such as efficiency, equity, and benefit to the target groups 
are thus considered indicators of the quality of the government (Dahlberg et al., 2020; 
Svallfors, 2013; Teorell, 2009). These indicators reflect the process of making and 
implementing government policies, as the basis for the public to support or oppose 
government actions (Miao, 2014). Therefore, it can be inferred that the formulation and 
implementation of policies are related to the political interests of the government. Based on 
the above discussion and the evaluation results from Table 6.4 and Table 7.5, the average 
score for Criterion 7 (Benefiting target group(s)) and Criterion 8B (Equity) 27 from each of the 
four cases is: Case 1 = (3+3)/2 = 3, Case 2 = (5+3)/2 = 4, Case 3 = (4+5)/2 = 4.5, and Case 4 = 
(1+1)/2 = 1. It can be seen that Cases 1, 2, and 3 had a relatively high score for these two 
criteria, which resulted in their support for the governments being ‘considerably more’ or 
‘much more’ as a result of the CET policy programs. Such results support the statement that 
the formulation and implementation of policies are related to the political interests of the 
government. One exception is Case 4, which should be a failure in terms of providing 
political benefits for the government. However, the interviewees in Case 4 consider their 
level of support for the governments to be ‘considerably more’ or ‘much more’ as a result of 
the CET policy program. This may be because their dissatisfactions were associated with 
local government officials, whom they believed were the cause of the problems, but not to 
the government, which had good intentions. As participant 4DR said: “In lower-level 
government, no officials are good.” In this sense, the ‘politics’ realm can be related to the 
‘process’ or ‘program’ realm.  
To sum up, it can be concluded that ‘process’ and ‘program’ realms are related to the 
‘political’ realm. Thus, Criteria 11, 12, and 13 can help to evaluate the political impact of a 
policy in the Chinese context.  
 
27 In phase I, Criterion 8A was deemed ‘unclear’, so that this criterion is not included in the discussion. 
The score of Criterion 7 and 8B are derived from Table 6.4 and Table 7.5. And this study assumes that 





8.3.4 Evaluation using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework  
This research applies triangulation methodology, comparing the findings from applying 
McConnell’s framework with the findings from applying the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation, to 
help ensure analytical validity. However, the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework only 
assesses the aspects covered by Criteria 5 and Criterion 6 in McConnell’s framework. The 
evaluation results using McConnell’s Criteria 5 and 6 are consistent with the evaluation 
results using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in both phase of case studies (see 
section 6.6 and 7.6). This further confirm the validity of the research findings. 
On the other hand, the evaluation results using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework in 
the four cases can be sorted from highest to lowest levels of performance, that is, Case 2 > 
Case 4 > Case 3 > Case 1 (based on Table 6.5 and 7.6). However, a different result was 
obtained using McConnell’s framework, that is, Case 3 > Case 2 > Case 1 > Case 4 (based on 
Tables 6.4 and 7.5). What do such different results indicate?  
McConnell’s framework and the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework are different tools 
for different purposes, within different contexts. McConnell’s framework is designed to give 
a holistic view of the policy process and achieved policy outcomes, whereas the MEE [2010] 
136 evaluation framework is designed to be applied at the project or program level, which is 
narrower and more specific. However, the different evaluation results from using these two 
frameworks indicates there is a degree of complementarity between McConnell’s 
framework and the MEE [2010] 136 framework. 
A policymaker can take the systematic and holistic view provided by an overall policy 
evaluation framework, or just focus on the specific program level. Policy makers and analysts 
should use both general and targeted approaches – not only evaluating a part of the policy 
process but considering it as a whole, because evaluating only one part of the policy process 
may lose the systems view provided by of overall policy evaluation, in particular the 
connectivity between the different realms. Especially at a higher policy level, use of the 
amended McConnell’s framework is recommended because it provides for the identification 






8.4 Causes of policy failure 
This section considers the causes of policy failure, again based on the case studies. It 
responds to the research question: what are the causes of policy failure? Arguments based 
on McConnell’s (2016) explanation of policy failure are discussed first, complemented then 
by the propositions of other researchers.  
8.4.1 An examination of policy failure causes based on application of 
McConnell’s framework  
McConnell (2016) argued that the cause of policy failure exists in a tripartite frame, namely: 
the individual actor centred frame, institution/policy process centred frame, and societal 
centred frame. Findings from the four case studies can be situated to contextualize the 
causes of policy failure based on McConnell’s proposed explanations (see Table 8.4).  
Table 8.4 Common causes of policy failure identified by McConnell and observed in the 
four Chinese case studies 
McConnell’s proposed 
causes of policy failure  
Causes of policy failure 
from case studies 
Observed examples 
Individual actor-centred frame 
Incompetence Lack of professionalism Case 3: program designers had no 
expertise in environmental issues 
Institution/policy process-centred frame 
Institutional self 
interest 
Institutional design Cases 1, 2, and 4: limited the entry 
of most stakeholders 
Bureaucratism and 
shifting responsibility 
Case 4: county government shifted 
responsibility to lower level 
governments 
Weak capacity for good 
decision making 
Lack of normalized and 
standardized 
policymaking process  
Case 1: failed to systematically 
evaluate unexpected outcomes 
Case 2: failed to assess the priority 
environmental problems 
Case 4: failed to examine the 
possible policy options and evaluate 




policymaking biases and 
inevitable failures 
Elite politics of agenda-
setting 
Cases 1 and 2: elite interests 
produced policymaking biases, and 
thus led to failure in the ‘process’ 
realm 
 
Individual actor-centred frame 
Local governments lacked professionals and staff with experience in environmental 





and to develop and implement environmental projects. For example, in Case 3, the P3 
program was designed by the VC, with advice from other stakeholders, e.g., villagers. 
However, none of the program designers had the expertise to develop an environmental 
project or had access to third-party organizations who had the relevant expertise. As a 
result, recycling manure and using it sustainably were not taken into account by the program 
designers.  
Institution/policy process-centred frame 
First, the government institutional designs limited the participation of most stakeholders in 
the policymaking process, thus consigning the project to almost certain failure in the 
‘process’ realm, e.g., Case 1 (Absolute Failure), Case 2 (Absolute Failure), and Case 4 
((Outright) Failure = Marginal Success).  
Meanwhile, in China's hierarchical political system, local officials shift responsibility to avoid 
being blamed for not resolving tricky issues. The best example is Case 4, in which the county 
government shifted responsibility for settling disputes over compensation for land 
expropriation to the township and village offices, which resulted in the obstruction of 
program implementation.  
Second, local governments were less able to make science-based decisions. In all four cases, 
local governments lacked normalised and standardised policymaking processes, namely: 
there were no clear guidelines on how to identify problems before a policy is made; how to 
measure the size and severity of a problem; how to examine the possible policy options; 
how to systematically evaluate the likely outcome of the various policy alternatives, 
including the expected and unexpected outcomes; and how to evaluate actual policy 
outcomes. Indeed, local governments might conduct one or two of these actions, but not 
from systematic and/or scientific perspectives.  
For example, in Case 1, the township government designed the program without 
stakeholder participation, leading to the failure to systematically evaluate unexpected 
outcomes, e.g., some villagers still use pits dug by themselves to dump their waste. In Case 
2, the township government assessed environmental problems without any transparent 
prioritisation process when they applied for CET policy funding. And in Case 4, the county 
government simply measured the size and severity of the problem in each village, based on 
the data submitted by the township government. However, the county government failed to 





be conducted at the village level. Finally, the county government also failed to evaluate the 
unexpected outcomes and to put forward countermeasures, e.g., to deal with emergent 
disputes over land compensation.  
In the absence of a science-based decision-making process, the quality of decision-making is 
easily affected by the leaders' personal biases. As in street-level bureaucracies (public 
service workers), the attributes of the service provider is one of the determinants of 
bureaucratic discretion (Scott, 1997). In China, what items should be put on the policy 
agenda, what measures should be adopted, and even the judgment on the effectiveness of a 
policy depends on the views of political leaders. Personal factors, such as cognition, 
judgment ability, background, and experience all significantly influence the policy process 
and policy outcome (Qu & Jiang, 2015). For example, in Case 1, the village secretary is a 
typical local farmer who earns his living by farming. The interviewees described him as rigid 
and conformist. In Case 2, the village secretary is a rich businessman. The interviewees used 
words such as strong, forceful, and ambitious to describe him. In Case 3, the village secretary 
is an official sent by the municipal government to work at the local level. The interviewees 
said he had great political ambitions and wanted to perform well to get recognition from 
higher officials. In Case 4, the village secretary has been working in the local area for many 
years. The interviewees described him as a typical government official, who is slick and 
worldly-wise. Among them, the political leaders in Case 2 and Case 3 were considered more 
enterprising and ambitious, so that they were more active in improving the local 
environment. In Case 2, the VC actively participated in program implementation. In Case 3, 
the village secretary actively visited the villagers and asked for their advice, for the purpose 
of better program outcomes. As a result, Case 2 and Case 3 were all deemed Tolerable 
Failure = Resilient Success, which means both cases were more successful than Case 1 
(Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success) and Case 4 ((Outright) Failure = Marginal Success).  
Societal-centred frame 
Elite interests produced policymaking biases and thus led to failure in the ‘process’ realm 
and success in terms of Criterion 11 (Easing the business of governing). In Case 1 and Case 2, 
the agenda was set with little public involvement, following instructions or calls from higher 
authorities. As a result, the government has been very successful in easing the business of 
governing by controlling the agenda, but has neglected long-term and tricky problems, such 





8.4.2 Alternative explanation for the causes of policy failure 
McConnell’s framework provides an opportunity to explore the causes of policy failure. 
However, it may not be sufficient to unveil a Chinese policy story. Therefore, there is still a 
need to find empirical evidence to better understand the topic. Based on the case studies, 
local economic conditions may provide an alternative explanation for policy failure in the 
Chinese context.  
The research findings suggest that the more developed the local economy, the better the 
policy performance when evaluated using the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework. Of the 
four cases, Case 2 was characterized by having the strongest economic conditions. V2 village 
has sufficient tourism resources and tourists to bring income to the local economy, so that 
the VC had the economic basis to provide convenient public services, such as free garbage 
cans and recycling of large appliances. The local office was more willing to deal with the rural 
waste problem because a better environment might bring more tourists, a view shared by all 
interviewees. This is one explanation why Case 2 recorded the highest MEE (2010) 136 score 
and recorded better performance than Case 1.  
In Case 4, V4 village also had a strong economic foundation. Greenhouse-based agriculture is 
the main source of income for the local economy. In order to develop the economy, V4 
village built a large exhibition centre and ecological agriculture restaurant near the highway 
entrance to the village, both of which were used for business negotiations and government 
officials’ visits. Therefore, in CT4 county, V4 village was among the first villages to have a 
sewage treatment facility which could help the village maintain a good environmental 
image. This is one reason why Case 4 got the second-highest MEE (2010) 136 score and 
performed better than Case 3.  
In fact, both Case 2 and Case 4 had much higher scores than Case 1 and Case 3 on 
‘establishment of rural environmental protection team’ and ‘facility operation and 
management’ in the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (See Tables 6.5 and 7.6). Hiring 
staff and maintaining environmental protection equipment required a lot of money so that 
local financial status was a key factor for the success of environmental protection programs. 
Certainly, the success of environmental program is closely related to the reasons mentioned 
in the previous section, so this does not mean poor areas are necessarily unsuccessful. But it 
can be deduced that economic conditions are an important factor for the successful 





8.5 Research contributions 
This section discusses the contributions of this research, in terms of how the research 
findings into the design and application of McConnell’s framework and the causes of policy 
failure fit with existing knowledge and the Chinese context.  
8.5.1 McConnell’s framework  
The value of McConnell’s framework lies in its ability to examine the structural reasons for 
policy success and failure. As noted in the literature review, most of the current literature 
uses only the idea of policy failure but fails to provide a systematic and holistic framework 
for overall policy evaluation. McConnell’s framework, however, does seek to provide this 
oversight. Nevertheless, while it still focuses on policy failure, by identifying 13 criteria 
across ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ realms, it provides a framework that can also be 
used to explore elements of comparative success. This approach makes it easier to frame 
comparative studies in different cultural and political contexts. In this regard, the empirical 
research undertaken here suggests the framework, and its proposed modifications, is a 
useful tool for the integrated evaluation of policy. This study makes four key contributions to 
McConnell’s framework.  
First, it addresses a gap left in McConnell’s framework around the ability to evaluate the 
‘value’ dimension in environmental policy. “The same actor can entertain very different ways 
to understand problems, and can juggle many criteria to decide that a policy outcome was a 
success and a failure” (Cairney, 2020, p. 72; Stone, 2012). On the other hand, the 
government may naturally think the policy it implemented is a success, while the other 
stakeholders may view it as a failure. Given such conflict, McConnell considers success and 
failure are “both fact and interpretation, and a policy can be successful in some senses (e.g., 
meeting objectives), but not everyone will perceive it as a success or failure” (McConnell, 
2010b, p. 31). Accordingly, McConnell’s definitions of policy success and failure are based on 
two objective standards, namely: goal attainment and the existence of opposition or 
support. But such a definition and the framework developed for this definition did not 
contribute to any moral judgment of the policy content. To be specific, among the 13 criteria 
originally proposed by McConnell (2015) (Table 2.2), Criteria 1-3 judge the key policy steps 
during the policymaking process and Criterion 4 considers the level of public support or 
opposition in this process. Criteria 5-6 judge the policy objectives and outcomes. Criterion 7 





considers the level of public support or opposition during policy implementation. Criteria 10-
13 judge the political impact of the policy. These criteria do not contain any value judgment 
component and particular values could have been specified in Criterion 8, but McConnell did 
not clarify what the nature of these values are, other than “policy sectors have values that 
are widely held by its community of actors…these values enshrined in industry standards or 
benchmarks”, except “efficient use of resources has become common currency for 
programme success” (McConnell, 2010b, pp. 48-49; 2015, 2016). Furthermore, while the 
original McConnell’s framework can measure the key indicators of the policy process, it does 
not provide for any moral judgment of the policy content. Take the example of an extreme 
value-laden case, namely Nazi Germany’s holocaust policy which was clearly evil and led to 
the murder of millions of European Jews - this policy could be evaluated as a successful 
policy in terms of policymaking and implementation by using McConnell’s original criteria. 
Although there was resistance to this policy, “the remaining opposition was never able to 
dent the general passivity and even popular support for Nazi policies within the Reich” (Pines, 
1994). This case illustrates the importance of including a moral judgment component, which 
“refers to any injunction that implies an obligation to carry out an act, implicitly involving the 
terms ‘ought’ or ‘should’” (Cohen & Wartofsky, 1963, p. 219). 
Based on the above line of reasoning one of the major contributions from this study is to 
specify what should be included in Criteria 8, namely: Criteria 8A (Efficiency), 8B (Equity), 
and 8C (Appropriateness). These proposed criteria fill a gap left by McConnell and are 
considered key additions to McConnell’s framework around the lack of ability to evaluate 
the ‘value’ dimension in the environmental policy sector. However, ‘efficiency’ is less able to 
provide a moral judgment of a policy, because one could argue that the Nazi’s holocaust 
policy was efficient ways to kill people. And indeed, striving for equity is important, but 
absolute equity is unattainable in public policy practice because “the rule itself rests upon no 
absolute equity” (Shaw et al., 1848). On the contrary, ‘appropriateness’, such as sustainable 
development and human rights protection, implies a moral judgment on ‘goodness’ and 
further becomes a paramount test. These ‘moral judgements’ may differ in country and 
culture, and even differ in the way people interpret. But it is beyond the scope of this study 
to discuss what ‘moral judgments’ are included in ‘appropriateness’.  
Second, a number of adjustments to the criteria are proposed to make the framework more 
useful and relevant in the Chinese context. While Criteria 8A, 8B, and 8C complement 





the framework are sufficient to ascertain policy failure in the Chinese context. This study 
indicated that some criteria are judged to be applicable, partially applicable, and not 
applicable. Therefore, another important contribution from this research is the proposed 
adjustments of McConnell’s criteria to the Chinese context, that is: Criterion 1 (Persevering 
goals and policy instruments) is redesigned as ‘Policy Trial’; Criterion 2 (Securing legitimacy) 
is defined more broadly and revised as ‘Disputes Settlement; an addition criterion, namely: 
Coordinated Government, is added to Criterion 3 (Building sustainable coalition) to more 
fully capture the requirements for policy success in China; Criterion 4 (Attracting support for 
process) partially fits the Chinese context but is retained; Criterion 10 (Enhancing electoral 
prospect/reputation) is recommended not be retained when it is used for evaluating Chinese 
environmental policy, but its retention be considered if the framework is used to evaluate 
other types of policy, such as economic policy; and the scope of Criterion 13 (Providing 
political benefits for government) is widened to all stakeholders as ‘providing political 
benefits’. These adjustments make McConnell’s framework, at least in the cases investigated 
in this research, useful to assess policy failure in China.  
Third, this research developed a methodology for testing and adapting an evaluation 
framework which could be used in future by other scholars when assessing and adapting this 
or other frameworks in new contexts. In this research, McConnell’s framework was first 
assessed and developed theoretically, and then tested and adapted using empirical 
enquiries. Several methods, tools, and different approaches were identified to help test this 
framework and evaluate it within the context of a rural environmental policy in a holistic 
way. The adaptive learning approach, case study, and triangulation methodology were 
employed, along with qualitative and quantitative methods that obtained data from 
interviews, public documents, on-site observation, and qualitative visual material. The 
results of these methods validate the need for a comprehensive study of the sort 
undertaken here. Moreover, this study explored how to judge the success and failure of 
each individual policy evaluation criteria realm (process, program, and politics) and the 
overall policy program, based on the relative success and failure of each individual criterion - 
McConnell did not articulate this possibility in his study. In this research, it is proposed that 
McConnell’s framework, that evaluates policy failure via three categories, namely: Tolerable 
Failure = Resilient Success; Conflicted Failure = Conflicted Success; (Outright) Failure = 
Marginal Success, be expanded by adding ‘Absolute Success’ and ‘Absolute Failure’ to allow 
for evaluation of the full range of possible outcomes (see Chapter 5). This study also 





realm and overall policy program, based on the degree of success or failure of each criterion 
and a basic assumption that the criteria are weighted equally (see Chapter 6). This scoring 
system also fills a gap left by McConnell. To sum up, the application and the development of 
the multiple approaches above are important contributions of this research, which can be 
used as a reference for further study. 
Fourth, the amended McConnell’s framework has strong practical application potential in 
the Chinese context. It can be considered complementary to current policy evaluation tools 
that are designed to be applied at the program level, e.g., the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation 
framework. McConnell’s framework provides a more holistic view, considering the whole 
policy process and the necessity to identify impacts beyond policy effectiveness. For 
policymakers, use of McConnell’s framework can ensure the integrity of policy assessment 
as far as possible, because it takes into account the relevance of the range of policy realms 
(process, program, and politics). If only one realm is evaluated, important policy information 
will be ignored and important opportunities for policy learning will be lost. The need to 
evaluate all policy realms is especially relevant in China because the policy process is 
characterized by ‘top-level design and local execution’ (Naughton, 2012). As such, policy 
design may not meet the local conditions in which policy is implemented and thus 
exacerbate the misalignment between policymaking and implementation. Therefore, the 
amended McConnell’s framework can be used directly by policymakers in China.  
8.5.2 Causes of policy failure 
To date, much of the relevant literature confuses the appearance and causes of policy 
success and failure, which is fundamental because the definition of policy failure is not 
clear. One of McConnell's contributions is to distinguish between the ‘what can be observed 
if a policy fails’ and ‘what reasons cause such failure’. However, there has been little 
empirical study of McConnell’s explanations (2016) of policy failure. Therefore, this study 
also sought to identify and understand the causes of policy failure by using case studies in 
the Chinese context.  
The research findings about the causes of policy failure fit with McConnell’s explanations, 
that is, policy failures could be and were categorized into three frames, namely: individual 
actor centred frame, institution/policy process centred frame, and societal centred frame 
(Table 2.3). As discussed in section 8.4, it then further contributed to an understanding of 





are caused by complex interactions between individual behaviours, institutional design, and 
prevailing societal values. Institutional factors in particular, which limited stakeholder 
participation and the delegation of authority to local offices, had caused failures in policy 
shaping and implementation, as identified in the case studies.  
However, some factors discussed in Chapter 5, which may influence the policy process in 
rural China, e.g., ‘guanxi (personal relationship)’, ‘renqing (favour)’, ‘bao (reciprocity)’, were 
not detected in the case studies. Meanwhile, there are factors lying outside McConnell's 
three frames that could explain policy failure. Factors observed in the case studies included 
social and economic conditions, which were considered an alternative cause of policy failure 
in the case studies. Some factors were not observed in case studies but are critical for 
China’s policy process and may influence the policy effect. For example, the flexibility of the 
bureaucratic system is identified as the crucial element in China’s political system (Heilmann, 
2017). Therefore, it is suggested that the three frames would have to look at these peculiarly 
Chinese features.  
8.5.3 Future research challenges 
Challenges for future research in two main areas have been identified. First, McConnell 
(2015) used the stages (heuristic) model (Kulaç & Özgür, 2017; Sabatier, 2007) as the basis of 
his policy evaluation framework, which is also the basis of this study. According to the 
conceptual framework proposed by Anderson (2003), this study divides the basic policy 
process into two stages: policymaking and policy implementation. Among them, the 
policymaking process is divided into agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption. 
However, the policy process is complex, and there is much debate about using the stage 
heuristic to describe the policy process. As stated by Sabatier (2007):  
The assumption that there is a single policy cycle focused on a 
major piece of legislation oversimplifies the usual process of 
multiple, interacting cycles involving numerous policy proposals 
and statutes at multiple levels of government (p. 7). 
The policy process in China may be even more complex, because the government usually 
conducts policy experiments at the local level. The basic process of policy experiments can 
be described as: policy formulation at the national level - local pilot project formulation - 
pilot project implementation - implementation effect feedback - policy reformulation - large-
scale policy implementation. This process is usually mixed with policy learning and policy 





may overlap, e.g., the implementation of pilot projects may be a step toward policy 
formulation on a larger scale. However, McConnell’s analytical framework is based on a 
linear policy process, and so ignores the ‘multiple, interacting cycles' (Sabatier, 2007). 
Therefore, the use of this framework to evaluate a multi-tiered policy process must be 
approached with caution, because it is difficult to identify which step is the policy 
formulation process and which is the policy implementation process, which may lead to the 
misuse of the evaluation criteria in McConnell’s framework. Future research should be 
aware of this limitation. 
Second, in McConnell’s framework, whether all 13 criteria and each realm (process, 
program, and politics) have the same weight also needs further discussion. McConnell (2015, 
p. 237) did not state clearly how to weigh the 13 criteria and each realm, but he argued that: 
“what factors are/are not important, is part of the ‘art and craft’ of analysis”. Logically, the 
assessment can apply a higher level of criteria (meta-criteria) to analyse the relationships 
between rational forms. Criteria 8A (Efficiency), 8B (Equity), and Criterion 8C 
(Appropriateness) may take precedence over other evaluation criteria, showing the 
characteristics of meta-criteria (Xie & Zhang, 2015). But this study did not assess the 
respective weights of the 13 criteria in McConnell’s original framework and instead accorded 
them all equal weight. Therefore, future studies need to take these considerations into 
account when evaluating using McConnell’s framework.  
8.6 Summary  
This chapter examined the research findings of the four case studies within the context of 
testing and adapting McConnell’s policy evaluation framework within the Chinese context. 
An amended framework has been developed, based on the research findings. The evaluation 
results from using McConnell’s framework in the four case examples were compared and 
interpreted, leading to the conclusion that delegating particular areas of authority to local 
governments and communities, and delegating relevant decision-making power to other 
actors, can help to improve the effectiveness of a policy. It is also concluded that the failures 
in the ‘process’ realm do not necessarily result in failures in the ‘program’ realm. Both 
‘process’ and ‘program’ realms are related to the ‘politics’ realm. In the end, the research 
findings indicated that policy failures are caused by complex interactions between individual 
behaviours, institutional design, and prevailing values of the society, but the causes of policy 





Finally, the contributions of this research in relation to existing knowledge were discussed. 
First, Criteria 8A (Efficiency), 8B (Equity) and 8C (Appropriateness) are proposed to fill the 
gap left by McConnell around the lack of ability to evaluate the ‘value’ dimension of policy – 
in this regard it is proposed that Criterion 8C potentially holds a pivotal position in the policy 
evaluation process. Second, McConnell’s Criteria are amended to fit the Chinese context, 
including Criteria 1, 2, 3, 13 modified, Criterion 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 retained, and Criterion 10 
deleted. Third, the methods applied and developed in this research can be used as reference 
for further study. Fourth, McConnell’s framework provides a more holistic view and can be 
considered to be complementary to current policy evaluation tools in China. Fifth, 
McConnell’s explanations on the causes of policy failure could fit the Chinese context but 
should be studied further. Finally, challenges for future research in two main areas have 
been identified. 
The next and final chapter concludes the research and presents a summary of the most 







How environmental policy is shaped, implemented, and evaluated (including relative success 
and relative failure) is a question frequently raised in the Chinese context, and is a question 
with both national and global implications. However, there is currently no such systematic 
and holistic evaluation framework for environmental policy in China. Therefore, this thesis 
seeks to fill the gap. McConnell’s policy evaluation framework (2015) is identified as a 
potential framework for application in the Chinese context and potentially can be applied 
more broadly.  
This concluding chapter of the thesis begins with a review of the four main research 
questions. It first addressed the following research question: (1) what aspects of 
McConnell’s framework are missing/not fitting/can be revised in the Chinese context? A 
focused theory level review of relevant Chinese and related literature led to potential 
improvements of McConnell’s framework and the development of methods to measure 
policy failure. With these improvements and developments incorporated, a slightly modified 
framework was then tested in two empirical case study phases. This testing found that the 
framework and most of the 13 criteria are applicable in the Chinese context, subject to some 
relatively minor but important modifications. The amended framework is considered to be a 
useful policy evaluation framework that provides a holistic view for policymakers.  
McConnell’s framework provided the basis to evaluate the shaping, implementation, and 
political impact of a policy, and it allows for structured comparison across sectors. In this 
research, two research questions dealt with how to measure and understand policy success 
or failure in the Chinese environmental policy context. Specifically, the research addressed: 
(2) what are the relative degrees of policy success/failure in each case study? (3) what are 
the internal relationships between success/failure in the ‘process’, ‘program’, and ‘politics’ 
realms? In relation to the first of these questions, the research findings indicated there were 
various levels of policy successes and failures between cases and across the realms. In 
answer to the second question, the evaluation results from using a slightly modified 
McConnell’s framework in case examples were compared and interpreted, thus drawing the 
conclusion that delegating particular areas of authority to local governments and 





improve the effectiveness of a policy. It is also concluded that the failures in policy shaping 
do not necessarily result in policy implementation failure, and policy formulation and 
implementation are related to the political impact of a policy. The evaluation results using 
McConnell’s framework and the MEE [2010] 136 evaluation framework (the policy effect 
evaluation guideline for the CET policy from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment) were 
also compared. It is thus further concluded that the amended McConnell’s framework can 
provide a meaningful complement to the existing CET policy evaluation method. 
Finally, this research responds to the research question: (4) what are the causes of policy 
failure? Emergent reasoning is based on McConnell’s (2016) explanation of policy failure. 
Findings indicate there are multiple and complex interactions between individual behaviour, 
institutional design, and prevailing societal values which contributed to different degrees of 
policy failures. However, I argue that the exploration of the causes of policy failure should 
extend beyond the three frames of McConnell’s explanations into areas such as social and 
economic conditions which were considered as potentially contributing to policy failure in 
the case studies. 
Given there is a lack of an systematic and holistic environmental policy evaluation 
framework and the three realms (process, program, and politics) identified by McConnell are 
all relevant but seldom addressed in China, this research demonstrates, both in theory and 
in practice, that use of the amended framework can deliver practical insights into China’s 
environmental management and potentially improve policy effectiveness. The research 
findings indicated that policymakers should consider involving key stakeholders in the 
formulation of policies and ensure the suggestions put forward by these stakeholders are 
properly adopted. Involving stakeholders in this way can enhance public support for policy 
programs and effectively reduce the possibility of conflicts in the implementation of 
programs. The research also indicated the need to devolve appropriate authority to local 
governments to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation. More professional 
third-party agencies are encouraged to participate in the design and evaluation of the policy 
initiatives. A science-based policymaking procedure needs to be developed and introduced, 
not only to help promote the rationality of policies but also to educate the public before 
policies are designed and implemented.  
Despite the apparent success of the research, there are several limitations to the overall 
research design. First, the generalisability of the results is limited by the selection of case 





more areas for comparison. Second, the reliability of data can be impacted by selected 
program types – two types in this research. More types of programs are suggested to be 
selected in future studies. Third, the scope of this study is to examine an environmental 
policy. Further study may select other types of public policies. Fourth, this research 
proposed a scoring system and assigned values to each of the evaluation criteria. More 
research is required to improve this scoring system.  
Despite these limitations, this study fills the gap caused by the lack of a systematic and 
holistic environmental policy evaluation framework in China. The amended McConnell's 
framework and the methods developed in this research are very practical and usable for 
evaluating an environmental policy in the Chinese context. Especially at a higher policy level, 
use of the amended McConnell’s framework can provide a holistic view of the policy process 
for the identification of bigger picture questions, and further deepens the understanding of 
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ID  Gender  
Age  Ethnic group  
Occupation  Position  
 
What are you in charge of?   
 
What do you think are the main environmental problems in the village? 
 









Items  Interview questions  
Preserving goals and policy 
instruments (Criterion 1) 
 
Building sustainable coalition 
(Criterion 3) 
 
Attracting support for process 
(Criterion 4) 
 
Easing the business of governing 
(Criterion 11) 
 
• Who initiated the application of this CET program? Why? 
• Why was this environmental problem addressed from amongst the range of problems? 
• Who/which department drafted the proposal of this program? 
• Who was consulted when drafting the proposal? How? 
• Was there any revision of the draft proposal? 
• Why was it revised and what has changed? 
• Was the draft proposal discussed in any form of meeting or seminar?  
 What was this meeting or seminar? 
 Which government departments were involved? 
 Was there any stakeholder involvement in the discussion? 
 Was any important group missing and if so, why? 
 Did the participants work well together? (1. Very poorly 2. Poorly 3. Fairly well 4. Well 5. Very well; ‘Don’t 
know’) 
 Did the participants form a coalition? Why? 
 What were the obstacles to working together? 
 How were these obstacles addressed in this process? 
 Do you think the stakeholder participation had influenced the decision making? Why? 
 How was final decision made? 
 Do you think any coalition helped obtain approval of this program? 
• What happened then to the program proposal? 
• Do you support the policymaking process? (1. Very low 2. Low 3. Average 4. High 5. Very High; ‘Don’t know’). 
Why?  
Securing legitimacy (Criterion 2) Do you think the process for introducing the programme was legitimate/fair/ok? Why? 
Policy as process How successful was the policymaking process? 1. Absolute failure 2. Failure > success 3. Success = failure 4. Success 
> failure 5. Absolute success; ‘Don’t know’. Why?  
Implementation in line with 
objectives (Criterion 5) 
What are the CET program objectives from your point of view?  
To what extent was the program implementation in consistent with these objectives? 1. A very little 2. A little 3. 





Achieving desired outcomes 
(Criterion 6) 
To what extent did the program result in better management of/or in reduced levels of rural pollution?  1.A very 
little 2. A little 3. Somewhat 4. A great extent 5. A very great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
To what extent did the program solve the most prominent rural environmental problems? 1.A very little 2. A little 
3. Somewhat 4. A great extent 5. A very great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
To what extent did the program increase villagers’ environmental awareness? 1.A very little 2. A little 3. Somewhat 
4. A great extent 5. A very great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
To what extent did the program change the behaviour of villagers? 1. A very little 2. A little 3. Somewhat 4. A great 
extent 5. A very great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Benefiting target group(s) 
(Criterion 7) 
To what extent did the program benefit villagers? 1. A very little 2. A little 3. Somewhat 4. A great extent 5. A very 
great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Efficiency (Criterion 8A) Do you think the government spent the money in the right way in terms of this program? Why? 
Equity (Criterion 8B) Do you think the program was implemented in a way that benefitted everyone equally? 1. A very little 2. A little 3. 
Somewhat 4. A great extent 5. A very great extent; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Appropriateness (Criterion 8C) Do you think the program had identified the most important problem? Yes/No. Why?  
Do you think the program is the appropriateness solution to this problem? Yes/No. Why? 
Attracting support for program 
implementation (Criterion 9) 
What actions did the government take to help this CET program?  
What was your level of support for what government did? 1. Very low 2. Low 3. Average 4. High 5. Very High; ‘Don’t 
know’. Why? 
Policy as program How successful has this program been in terms of what the government did for this CET program? 1. Absolute 
failure 2. Failure > success 3. Success = failure 4. Success > failure 5. Absolute success; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Enhancing electoral 
prospects/reputation (Criterion 10) 
Do you think the program enhanced the government officials’ reputation?  Why?  
Do you think any government officials get promoted as a result of this program? Why? Could you give an example? 
Promotion of government’s 
desired trajectory (Criterion 12) 
Do you think the program was designed with wholehearted commitment to fulfil the obligations to build ecological 
civilization? 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Undecided 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Do you think the program conflicts with other national trajectories? Why? 
Providing political benefits for 
government (Criterion 13) 
Do you support the government more as a result of this program? 1. Much less 2. Somewhat less 3. Unchanged 4. 
Considerably more 5. Much more; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
Overall program evaluation Overall, how successful was this program? 1. Absolute failure 2. Failure > success 3. Success = failure 4. Success > 
failure 5. Absolute success; ‘Don’t know’. Why? 
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 Item Relative Weighting Indicators 
Relative 











20 1. Desired objectives achieved, and desired 
outcome produced 
5 Achieve desired objectives and produce desired 
outcome. 
2. Satisfaction rate of rural population with rural 
environment 
5 ≥95% 
3. Input and output ratio 5 East region (3:1); Middle region (1:1); West region (0.5:1). 
4. Establishment of rural environmental 
protection team 
5 Full-time staff in charge of program implementation 













20 5. Sanitation rate of drinking water 5 =100% 
6. Water source water quality 5 Fulfil quality requirements of water source.  
7. Water source water quality guarantee  5 Water source was effectively protected.  
8.Water source pollution control  5 Pollution sources in drinking water protection areas were treated.  
Domestic 
waste  
10 9. Domestic wastewater disposal rate 3 =100% 
10. Hazard-free treatment rate of domestic waste   3 ≥70％ 
11. Domestic waste facility operation and 
management 
4 Stable operation; Follow-up management, and 
operating expense guaranteed. 
Domestic 
wastewater  
10 12. Domestic wastewater disposal rate  5 ≥60％ 
13. Domestic wastewater disposal facility operation 
and management 
5 Stable operation; Follow-up management, and 





 Item Relative Weighting Indicators 
Relative 




10 14.Livestock and poultry waste comprehensive 
utilization rate (%)  
5 
≥70％ 
15. Livestock and poultry disposal facility operation 
and management  





10 16.Pollution source management  5 Soil and water pollution were effectively controlled or treated.  
17. Pollution control facility operation and 
management  


















15 Meet the requirements of environmental function 
areas or environmental planning; Regional water 
environment improved; Solve problems of rivers and 
ditch ponds, such as black, smelly, clogging. 
19. Air quality 
5 Meet the requirements of environmental function 
areas or environmental planning; Regional air 
environmental quality effectively improved.  
Total  100  100  
Note. National Bureau of Statistics divides 31 provinces in China (including autonomous regions and municipalities) into eastern regions, western regions, 
and middle regions according to economic regions. Beijing belongs to eastern regions, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region belongs to western regions. 
In general, western regions were less developed than eastern regions; Hazard-free treatment of domestic waste refers to sanitary landfill, thermophilic 










Guidelines of the Revised MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework for Domestic Waste Programs  
Key. For indicators 1, 3, and 6, partially meeting one of the requirements gets a 50% score; for indicator 2, less than 50% satisfaction rate gets a 0 score, 
50%-94.9% would be considered partial success and get 4 points, above 95% would get 8 points; for indicators 4 and 5, the calculation was based on the 
actual waste transfer rate, e.g., 23x60% = 13.8. Findings were derived from interviews, on-site observation, and qualitative visual assessments. The MEE 
[2010]136 evaluation framework regulates that the assessment results are divided into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The overall 
corresponding assessment scores are: ≥ 90 = excellent, ≥ 70 - <90 = good, ≥60 - <70 = Fair, and < 60 = poor (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010b). 
 
 N Indicators Relative 
Weighting 
(out of 100) 
















8 Achieve desired 




Qualitative audio and 
visual materials; In-
depth interviews 
Public documents were collected from websites 
and local government offices to provide detailed 
data; Observation and photos were taken to 
indicate if some of the objectives have been met; 
Interviews were conducted and the questions 
overlap with questions asked in Criterion 5 and 6 in 
Appendix A. 




8 ≥95% In-depth interviews How satisfied are you with the condition of the 
rural environment around where you live? (1. Very 
dissatisfied 2. Dissatisfied 3. Neither 4. Satisfied 5. 
Very satisfied; ‘Don’t know’) Please explain your 
answer? 
3 Establishment of 
rural environmental 
protection team 





Public documents were collected from websites 
and local government offices to provide detailed 





Note. The revision index is based on original MEE [2010] 136 Index (Appendix B), of which item 3, 18, and 19 are excluded due to reliability concerns, and 







management hired in 
township. 
charge of program implementation and 
management hired in township? (1. Yes; 2. No; 3 









4 Domestic waste 
transfer rate 
23 =100％ Observation; 
Qualitative audio and 
visual materials 
Observe household waste deposit transportation in 
the morning and evening for two consecutive days, 
each observation took 15 minutes; Observe 
leftover of household waste in the village for two 
consecutive days, each observation depended on 
the size of the village; Observation notes and 
photos were taken. 
5 Hazard-free 
treatment rate of 
domestic waste 
23 ≥70％ Qualitative audio and 
visual materials; In-
depth interviews 
Photos were taken; Interview question: How much 
of the village’s household waste was transported 
and treated in a hazard-free facility? (1. Very little 
2. A little 3. A moderate amount 4. Most of it 5. All 
of it; ‘Don’t know’) Please explain your answer? 
6 Domestic waste 
facility operation 
and management  
30 Stable operation; 
Follow-up management, 
and operating expense 
guaranteed. 
Qualitative audio and 
visual materials; In-
depth interviews 
Photos were taken; Interview question: How well 
do you think the household waste disposal facility 
is operated? (1. Very poorly 2. Poorly 3. Acceptable 
4. Good 5. Very good; ‘Don’t know’) Please explain 
your answer? Was there an approved operating 
budget? (1. Yes; 2. No; 3 Unsure) If ‘no’, why not? 






Guidelines of the Revised MEE [2010] 136 Evaluation Framework for Domestic Wastewater Programs 
Key. For indicators 1, 3, and 5, partially meeting one of the requirements gets a 50% score; for indicator 2, less than 50% satisfaction rate gets a 0 score, 
50%-94.9% would be considered partial success and get 4 points, above 95% would get 8 points; for indicators 4, the calculation was based on the actual 
rate, e.g., 23x60% = 13.8. Findings were derived from interviews, on-site observation, and qualitative visual assessments. The MEE [2010]136 evaluation 
framework regulates that the assessment results are divided into four grades: excellent, good, fair and poor. The overall corresponding assessment scores 
are: ≥ 90 = excellent, ≥ 70 - <90 = good, ≥60 - <70 = Fair, and < 60 = poor (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 2010).   
 
 N Indicators Relative 
Weighting 
(out of 100) 
















8 Achieve desired objectives 










Public documents were collected from websites and 
local government offices to provide detailed data; 
Observation and photos were taken to indicate if some 
of the objectives have been met; Interview questions 
overlap with questions asked in Criterion 5 and 6 in 
Appendix A, methods to get data are same. 




8 ≥95% In-depth 
interviews 
How satisfied are you with the condition of the rural 
environment around where you live?  
(1. Very dissatisfied 2. Dissatisfied 3. Neither 4. 
Satisfied 5. Very satisfied; ‘Don’t know’) 





3 Establishment of 
rural environmental 
protection team 
8 Full-time staff in charge of 
program implementation 






Public documents were collected from websites and 
local government offices to provide detailed data; 
Interview: Were full-time staff in charge of program 
implementation and management hired in township? 
















Public documents were collected from websites and 
local government offices to provide detailed data; 
Interview: How much of your village’s domestic 
wastewater has been diverted to a treatment facility? 
(1. Very little 2. A little 3. A moderate amount 4. Most 
of it 5. All of it; ‘Don’t know’). Do you know how the 






38 Stable operation; Follow-







Public documents were collected from websites and 
local government offices to provide detailed data; 
Interview: How well do you think the domestic 
wastewater disposal facility operated? (1. Very poorly 
2. Poorly 3. Acceptable 4. Good 5. Very good; ‘Don’t 
know’) Please explain your answer? Was there an 
approved operating budget? (1. Yes; 2. No; 3 Unsure) 
If ‘no’, why not? 
Total   100    
Note. The revision index is based on original MEE [2010] 136 Index (Appendix B), of which item 3, 18, and 19 are excluded due to reliability concerns, and 
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